State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1137

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deionte Jaewon Parker,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Chutich, Judge*

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-8801

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Tara Reese Duginske, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Chutich,
Judge.

* Retired justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724,
subd. 3 (2024).
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Deionte Jaewon Parker challenges his convictions of second-degree
intentional murder and unlawful firearm possession. He contends that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing respondent State of Minnesota to introduce evidence of prior incidents. Because
sufficient evidence supports Parker’s convictions and the district court acted within its
discretion in its evidentiary rulings, we affirm.
FACTS
Parker’s convictions stem from an October 2023 shooting at a house party that left
one person dead and three others, including Parker, injured. We begin by addressing two
incidents that occurred before the October shooting that were admitted as evidence at trial
and are at issue in this appeal.
July 15 Altercation
On July 15, 2023, two groups of people were involved in an altercation outside the
Red Carpet, a nightclub in St. Cloud. Two participants are related to Parker, and one of
these relatives was stabbed during the altercation. Witness #1— one of the October
shooting victims—was present during the July 15 altercation and is friends with the person
alleged to have stabbed Parker’s relative. Witness #1 is also friends with the person who
died in the October shooting (the victim). The state presented evidence that Parker was
aware of the July 15 stabbing of his relative.

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October 15 Encounter
On October 15, 2023, one week before the house-party shooting, the victim was
present at the Red Carpet with another person. Parker was also present and encountered
the victim inside the Red Carpet. The two began talking. One witness described this
conversation as not “like a friendly talk” but not “aggressive.” Parker and the victim
walked outside of the Red Carpet together and continued talking. A witness testified that
he “got in between” the two men to keep them from fighting. The state introduced a
surveillance video, which a law enforcement officer testified showed Parker enter a
shooting stance and point finger guns at the victim. The two eventually went off in separate
directions without further interaction.
October 22 Shooting
On October 22, 2023, a woman (the host) held a party at her St. Cloud residence.
Guests began arriving at around 3:00 a.m. Many persons attended the party, with one
witness remarking that “[h]alf of St. Cloud” was there.
Before the party, surveillance video at a gas station captured an image of Parker. In
the video, he is shown as having a beard and wearing a red hooded sweatshirt, blue jeans,
and black shoes.
Parker does not dispute that he was at the party that night. The victim and witness
#1 were also at the party. Witness #1 testified that he called Parker over to him to introduce
himself and address rumors about the July 15 altercation. Parker asked witness #1 whether
he stabbed anyone during that incident. Witness #1 testified that, at some point during the
interaction, Parker pointed a firearm at his chest. Witness #1 stated that he pushed Parker’s
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wrist down to get the weapon away from his chest. Parker walked away some time after.
The victim, witness #1, and Parker were all inside the home during this encounter, but the
victim was not part of this conversation.
At trial, witness #1 was unable to recall what Parker was wearing at the party.
Witness #1 testified on cross-examination that he (witness #1) was wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt and black pants at the party. On redirect examination, however, he agreed that
whatever he was wearing when transported to the hospital was what he was wearing at the
party. He further agreed that if there was not a red hooded sweatshirt present at the hospital,
he probably was not wearing it at the party. An officer testified that witness #1 was wearing
a white shirt when taken to the hospital.
Witness #2, who was standing by the door, testified that there was a commotion
inside and several persons were “told to take it outside.” Witness #2 testified that the first
of these people to go outside was a tall man with dreadlocks who was wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt. Witness #2 first met this man the previous day. Witness #2 later found the
Facebook profile of this person and that profile was later linked to Parker. Witness #2
stated that the man in the red hooded sweatshirt was clutching a firearm in his pocket. She
testified that she saw the “butt” of the gun.
Witness #2 further testified that, as the man walked outside, he said “to pretty much
everybody that was behind him,” “Y’all can die too.” According to witness #2, the victim
and witness #1 walked outside after Parker. Witness #2 stated that witness #1 wore a red
sweatshirt.
5
The host was standing by the front door, collecting entry fees from guests. She
testified that the victim, whom she knew, left the house to smoke a cigarette. She stated
that, shortly after the victim walked outside, a man with dreadlocks, wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt, stepped outside. The host did not know this person. That person told the host
that he was coming back, and he then walked over to a white car. Surveillance video at the
gas station showed that Parker was riding in a white car with three friends before the
shooting. And after the shooting, the police found a letter addressed to Parker in the white
car.
Contrary to witness #2’s testimony, the host testified that the person with dreadlocks
was the only person she saw at the party that night who was wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt. A law enforcement officer also testified that he reviewed a recording of a call
in which Parker stated that he was the only person wearing a red hooded sweatshirt that
night.
The host testified that she saw the man in the red hooded sweatshirt walk back from
the white car toward the victim, who was standing on a small hill in front of her house.
According to the host, the two men were facing each other when the man in the red hooded
sweatshirt “cocked [a] gun back.” The host, however, stated that she did not actually see
a gun. She saw only a dark item in the man’s hand and saw the man make a sliding motion
that she understood to be cocking a gun back. She then heard the victim say, “I don’t give
