Jacob Schlichter, et al., Relators,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1356

Jacob Schlichter, et al.,
Relators,

vs.

City of Albert Lea, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 18, 2026
Reversed; motion denied
Beane, Judge

City of Albert Lea

David L. Liebow, James A. Godwin, Christopher T. Porter, Godwin Adkins, Rochester,
Minnesota (for relators)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Relators Jacob Schlichter and The Smoking Tree LLC (collectively, Schlichter)
appeal by writ of certiorari the decision of respondents City of Albert Lea (the city) and
the Albert Lea City Council (the council) to deny his application for a cannabis retail
business registration. Schlichter argues that the denial of his application, despite a city
ordinance requiring registrations to be issued on a first-come, first-served basis, was
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contrary to law and arbitrary. Schlichter also moved to strike portions of the city’s brief.
We reverse and deny Schlichter’s motion to strike.
FACTS
In 2023, the Minnesota legislature legalized the adult use of cannabis and adopted
chapter 342 of the Minnesota Statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 342.01-.82 (2024). 2023 Minn. Laws.
ch. 63, art. 1, at 2686-798. Chapter 342 established a state-wide regulatory scheme
governing licensure for cannabis and hemp businesses. Minn. Stat. § 342.10. The
Minnesota Office of Cannabis Management (OCM) was created to enforce that regulatory
scheme, in part by issuing and renewing cannabis licenses. Minn. Stat. § 342.02,
subd. 2(6). Would-be cannabis businesses seeking to operate in Minnesota must both
obtain a state license from OCM and register with the local government in the location
where the business will operate. See Minn. Stat. § 342.14, subds. 1, 6. The legislature
expressly limited the authority of local units of government to prohibit the establishment
or operation of cannabis businesses within their jurisdictions. See Minn. Stat. § 342.13.
Against that backdrop, the city adopted local ordinances implementing the
provisions of Minnesota Statutes chapter 342, which included a procedure for registering
cannabis businesses to operate in the city. See Albert Lea, Minn., Code of Ordinances
(ALCO) §§ 5.001-.080 (2025).
1 The ordinances provide procedures for registering
cannabis businesses with the city after OCM issues a cannabis business license to operate

1 About a week before oral argument in this court, the city significantly amended its
cannabis-related ordinances. Albert Lea, Minn., Ordinance 26-150 (Feb. 23, 2026). Unless
indicated otherwise, we cite the ordinance in effect at the time of the events in this case.
3
in the state. Of particular relevance here, section 5.030 states that the city “will register
cannabis businesses on a first-come, first- served basis, which will be based solely on a
time-stamped State of Minnesota, OCM issued license.” ALCO § 5.030. The parties agree
that this version of the city’s ordinance was in effect at the time of the city’s decision on
Schlichter’s application.
On July 17, 2025, OCM issued Schlichter a cannabis microbusiness license.
Schlichter applied for a cannabis retail business registration from the city on the same day.
City staff reviewed Schlichter’s application for preliminary compliance, deemed it
complete, and forwarded the application to the council for final approval. Schlichter’s
application was placed on the agenda for the July 28 council meeting.
Before the July 28 council meeting, city officials received email and social media
messages raising concerns about Schlichter’s criminal history and conduct in the
community. One self- described “concerned citizen” sent a member of the city council
documents from the court file in a criminal matter related to a 2016 incident involving
Schlichter.
The council discussed Schlichter’s application at a work session and again at the
regular council meeting on July 28. During the work session, both the city manager and
the city attorney acknowledged the concerns raised by members of the public about
Schlichter’s application. They each explained their understanding that state law limited the
city’s authority to reject cannabis business registration applicants who had received
licenses from OCM. The city manager also explained that the city’s ordinance had b een
written to award cannabis retail business registrations on a first-come, first-served basis in
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part to mitigate the city’s risk of being sued for rejecting applicants for reasons not
authorized by state law.
During the public meeting that immediately followed the work session, the council
considered a motion to approve Schlichter’s application for a cannabis business
registration. The city manager explained that the city had adopted a cannabis ordinance
that reflected what it understood to be the extent of its authority under state law to limit
cannabis businesses in the city and that Schlichter’s application met all the requirements
of that ordinance. The council’s discussion of Schlichter’s application focused on
opposition to cannabis among both councilmembers and constituents and on frustration
among councilmembers and city staff over the legislature’s decision to restrict local
government control over cannabis businesses within their jurisdiction. No council member
expressed opposition to Schlichter’s application because of his criminal history or for any
other reason specific to his suitability to operate a cannabis business in the city. The motion
to approve Schlichter’s application failed on a 4-3 vote. No one indicated during the July 28
meeting that Schlichter’s application was being tabled for further consideration or would
be reconsidered at a future meeting.
After the July 28 meeting, the city heard from additional members of the public with
concerns about Schlichter’s criminal history and alleged pattern of harassing behavior ,
including online harassment of journalists who reported on Schlichter . City staff also
sought clarification from OCM about the state’s expectations regarding the city’s role in
approving cannabis businesses within its jurisdiction. OCM’s response led city staff to
conclude that local governments are not required to be a “rubber stamp” for OCM licensing
5
decisions but may instead implement their own processes for selecting among applicants
for available cannabis business registrations.
The council held its next work session and regular meeting on August 11. At the
August 11 meeting, the city manager gave a report on cannabis licensing and what city
staff had learned from OCM since the July 28 meeting. He described the new guidance city
staff had received from OCM that the city retains discretion to develop its own process for
evaluating would-be cannabis business owners. The city manager also explained that OCM
does not conduct thorough background checks on cannabis business license applicants and
proposed that the city implement a background check requirement for obtaining a city
registration. The council then voted to grant registrations to two other cannabis business
applicants, thereby issuing the city’s two available cannabis business registrations. 2 The
council briefly discussed Schlichter’s application, and the mayor asked whether there was
a motion to reconsider it. No councilmember made a motion to reconsider. The meeting
ended without further action on Schlichter’s application.
Schlichter appeals by writ of certiorari.

