Debra Ann Edwards, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1229

Debra Ann Edwards, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-25-37

Debra Ann Edwards, Monticello, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Victoria Bernhagen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of her
driving privileges, arguing that the underlying traffic stop was not supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion and that the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine was not

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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supported by probable cause. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence not timely disclosed. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Debra Ann
Edwards’s driving privileges after her arrest for driving while impaired. The following
factual summary is based on the evidence received at an implied-consent hearing.
A sheriff’s deputy initiated a traffic stop after seeing that Edwards’s vehicle had a
malfunctioning brake light and observed her vehicle fail to yield to another vehicle and
drift across lane lines while driving. At that time, the deputy did not suspect impairment.
However, he developed suspicion of impairment after approaching Edwards and noticing
slurred and rapid speech, reddened eyes, “tremors in the area of the cheeks and eyes,” a
rapid heart rate, and a collection of rocks in the backseat of her vehicle. The deputy
testified that, in his training and experience, “individuals who use methamphetamine or
other stimulants can sometimes collect rocks and keep them in their vehicles.”
The deputy administered the following field-sobriety tests, each of which indicated
impairment:
1. Horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The deputy observed
“a lack of smooth pursuit, so the ability of the eyes to
focus and smoothly track from side to side.”

2. Lack of convergence test. Edwards’s eyes, “when they
began to focus in towards the bridge of the nose, where
[his] finger was moving to, instead bounced back to
center, so instead of crossing, fixed ahead again.”

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3. One-leg stand test. Edwards began counting and, after
reaching the number seven, began to wobble and put her
foot down.

4. Walk-and-turn test. Edwards “raised her arms from
the sides in order to balance,” “stepped on her own
foot,” and “step[ped] off to the side in order to balance.”

5. Modified Romberg Test. Edwards guessed that 29
seconds had passed, but the deputy stated that only 22
seconds had passed. The deputy “noticed that there was
eyeball movement while [Edwards’s] eyes were closed,
that her eyelids themselves were fluttering, and
twitching of the fingers as they were along her legs,
waist area.”

The deputy also (1) administered a preliminary breath test, which produced a 0.00 reading,
and (2) took Edwards’s pulse, measuring it at “about 126” beats per minute. Edwards told
the deputy that she was taking medications for several health conditions. The deputy
testified that this information did not lessen his “concerns of impairment”; instead, it
“further narrowed down that medication being prescribed was not a factor.”
The deputy arrested Edwards for suspicion of driving while impaired. A canine
search of the vehicle detected the presence of controlled substances and a subsequent
search revealed suspected methamphetamine and smoking paraphernalia.
After Edwards’s arrest, the deputy applied for and received a warrant to obtain a
sample of her blood or urine. The warrant application stated that the deputy initiated the
traffic stop because the vehicle had a malfunctioning brake light and the deputy saw the
vehicle cross a lane line. It listed the following as indicating that Edwards was under the
influence:
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1. Traffic violations. Edwards pulled out in front of
another vehicle, malfunctioning brake light, and crossed
lane lines.

2. Deputy’s observations. Slurred speech, bloodshot
eyes, tremoring in area of cheeks and eyes, collection of
rocks in back seat of vehicle, and rapid heart rate.

3. Edwards’s statements. Edwards “initially denied
drinking then admitted to it,” “referenced repeatedly
where [she was] going but not where [she] was coming
from,” was “evasive regarding [her] last
methamphetamine use, ” and reported “be[ing] around
people using methamphetamine a couple days prior.”

4. Field sobriety testing. Edwards “performed
[Standardized Field Sobriety Testing] with lack of
smooth pursuit in both eyes,” had a preliminary breath
test result of 0.00, exhibited eyeball movement and
rapid eyelid tremoring” during Modified Romberg Test,
and estimated “22 seconds . . . as 29 while counting.”

5. Vehicle search . “[S]uspected methamphetamine and
paraphernalia found in vehicle after K9 sniff and alert.”

The deputy testified that, while he did not note the medications that Edwards
reported taking in the warrant application, the inclusion of those medications would not
“have eliminated [his] probable cause.”
Edwards provided a urine sample pursuant to the warrant. The sample tested
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Edwards petitioned for a hearing on the reinstatement of her license. The hearing
took place over three days, with the first day occurring in March 2025 and the second two
days occurring in May 2025. In the time between the first and second days of the hearing,
Edwards filed an exhibit list and a motion to suppress statements made during the traffic
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stop. The court denied the motion as untimely. It also determined that Edwards could not
introduce the evidence in her exhibit list because it was not timely disclosed.
In June 2025, the district court filed an order denying Edwards’s request to rescind
the revocation of her driving privileges. It reasoned that (1) the traffic stop was supported
by reasonable articulable suspicion; (2) subsequent “expansion of the scope of the stop was
justified by the [deputy’s] observations”; (3) probable cause supported Edwards’s arrest;
and (4) the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine was supported by probable
cause.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Edwards argues that (1) the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion, (2) the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine test was not supported
by probable cause, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence as
untimely.
I. The traffic stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

