Donald D. Kern, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1012

Donald D. Kern,
Relator,

vs.

New Century Systems Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed March 9, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51477340-5

Donald D. Kern, Maple Grove, Minnesota (pro se relator)

New Century Systems Inc., Otsego, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he was
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment without a good
reason caused by his employer. Relator also asserts that he did not receive a fair hearing.
We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Donald D. Kern was employed by respondent New Century Systems Inc.
from May 10, 2024, to January 13, 2025.1 Kern worked full-time as a service technician.
During the time Kern worked for New Century Systems, the company had policies for
employees to track their time. Technicians were not permitted to clock in for work until
they arrived at their first job site, and they were required to clock out at the end of their last
job. Kern was aware of the policies relating to recording his work hours and knew that he
was not allowed to clock in until he arrived at his first job site.
On January 13, Kern clocked in while he was driving from his home to his first job
site. Kern decided to clock in early because he was receiving work-related phone calls.
Kern did not receive permission from New Century Systems to clock in before arriving at
his first job site. New Century Systems’ service coordinator noticed that Kern had clocked
in before arriving at the first job site and notified Kern’s supervisor. The supervisor called

1 The facts are drawn from the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(a) (2024) (stating that “[t]he Minnesota Court of Appeals must, by writ
of certiorari to the department, review the unemployment law judge’s decision on
reconsideration”).
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Kern to ask why he clocked in before arriving at the job site. According to the supervisor,
Kern became “irritated” and said, “F -ck this place. And f- ck you.” Kern hung up the
phone. A short time later, he called the supervisor back and told his supervisor that he was
quitting. Kern also sent a text message to the service coordinator stating, “I just quit. F -
ck this place.” Kern clocked out of work approximately half an hour later and was paid for
this time. Kern later attempted to withdraw his resignation, but the business owner did not
allow Kern to do so.
Kern applied for unemployment benefits and established an unemployment-benefit
account with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED). DEED issued a determination of ineligibility and Kern appealed.
The ULJ held a de novo hearing and heard testimony from Kern, New Century Systems’
operations manager, Kern’s supervisor, and the service coordinator. The ULJ issued a
decision concluding that Kern was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit
his employment and the evidence did not support a finding that he quit because of a good
reason caused by his employer.
Kern filed a request for reconsideration. The ULJ reconsidered the matter and, in a
written order, modified the original order to include two additional factual findings and to
make more detailed credibility findings. The ULJ determined, however, that none of the
additional evidence or arguments put forth by Kern “cause[d] the ULJ to question the
outcome of the decision.” The ULJ therefore affirmed the prior decision as modified. The
ULJ found “that it was Kern’s decision to end the employment” because Kern “was
dissatisfied with his perception of the working conditions.” The ULJ explained that an
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employee who quits employment is ineligible for benefits unless an exception applies and
noted that one such exception is quitting for a good reason caused by the employer. But
the ULJ determined that Kern did not quit his employment for a good reason caused by
New Century Systems . The ULJ further found that Kern did not give New Century
Systems a reasonable opportunity to correct any perceived adverse working conditions
prior to quitting. The ULJ also denied Kern’s request for a new hearing.
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
Kern challenges the ULJ’s decision determining that he was ineligible to receive
unemployment benefits. When reviewing a ULJ’s decision on reconsideration, we may
affirm the decision or remand for further proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)
(2024). Or we may reverse or modify the ULJ’s decision if the substantial rights of the
relator have been prejudiced because, among other reasons, the decision is made upon
unlawful procedure, affected by an error of law, or not supported by substantial evi dence
in the record. Id., subd. 7(d)(3)-(5). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Posey v. Securitas
Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). We
review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision.
Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016). And t hese findings
will not be disturbed “as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to
sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011).
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Kern raises several arguments on appeal. First, Kern asserts that the ULJ erred by
determining that he quit his employment without a good reason caused by his employer.
Second, Kern challenges the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Third, Kern claims he did
not receive a fair hearing because the ULJ was biased against him. We address each
argument in turn.
I. The ULJ did not err by determining that Kern was ineligible for
unemployment benefits.