a f--k about none of that sh-t.” The host testified that she was “scared” and immediately
backed up from the doorway into her house. She further testified, “And once I backed up,
6
that’s when I heard the gun go off.” The host did not see the actual shooting. Witness #2
similarly did not observe the shooting.
Witness #1’s testimony also addressed the immediate lead-up to the shooting. After
the interaction with Parker, witness #1 went outside. Witness #1 was standing close to the
door, facing the back of the victim, who was about five to seven steps ahead of witness #1.
Witness #1 observed someone in a red sweatshirt walking toward the victim and stated that
the victim appeared to be fighting someone. Witness #1 was not sure whether this person
was the same person who had allegedly pointed a gun at him earlier. Witness #1 then heard
gunfire and ran into the house. While in the house, witness #1 realized that he had been
shot in the leg. He heard continued gunfire while he was in the house.
A different witness, witness #3, observed a portion of the shooting. Witness #3 was
standing close to the street, near a car that was in front of the house. Witness #3 testified
that he observed a person firing gunshots toward the house. According to witness #3, this
person was standing “[k]ind of close to [him],” near the sidewalk, when the shooting
occurred.
Residential surveillance video captured Parker and others running from the scene of
the shooting on foot. One person appeared to be carrying a handgun, and Parker was not
wearing the black shoes depicted in the gas-station surveillance video.
Emergency personnel responded to the scene of the shooting. The victim sustained
numerous gunshot wounds and died at the scene. Witness #1 was transported to a hospital
with a leg wound. A third person was shot. Parker, who had left the scene and did not
seek medical treatment, additionally sustained a gunshot wound to his leg.
7
Post-shooting Investigation
A subsequent law-enforcement investigation gave more insight into the shooting.
At least six different firearms were used in the shooting, firing at least 50 bullets. Six
cartridge casings were connected to a pistol found in the kitchen of the home. DNA testing
linked this pistol to witness #1. Law enforcement recovered one firearm near the victim,
in front of the host’s home, and testing linked that firearm to five cartridge casings. DNA
testing could not exclude the victim as a possible DNA contributor. A third firearm, found
on the roof of a nearby house, was linked to seven cartridge casings. DNA testing
connected that firearm to another person, A.W. Ammunition components were linked to
several firearms that were never recovered.
Critical to the state’s theory of the case is a firearm referred to as a Taurus G3c 9mm
Luger. Five cartridge casings found at the shooting were linked to this firearm. Four of
these cartridge casings were located near a black shoe. These items were found near the
sidewalk on the front side of the house. DNA testing of the shoe revealed a major male
DNA profile that matched Parker. But the firearm itself was not recovered until July 2024,
many months after the October 2023 shooting. Law-enforcement officers recovered the
firearm following a domestic dispute in St. Louis Park. Parker’s uncle had at one time
owned the firearm. Testing of this firearm excluded Parker as a DNA contributor.
An autopsy showed that the victim sustained 18 gunshot wounds. Four bullets were
recovered from the victim’s body. A Bureau of Criminal Apprehension report stated that
these bullets “were identified as having been fired by the same firearm or different firearms
manufactured by the same tool in a similar state of wear.” This report states that these
8
bullets are “consistent with a .40 full metal jacket bullet.” The cartridge casings found near
the black shoe connected by DNA testing to Parker are 9 mm caliber.
In a recorded phone call a few weeks after the shooting, Parker said that he was
nearby listening when law-enforcement officers went to a friend’s house inquiring about
Parker’s whereabouts. Parker said that, as soon as the officers left, he “got the f--k up out
of dodge.”
Parker’s stepmother testified that, a few days after she found out about the shooting,
she picked Parker up from Minneapolis and drove him to St. Cloud. Parker’s stepmother
saw a wound on his leg, and Parker explained that he injured himself in a fire and “a stick
had lodged in his leg.” Law-enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for her car and
recovered various medical supplies, including hydrogen peroxide, pain medication, gauze,
and antiseptic liquid.
Law enforcement also investigated phone records associated with Parker. Between
4:11 a.m. and 7:02 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, there were 13 phone calls made
between Parker’s phone and another person’s phone. Parker apparently arrived at the party
in that person’s car, accompanied by that person. Law enforcement additionally executed
a search warrant at Parker’s home, where they recovered a Glock gun case, a single 9 mm
Luger bullet, and a Remington Luger 9 mm case that was missing some bullets. No
firearms were recovered during this search.
Legal Proceedings
The state charged Parker by amended complaint with: (1) aiding and abetting
second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2022);
9
(2) second-degree assault related to the allegation that he pointed a firearm at witness #1,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2022); and (3) unlawful possession of a
firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b) (2022).
The state filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence of the July 15 and October
15 incidents as Spreigl evidence.1 Parker objected to the admission of evidence of those
incidents. Because the July 15 altercation did not involve acts by Parker, the district court
did not admit it as Spreigl evidence; rather, it deemed the evidence admissible as relevant
evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 402 and 403. The district court additionally deemed
admissible the evidence of the October 15 encounter as Spreigl evidence.
The district court held a six-day jury trial in February and March 2025. At trial, the
state presented evidence of the July 15 and October 15 incidents, and Parker stipulated that
he was ineligible to possess a firearm. The jury found Parker guilty of second-degree
intentional murder and unlawful firearm possession but found him not guilty of second-
degree assault. The district court entered convictions on both counts on which the jury
found Parker guilty. The court sentenced him to 480 months in prison for the murder
and
a concurrent 60-month sentence for the firearm offense. This appeal followed.