Edwards asserts that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion because (1) the
squad camera footage offered at the implied- consent hearing “shows the white line in
question disappears, contradicting the deputy’s testimony”; and (2) the deputy “stated that
he had no reason to suspect driver was under the influence.” Edwards’s assertions are
unavailing.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Warrantless searches and
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seizures are per se unreasonable,” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024), but
one exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to “conduct a brief,
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted).
“Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.” Lorsung v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 30 N.W.3d 777, 784 (Minn. 2026)
(quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is not a high standard,” although the suspicion
must be based on “something more than an unarticulated hunch.” Id. at 785 (quotation
omitted). Appellate courts “assess reasonableness through an objective examination of the
totality of the circumstances” and do not focus on “[t]he actual, subjective beliefs of the
officer.” Id. at 784-85 (quotations omitted). “[T]here is no bright-line rule requiring
physical signs of impairment to establish reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 786. Generally, any
traffic violation provides an objective basis for conducting a traffic stop. State v. George ,
557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
“Determining the existence of reasonable suspicion presents a question of fact and
a question of law.” Lorsung, 30 N.W.3d at 784. This court reviews de novo “the district
court’s determination that its factual findings support reasonable suspicion.” Id. We
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See id. We “view the evidence
in a light favorable to the findings” and “will not conclude that a fact[-]finder clearly erred
unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
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has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotations and citation omitted). We defer to the district court’s credibility findings
and weighing of evidence. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App.
2009).
Deferring to the district court’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony that
Edwards crossed the lane line, see id., and viewing the squad camera footage in the light
most favorable to the district court’s factual findings, we have no firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed, see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. This traffic violation, on its
own, provides an objective basis for conducting the traffic stop. See George, 557 N.W.2d
at 578. The deputy’s subjective belief concerning Edwards’s impairment does not undercut
this conclusion. See Lorsung, 30 N.W.3d at 785, 787.
II. The warrant to obtain a sample of Edwards’s blood or urine was supported by
probable cause.

Edwards argues that the district court erred by determining that the warrant was
supported by probable cause because the officer omitted “details about medication used”
and “[t]he rocks said to be seen were not completely visible.” We are not persuaded.
A blood or urine test is a search that is subject to Fourth Amendment protections.
See State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233- 34 (Minn. 2016). “A warrant is supported
by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Holland,
865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This court presumes that the
affidavit supporting the search warrant is valid, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
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(1978), but the “warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the
application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the
findings of probable cause,” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). A defendant challenging a search warrant on that basis must satisfy
the two-prong Franks test1 by “show[ing] that (1) the affiant deliberately made a statement
that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the statement was material to the
probable cause determination.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327 (quotation omitted). To
establish that “a misrepresentation or omission is material,” the defendant must show that,
“when the misrepresentation is set aside or the omission supplied, probable cause to issue
the search warrant no longer exists.” Id.
Edwards satisfies neither prong of the Franks test. First, she does not argue that the
deputy intentionally or recklessly included material misrepresentations or omissions of fact
in the warrant application. Second, probable cause to issue the warrant would exist even
if the application included mention of the medications and excluded mention of the rocks.
The application’s inclusion of the observed indica of intoxication as well as the discovery
of “suspected methamphetamine and paraphernalia” in the vehicle provided sufficient
grounds for the probable-cause determination.
III. Edwards inadequately briefs her argument about excluded evidence.

“The question of whether to admit or exclude evidence rests within the broad
discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an

1 The Franks test is derived from Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, and State v. Causey, 257
N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn. 1977). See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327.
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erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Uselman v. Uselman, 464
N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn. 1990).
Edwards asserts that the evidence excluded by the district court was “filed on time,”
but does not describe the evidence excluded or identify record support for her assertion.
“On appeal, the appellant is responsible for providing the court with an adequate record.
An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal.”
State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 204 n.12 (Minn. 2002). Edwards provides this court with
insufficient legal argument, authority, and record support to consider her challenge to the
district court’s evidentiary decision. We therefore decline to address the issue.
See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017)
(“Minnesota appellate courts decline to reach an issue in the absence of adequate
briefing.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017).
Affirmed.