Kern does not dispute that he quit his employment. Instead, Kern argues that the
ULJ erred by determining that Kern is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he
quit his employment without a good reason caused by his employer. We are not persuaded.
The ULJ determined that Kern quit his employment “because he was dissatisfied
with his perception of the working conditions.” Eligibility for unemployment benefits is
governed by Minnesota Statutes section 268.095 (2024). An applicant for unemployment
benefits is ineligible for benefits if they quit their employment unless an exception applies.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1. One such exception exists when “the applicant quit the
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). To qualify
for this exception, the “good reason” must be (1) “directly related to the employment and
for which the employer is responsible”; (2) “ adverse” to the employee; and (3) one “that
would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than
remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a). “The standard of what constitutes good
cause to quit is whether the reason was compelling, real and not imaginary, substantial and
not trifling, reasonable and not whimsical or capricious.” Trego v. Hennepin Cty. Fam.
6
Day Care Ass’n, 409 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted). Further, an
applicant subject to adverse working conditions “must complain to the employer and give
the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before
that may be a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 3(c).
Whether the ULJ’s factual findings establish that the applicant meets a statutory
exception to ineligibility for quitting employment is a question of law, which we review
de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
The reason for which an employee quit their employment is a question of fact for the ULJ
to determine. Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. App. 1986).
The determination that an employee did not have a good reason to quit must be based on
factual findings supported by substantial evidence. Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., Inc.,
720 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Minn. App. 2006).
Here, the ULJ found that “technicians were not allowed to clock in for work until
they arrived at the first job site.” The ULJ also found that “Kern knew and understood the
policy for recording his work hours ,” but clocked in while driving to his first job site on
the day in question. The ULJ noted that “[t]he evidence does not support that [Kern] was
subjected to any adverse working conditions.” The ULJ further noted that Kern did not
give New Century Systems “a reasonable opportunity to correct any perceived or actual
working conditions” before quitting. For these reasons, the ULJ concluded that Kern did
not quit due to a good reason caused by his employer.
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The record supports the ULJ’s findings. New Century Systems’ witnesses testified
that technicians were not permitted to clock in until they arrived at their first job site. The
ULJ found that Kern quit “because he was frustrated with being asked why he was not
complying with the policy for clocking in and no longer wanted to work for the employer.”
Simply being frustrated or dissatisfied with working conditions is not a good reason to quit
caused by the employer. Portz v. Pipestone Skelgas, 397 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. App. 1986)
(explaining that the “phrase ‘good cause attributable to the employer’ does not encompass
situations . . . where the employee is simply frustrated or dissatisfied with his working
conditions”); see also Ryks v. Nieuwsma Livestock Equip., 410 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn.
App. 1987) (stating that “mere dissatisfaction with working conditions” does not establish
good cause). And Kern has not shown that New Century Systems’ clock-in policy would
compel an average, reasonable worker to quit. We therefore discern no error in the ULJ’s
determination that Kern did not quit his employment due to adverse working conditions.
Further, it is uncontested that Kern did not give New Century Systems a reasonable
opportunity to correct any adverse conditions before quitting. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 3(c). There is no evidence that Kern spoke to New Century Systems’ management
regarding his concerns or gave New Century Systems an opportunity to address his
concerns before quitting. Thus, even assuming Kern was subject to adverse working
conditions, he did not afford New Century Systems a reasonable opportunity to correct the
conditions he thought were adverse as required for those adverse conditions to be a good
reason to quit under section 268.095, subdivision 3(c).
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For these reasons, we conclude that the ULJ did not err in determining that Kern
quit his employment without a good reason caused by his employer.
II. The ULJ’s credibility determinations do not warrant reversal.
Kern argues that New Century Systems’ witnesses misstated or misrepresented the
policies related to compensation. He further asserts that the ULJ did not understand the
“nuance” of Kern’s testimony related to his workday. We construe these arguments as a
challenge to the ULJ’s credibility determinations underlying its factual findings.
“Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ.” Bangtson v. Allina
Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). “When the
parties have presented conflicting evidence on the record, [an appellate court] must defer