1 The term “Spreigl evidence” takes its name from State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.
1965). Spreigl evidence, codified under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), refers to “evidence of
another crime, wrong, or act.” State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2014)
(quoting Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)).
10
DECISION
I. The state presented sufficient evidence to sustain Parker’s convictions.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction of second-
degree intentional murder and unlawful firearm possession , Parker argues that the
circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that he did not kill the
victim, as a principal or an accomplice, or possess a firearm.
We begin by addressing the elements of second-degree intentional murder.
Although the jury instructions allowed the jury to find Parker guilty as a principal or as an
accomplice, we focus our analysis on whether the state provided sufficient evidence of
Parker’s guilt as a principal. See State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407-08 (Minn. 2020)
(explaining that, because aiding and abetting is a theory of liability rather than a separate
substantive offense, courts need not rely on this theory when a defendant commits the act
as a principal). As relevant here, f or Parker to be convicted of second-degree intentional
murder as a principal, the state was required to prove that Parker “cause[d] the death of
[the victim ] with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without
premeditation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1).
Regarding the intent element, “with intent to” means “the actor either has a purpose
to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause
that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2022). “Intent is a state of mind, which
generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both
before and after the incident.” State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 552 (Minn. 2023) (quotation
omitted). A jury can infer that the actor “intends the natural and probable consequences of
11
his actions.” Id. (quotations omitted). A jury can likewise infer intent based on the nature
of the killing, the shooter’s words and actions before and after the shooting, and the use of
a deadly weapon. See State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2023) (nature of
killing); Stiles v. State, 664 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003) (words and actions);
State v. Geshick, 168 N.W.2d 331 , 332 (Minn. 1969) (deadly weapon). Regarding the
causation requirement, “the State must prove the defendant’s acts were a substantial causal
factor leading to the death.” State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 146 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted).
Standard of Review
Appellate review of sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges depends on whether the
evidence underlying a conviction is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024). “[ D]irect evidence is evidence that is
based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). In contrast, circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the fact[-]finder
can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Because the state did not provide direct evidence of Parker’s guilt of second-degree
intentional murder (e.g., testimony from a witness who directly observed Parker shoot at
and strike the victim), we apply the circumstantial-evidence test. See Segura, 2 N.W.3d at
155.
Appellate courts apply a two-step test for assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence underlying a conviction. State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026).
12
First, appellate courts “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all
questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of facts that
constitute the circumstances proved.’” Id. (quoting Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600).
This winnowing process recognizes that “the jury is uniquely positioned to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence, and that jurors may accept some parts of a
witness’s testimony while rejecting others.” Id. at 480. Relatedly, this test does not mean
that “any fact that is hypothetically consistent with the verdict must be included in the
circumstances proved regardless of the jury’s unique position to determine the credibility
of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 479. An inference from evidence
is not a circumstance proved, meaning that “inference[s] should never be included in the
first step of the circumstantial-evidence test.” Id. at 483.
At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test, appellate courts “consider
whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when
viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. In
doing so, appellate courts “do not defer to the fact[-]finder but examine the reasonableness
of the inferences” independently. Id. (quotation omitted). Evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction “[i]f the circumstances proved when viewed as a whole, support a
reasonable inference that is inconsistent with guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). Appellate
courts will not, however, “reverse a conviction based on mere conjecture.” Id. (quotation
omitted).

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Circumstances Proved
Consistent with Firkus, we begin by winnowing down the evidence, resolving
factual disputes in favor of the verdict. See id. at 489. The circumstances proved are as
follows:
• On July 15, Parker’s relative was stabbed in an altercation at which the
victim’s friend, witness #1, was present. Parker was aware of the incident,
and rumors had been circulating about this stabbing.

• On October 15, a week before the shooting, Parker and the victim had an
encounter at the Red Carpet. The two were engaged in not “friendly talk,”
and Parker went into a shooting stance and pointed “finger guns” at the
victim.

• On October 22, Parker attended a house party. Before the shooting, he was
observed at a gas station in a white car. After the shooting, a letter addressed
to Parker was found in a white car owned by Parker’s friend.

• Before the shooting, surveillance video showed that Parker was wearing a
red hooded sweatshirt and black shoes. He was the only person wearing a
red hooded sweatshirt at the party.

• The victim and witness #1 were also at the party.

• Witness #1 spoke with a person at the party about the July 15 altercation.2

• There was a commotion inside the house, and several persons were “told to
take it outside.”

• Witness #2 observed a person in a red hooded sweatshirt, whom she later
identified as Parker, leave the house. She saw the “butt” of a firearm in his
pocket. Parker is ineligible to possess a firearm. As Parker headed outside,
he said, “Y’all can die too.” The victim and witness #1 additionally left the
house.

2 Because the jury found Parker not guilty of second-degree assault, we do not include as
a circumstance proved that he pointed a gun at witness #1.
14
• The host observed a man in a red hooded sweatshirt leave her house. This
person said that he was coming back. He went to a white car parked on the
street and then walked back towards the house and the victim.

• As he approached the victim, the man in the red hooded sweatshirt made a
motion that the host believed to be “cock[ing] [a] gun back.” The victim
stated, “I don’t give a f--k about none of that sh-t.” These events caused the
host to back up into her house, and she then heard a gun go off.

• Shortly thereafter, approximately 50 gunshots were fired. Witness #3 saw a
shooter fire from near the sidewalk in front of the house.

• At least four people sustained gunshot wounds. The victim sustained 18
gunshot wounds and died at the scene of the shooting. Each of the gunshot
wounds contributed to the victim’s death. It is not possible to tell from the
victim’s wounds what position the victim was in when the shooting occurred.

• Residential video footage captured Parker running from the scene of the
shooting. The footage showed that Parker was not wearing the black shoes
following the shooting.