to the [ULJ’s] ability to weigh the evidence.” Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc.,
529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995).
Kern objects to the ULJ’s credibility assessments. When a ULJ relies heavily upon
a witness’s credibility in reaching a decision, the ULJ “must set out the reason for crediting
or discrediting” the witness’s testimony. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a (2024). The ULJ
followed that requirement here. In its decision on reconsideration, the ULJ made detailed
findings discussing the credibility of the witnesses. The ULJ found that the testimony
presented by New Century Systems’ witnesses “was credible because it was logical,
consistent, based on first-hand knowledge, and supported, to an extent, by Kern’ s
testimony.” By contrast, the ULJ found that Kern’s testimony was entitled to less weight
“because it was inconsistent with his admission to facts against his interest and contradicted
by written evidence and testimony in the record.”
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The decision on reconsideration shows that the ULJ “set out the reason for crediting
or discrediting” the witness testimony. Id. And, on balance, the ULJ credited the testimony
of New Century Systems’ witnesses over Kern’s testimony. We defer to these credibility
determinations and decline to reweigh them on appeal. See Whitehead, 529 N.W.2d at 352.
III. Kern received a fair hearing.
Kern also seeks to reverse the ULJ’s decision on the grounds that he did not receive
a fair hearing. Kern claims that the ULJ did not assist him in developing the record. And
he further contends that the ULJ interrupted Kern while Kern was questioning a witness.
We are not persuaded by either argument.
Development of the Record
Kern argues that he did not have a fair hearing because documents in New Century
Systems’ possession, including Kern’s payroll records, were not entered into evidence
during the hearing. The ULJ “must exercise control over the hearing procedure in a manner
that protects the parties’ rights to a fair hearing,” must “ensure that all relevant facts are
clearly and fully developed,” and must “assist all parties in the presentation of evidence.”
Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2023); see also White v. Univ. of Minn. Physicians Corp.,
875 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Minn. App. 2016) (stating the ULJ has a “duty to assist” parties
with the proper development of the record). However, the ULJ is not the attorney for an
unrepresented party and must “maintain neutrality to assure fairness to all parties.”
Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2012).
Here, the record shows that the ULJ assisted the parties in presenting evidence to
ensure that the record was fully developed. At the beginning of the hearing, the ULJ
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accepted five exhibits into evidence. The parties did not object to the exhibits or seek to
submit any additional materials. To the extent Kern believes additional exhibits should
have been submitted, the record does not show that he raised that concern to the ULJ. And
we do not presume error on appeal. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65
(Minn. 1944) (stating that error is not presumed on appeal and the aggrieved party bears
the burden of demonstrating error). On this record, we are satisfied that the ULJ fulfilled
the obligation of assisting the parties in developing the record while maintaining neutrality
and ensuring fairness to both parties.
Questioning a Witness
Kern also contends that he did not receive a fair hearing because the ULJ interrupted
Kern while Kern was questioning a witness. A hearing is generally considered fair if the
parties are allowed to give statements, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and offer and
object to exhibits. See Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 529-30
(Minn. App. 2007); see also Minn. R. 3310.2921 (noting that the proceeding is an
“evidence gathering inquiry” during which the parties may examine and cross-examine
witnesses, offer documents and exhibits, and raise objections). Yet the ULJ “may exclude
any evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, or unduly repetitious.” Minn. R.
3310.2922 (2023).
At the hearing, Kern was given an opportunity to cross-examine New Century
Systems’ witnesses. During Kern’s cross-examination of the operations manager, Kern
stated that he did not have any questions and instead tried to respond to the testimony of
the operations manager. The ULJ interrupted Kern and stated, “Hold on, sir. You’re
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responding. It’s not a question. I’m not hearing any arguments.” Kern then asked the
operations manager why the company accepted Kern’s resignation. The ULJ interrupted
to ask a clarifying question, which the witness answered. On review, the record shows that
the ULJ interrupted Kern to prevent Kern from testifying out of order and from asking
repetitive or argumentative questions. The record as a whole demonstrates that Kern was
able to testify, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and offer and object to exhibits. See
Ywswf, 726 N.W.2d at 529-30 (noting that a hearing is generally considered fair if both
parties are afforded these opportunities). Further, Kern does not explain how the ULJ’s
interjections prejudiced him. See id. at 530 (recognizing that an appellate court will not
reverse for evidentiary errors that do not prejudice the relator). We therefore conclude that
the ULJ’s questions to the witness did not deprive Kern of a fair hearing.
Affirmed.