• At least six different firearms were used in the shooting. One of these
firearms was linked to witness #1, one of these firearms was linked to the
victim, and one of these firearms was linked to A.W.

• Four discharged cartridge casings were located near a black shoe. DNA
testing of this shoe revealed a major male DNA profile belonging to Parker.
These four cartridge casings were linked to a firearm owned at some point in
time by Parker’s uncle.

• In the hours immediately following the shooting, 13 phone calls were made
between Parker’s phone and the phone of a person with whom he was seen
before the party. In a phone call with another person a few weeks after the
shooting, Parker stated that he was nearby listening when law enforcement
asked a friend about Parker’s whereabouts. As soon as the officers left,
Parker got “the f--k up out of dodge.” Parker left St. Cloud and went to
Minneapolis.

• A few days after the shooting, Parker’s stepmother drove him from
Minneapolis to St. Cloud. Parker told her that he was injured by fire and a
stick, but bullet fragments were later removed from Parker’s leg. Parker did
not go to the hospital for his injury, and law enforcement recovered various
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medical supplies from his stepmother’s car , including hydrogen peroxide,
pain medication, gauze, and antiseptic liquid.

Applying the Circumstantial-Evidence Test

Having identified the circumstances proved, we next address whether they are
consistent with guilt. See id. at 478, 483. As stated above, the state was required to prove
that Parker “cause[d] the death of [the victim] with intent to effect the death of that person
or another, but without premeditation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1).
A. The circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.
We conclude that the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt. Regarding the
acts that occurred before the shooting, the circumstances proved show that, just one week
before the shooting, Parker and the victim had an encounter in which Parker pointed “finger
guns” at the victim. Parker attended the party at which the shooting occurred and was the
only person wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. At the party, Parker was observed possessing
a firearm. While heading outside shortly before the shooting started, he said to the persons
behind him, “Y’all can die too.” The host saw Parker walk ing toward the victim and
making a motion that the host described as cocking a gun just seconds before the first shot
was fired, which raises a reasonable inference that Parker approached the victim, prepared
to use a firearm, and then fired it.
3 Witness #3 stated that he observed a person shooting

3 Based on the circumstance proved that Parker was the only person wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt, as well as the host’s testimony that she saw a person in a red sweatshirt walking
toward the victim, and witness #2 later showing to law enforcement a Facebook profile
that she identified as belonging to Parker, and which law enforcement connected to Parker,
the only reasonable inference is that the person that confronted the victim outside of the
house party was Parker.
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by the sidewalk, a location consistent with where the black shoe was found. Based on the
DNA testing of the shoe and the descriptions of Parker’s attire, the only reasonable
inference is that Parker wore this black shoe at the party. Many gunshots were fired, and
the victim died after sustaining 18 gunshot wounds. Four cartridge casings were found by
Parker’s shoe, and those casings were linked to a firearm at some point in time owned by
Parker’s uncle, raising an inference that Parker used that firearm—a deadly weapon —and
fired at least four times at the victim. Another cartridge casing was found in the direction
that Parker likely fled. Parker learned that law-enforcement officers were looking for him
and then got “the f--k up out of dodge,” leaving St. Cloud. Parker did not go to the hospital
despite sustaining a gunshot wound.
Considered as a whole, the circumstances proved allowed the jury to reasonably
conclude that Parker (1) had a motive to harm the victim based on the July 15 altercation,
as evidenced by the October 15 encounter; (2) threatened partygoers by stating “Y’all can
die too” shortly before the shooting began; (3) possessed a gun; (4) fired the gun at the
victim at least four times from fairly close range; and (5) was conscious of guilt, as shown
by his decision to flee and avoid going to a hospital. See State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480,
485 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that “evidence of flight suggests consciousness of guilt ”).
Accordingly, the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt, meaning that they are
consistent with a conclusion that Parker intended to cause the victim’s death and, by
shooting the victim, Parker was a substantial factor in causing the death.

17
B. The circumstances proved are not consistent with a reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.

We next address whether the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt. Parker argues that there is a reasonable alternative hypothesis
that he did not cause the death of the victim with intent to do so.
To support this argument, Parker contends that it is not even a “circumstance
proved” that he possessed a gun that night and that a witness’s observation that he “cocked”
a gun is inconsistent with the hand motion required before firing a firearm. He additionally
raises several inferences from the forensic evidence that he claims show that another
shooter caused the victim’s death.
Specifically, he contends that several cartridge casings found near the victim’s body
were from a firearm linked to A.W. ; that those casings were in a position consistent with
the victim’s gunshot wounds; that three wounds to the right of the victim’s body are
inconsistent with the sharper angle from which the cartridge casing s from the gun that
Parker allegedly possessed were found; and that 18 cartridge casing s from an unknown
firearm were found in a location consistent with the position of the straight backward
gunshot wounds that the victim sustained in his torso. He also notes that, based on the
location of the cartridge casings in relation to the shoe linked to Parker, the gunshots from
the firearm that Parker was alleged to have used could only have been fired directly west,
rather than southwest toward the victim.
Parker further argues that flight is not conclusive evidence of guilt. Finally, he
claims that admission of evidence from the July 15 and October 15 incidents shed no light
18
on his motive or intent. Parker asserts that he did not know who stabbed his cousin; that
there is no reason that, after the stabbing, he would shoot a friend of witness #1 rather than
witness #1 himself; and that he did not make a shooting gesture during the October 15
encounter.
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances proved here, we conclude that the
circumstances proved are not consistent with a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
First, contrary to Parker’s assertion, we conclude that it is a circumstance proved that
Parker possessed a gun that night. He maintains that witness #2 and the host testified that
they never saw a gun in the possession of the person in the red hooded sweatshirt. Witness
#2 clearly testified, however, that she did see this person with a gun in his pocket shortly
before the shooting, and she later identified Parker as the person wearing a red hooded
sweatshirt and possessing a gun from his Facebook account and at trial. Her only confusion
at trial stemmed from how to refer to the portion of the firearm that she observed,
describing it as the “end” or “butt.”
Similarly, although the host did not see the actual gun, she did see the person in the
red hooded sweatshirt “cock” a dark item that appeared to be a gun as he approached the
victim, just seconds before the first shot rang out. Moreover, a firearm that Parker’s uncle
owned was involved in the shooting and four discharged casings from that gun were located
near where Parker’s shoe was found at the crime scene. A fifth casing was found north of
the house, in the direction that Parker fled after the shooting. These circumstances proved
make Parker’s assertion that he did not possess or fire a gun that night an unreasonable
inference.
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Regarding the presence of other shooters, we note that, although gunshots from at
least one other firearm struck the victim, 4 that other gunshot wounds might have
contributed to his death does not mean that the bullets that Parker fired were not a
substantial factor in causing the victim’s death. The circumstances proved show that no
one specific gunshot fired from any particular gun killed the victim; rather, each of the 18
gunshot wounds that the victim sustained contributed to his death. In addition, given the
testimony of the host and witness #3 about their observations, the circumstances proved
suggest that Parker was the first shooter.
We turn to Parker’s argument that the location and trajectory of the victim’s gunshot
wounds are inconsistent with the location in which he was alleged to have shot the victim.
Parker’s theory relies on the unreasonable assumption that the victim was only facing north
and parallel to the house when he was shot. In fact, testimony from the host suggested
otherwise, as she testified that the victim was facing Parker when Parker walked from the
street toward the victim and the house.
5 In addition, the medical examiner testified that it
was not possible to determine where the victim was positioned before and during the
shooting.

4 The four bullets recovered from the victim’s body appear to be from a different caliber
firearm than the Taurus G3c 9mm Luger that was connected to Parker. Given the many
entry and exit wounds on the victim’s body, some of the bullets that struck the victim exited
his body, meaning that the four bullets that remained in the victim’s body could not be a
basis to exclude Parker as a shooter.

5 Exhibits show that this street is on the east side of the house.
20
Parker additionally argues that the orientation of the shooter must have matched the
orientation of the black shoe, which was found pointing west, meaning that the shooter
could not have been shooting southwest at the victim. This hypothesis, however, is
untenable for two reasons: (1) it assumes that the shooter’s torso was facing the same
direction as the black shoe when shots were fired; and (2) it assumes that the black shoe
that Parker left behind remained pointed directly west during the entirety of the shooting
and was not turned or moved when Parker fled or during the immediate aftermath of the
chaotic shooting and emergency response.
Parker’s theory does not establish a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt.
See Firkus, 31 N.W.2d at 483. That Parker’s DNA was not found on the Taurus G3c 9mm
Luger is not material given the large gap in time between the October 2023 shooting and
the July 2024 recovery of the firearm. Nor is the absence of bullet fragments in the victim’s
body tied to Parker’s firearm meaningful given the number of exit wounds in the victim’s
body. Additionally, Parker’s arguments regarding the angles of bullets shot from the
Taurus G3c 9mm Luger are unavailing because the premises upon which they rely—an
unmoved shoe that is aligned with the shooter’s torso when shots were fired and a
completely stationary shooting victim who was facing north —are implausible when
considering the totality of the circumstances proved.
Notably, at the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we review the
circumstances proved “as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts.” Id. The
circumstances proved as a whole show that Parker made a threatening gesture at the victim
in the days before the shooting; possessed a gun on the night of the shooting; threatened
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others at the party with death before leaving the house; approached the victim and was seen
cocking what appeared to be a gun just seconds before the first shot was fired; fled the
location of the shooting and, later, the city, without receiving medical aid for his gunshot
wounds. The circumstances proved further include the presence of cartridge casings linked
to the firearm owned by Parker’s uncle, which were found by the black shoe linked by
DNA and surveillance video to Parker. When considered as a whole, the only reasonable
inference is that Parker fired five shots from the firearm owned by his uncle and these shots
were a substantial factor in causing the victim’s death. These circumstances proved,
reviewed in their totality, do not support a rational inference inconsistent with guilt.
In sum, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Parker’s conviction for
second-degree intentional murder as a principal. Given this result, which requires a
conclusion that the act was carried out using a firearm, and Parker’s stipulation that he is
ineligible to possess a firearm, we likewise conclude that sufficient evidence supports
Parker’s unlawful-firearm-possession conviction.
II. The district court acted within its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Parker next challenges the district court’s decision to allow the state to introduce
evidence of the July 15 and October 15 incidents.
Appellate courts “will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). In making an evidentiary
ruling, a district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d
124, 134 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). As the party claiming error, Parker bears “the
22
burden of showing both the error and the prejudice resulting from the error.” Holt v. State,
772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
July 15 Altercation
Parker first challenges the district court’s decision to allow the state to present
evidence of the July 15 altercation in which his relative was allegedly stabbed in the
presence of witness #1, who was a friend of both the October shooting victim and the
person alleged to have stabbed Parker’s relative. Parker argues that the altercation was
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because neither he nor the victim were involved. Rather,
he asserts that “[i]t involved persons unknown to Parker assaulting [Parker’s] cousin,” and
that Parker did not know who was involved. In support, he cites witness #1’s testimony
that Parker asked him if he, witness #1, stabbed the relative. Parker adds that there was no
mention that the victim was connected to persons involved in the altercation.
Although the state initially sought to introduce the July 15 altercation as Spreigl
evidence, the evidence was ultimately admitted under evidentiary rules governing the
general admissibility of relevant evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 402, 403. Relevant
evidence is ordinarily admissible, Minn. R. Evid. 402, but it “may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence ,” Minn. R. Evid. 403. Evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401.
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The bar for relevance is not high as “Rule 401 adopts a minimal relevancy
approach.” State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 631 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
Regarding the risk of unfair prejudice, “the term prejudice in Rule 403 does not mean the
damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the
evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn.
2014) (quotation omitted).
In granting the state’s motion, the district court explained that the July 15 incident
is admissible under rules 402 and 403 because it could “be offered to demonstrate
[Parker’s] motive in the case at hand.” The district court explained that Parker’s “relatives
were assaulted and stabbed, which occurred while [Parker] was in custody, and the State
asserts that it has evidence that [Parker] was informed about this incident.”
Although Parker is correct that the July 15 altercation did not involve him, his
absence from that event does not make it irrelevant. The state’s theory was that the
altercation provided motivation explaining why Parker wanted to get back at witness #1
and his friends for assaulting Parker’s relatives. At trial, the state presented evidence that
the person stabbed that day was Parker’s relative and that Parker knew about the
altercation. The evidence of the July 15 altercation therefore helps establish that Parker
may have had a desire to retaliate against the person who had stabbed his relative and that
person’s associates.
Parker emphasizes that the state failed to present evidence that Parker knew who
was involved in the July 15 altercation or that he knew whether the shooting victim was
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associated with any of these persons. He cites as support testimony from witness #1 who
said that Parker asked him whether he, witness #1, was involved and had stabbed his
relative. Witness #1 testified, however, that there were “a lot of rumors going on” about
the July 15 stabbing and that he approached the person in the red hooded sweatshirt at the
house party to “clear the rumors up.” From that testimony, it could be reasonably inferred
that Parker already had an idea about who was involved in the July 15 episode and who
were their associates.
Regarding rule 403’s balancing requirement, the evidence of this altercation did not
create an unfair risk of prejudice through persuasion by “illegitimate means” so as to
require exclusion under rule 403, id., particularly when considering the district court’s
broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings, see State v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821
(Minn. 2009). Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion by admitting
evidence of the July 15 altercation.
October 15 Encounter

Parker next challenges the admission of the October 15 encounter, arguing that the
state failed to present evidence that the encounter was a “bad act.” In support of this
argument, Parker contends that witnesses denied that the October 15 encounter was
aggressive and that there is insufficient context to determine whether Parker intended his
hand gestures to be threatening. He relies on State v. Gallagher to argue that gestures can
be ambiguous without proper context. 275 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1979).
The district court allowed the state to admit evidence of the October 15 encounter
as Spreigl evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Under this rule, the state may introduce
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“[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act . . . . as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid.
404(b)(1). The state sought to admit evidence of the October 15 encounter as “proof of
motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident or fabrication, and modus operandi.” To be
admissible under rule 404(b), the act at issue must be wrongful. See Ture v. State, 681
N.W.2d 9, 17 (Minn. 2004) (agreeing with district court conclusion “that the evidence was
not evidence of bad acts because there is nothing per se wrong with” the acts).
In its pretrial order, the district court explained that “clear and convincing evidence”
showed that Parker participated in this October 15 act. The district court noted that
surveillance video depicted Parker “being animated during the interaction” and “mak[ing]
a motion as if he was shooting the victim.” The district court accordingly allowed the state
to present evidence of the October 15 encounter.
After careful review of the evidence, we conclude that it was reasonable for the
district court to have interpreted Parker’s conduct as a bad act. In the surveillance video,
Parker can be seen raising his hands together and pointing them at the victim, making a
motion consistent with shooting a firearm. Additionally, the testimony about the encounter
to which Parker refers does not foreclose the possibility that the encounter was aggressive.
At trial, one witness, who described the encounter as not “friendly” but not “aggressive,”
agreed that he might have told an investigator previously that the men’s conversation was
“aggressive talk.” Another witness, Parker’s cousin, agreed that the men were “in each
other’s faces” that night and that he got between the two men to keep them from fighting.
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The surveillance footage showed a person placing himself between Parker and the victim
several times.
Parker further contends that, even if evidence of the October 15 interaction is
evidence of a bad act under rule 404(b), the potential for unfair prejudice from its admission
outweighed its probative value. The district court, after stating that the “verbal altercation
between the victim and [Parker] clearly indicates animosity between them, and it occurred
the weekend prior to the homicide,” concluded that the possible “prejudice of the Spreigl
evidence does not unfairly outweigh the probative value.”
We agree with the district court. “Prejudice” in this context does not include
damage to a party’s case “from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.”
State v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Here, the evidence
of threatening behavior by Parker toward the victim on October 15, one week before the
shooting, sheds light on the relationship between Parker and the victim and does not seek
“to persuade by illegitimate means.” Id. (quotation omitted). When considering the district
court’s wide latitude in making evidentiary decisions, we conclude that Parker has not met
his burden in showing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of
the October 15 encounter.
Affirmed.