2 Chapter 342 obligates local governments to provide at least one cannabis business
registration per 12,500 residents but does not place a ceiling on registrations. Minn. Stat.
§ 342.13(h), (j). Complying with the minimum requirement, the city capped registrations
at two. ALCO § 5.026. Neither of the two registered cannabis businesses whose
applications were approved during the August 11 meeting are parties to this appeal.
6
DECISION
We begin by identifying the scope of our review. We next consider whether the
city’s denial of Schlichter’s application was a quasi-judicial or legislative decision. Turning
to the merits, we then address whether the city’s decision was contrary to law or arbitrary.
I.
The parties dispute whether the decision presented for our review occurred on July
28 or August 11. The city maintains that the decision under review is the August 11 denial
of reconsideration. Schlichter, however, argues that this court’s scope of review is limited
to the July 28 denial of his application and does not include the August 11 failure to
reconsider.
The scope of our certiorari review is limited to “the final determination of an inferior
tribunal which, if unreversed, would constitute a final adjudication of some legal rights of
the relator.” Minn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Knutson, 976 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). A determination is final when it has “a binding effect on the legal
rights of the parties . . . such that the rights of the parties are irrevocably fixed by the final
decision.” Lancaster v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 18 N.W.3d 80, 84 (Minn. 2025) (emphasis
omitted) (quotations omitted).
Our scope of review is limited to the July 28 meeting because at that meeting, the
council made a final, binding determination when the motion to approve Schlichter’s
application failed by a 4-3 vote. See ALCO §§ 3.04 (“Except as otherwise provided in this
Charter or by law, an affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified and acting members of
the council is required for the passage of . . . motions.”), 5.023 (stating that the city council
7
is responsible for approving or denying cannabis business applications) (2025); see also
County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 541-42 (Minn. 2012)
(holding, in part, that a city council’s denial of a claim was a binding decision based on the
city’s policy).
The council’s argument that the decision under review is the August 11 failure to
reconsider is unavailing. For a previous city-council decision to be reconsidered, the
movant must secure a passing motion to reconsider. See Chanhassen Ests. Residents Ass’n
v. City of Chanhassen , 342 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 1984) (concluding that the city
council’s passing vote on a motion to reconsider an application was valid, despite a
procedural irregularity). At the August 11 meeting, no motion to reconsider the council’s
July 28 denial of Schlichter’s application was made, so no formal action affecting
Schlichter’s legal rights was taken. In other words, the only meeting at which the council
rendered a decision on Schlichter’s application was the July 28 meeting.
The city contends that the July 28 decision “was not an affirmative denial” but a
“pause to allow council members more time to address unresolved concerns.” No
information in the record supports the council’s argument that it merely paused its
consideration of Schlichter’s registration to “address unresolved concerns,” nor does a city
ordinance authorize such a pause. The motion at the July 28 meeting concerned an “action
to approve” Schlichter’s registration. During that meeting, no one proposed reserving
discussion on Schlichter’s application to permit further investigation or deliberation. The
city points to no authority, in its ordinances or otherwise, that could support a conclusion
that the July 28 vote was anything other than a denial of Schlichter’s application.
8
Because the council’s July 28 vote denied Schlichter’s application and no formal
action was taken on that application on August 11, the only council decision presented for
our review is the July 28 denial.
II.
The parties next dispute whether the council’s decision to deny Schlichter’s
application was quasi-judicial or legislative. A decision is quasi-judicial if the decision
“affect[s] the rights of a few individuals analogous to the way they are affected by court
proceedings.” Zweber v. Credit River Township, 882 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted); accord Reetz v. City of St. Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 2021).
By contrast, a decision is legislative if it has “broad applicability and affect[s] the rights of
the public generally.” Zweber, 882 N.W.2d at 609 (quotation omitted). A quasi-judicial
decision involves “(1) investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary
facts; (2) application of those facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision
regarding the disputed claim.” Reetz, 956 N.W.2d at 243 (quotation omitted). Examples of
quasi-judicial actions include decisions to terminate the employment of public employees,
certain permitting and zoning decisions, decisions as to whether overpayments for city
services should be refunded, and decisions as to employee eligibility for defense and
indemnification. See Lancaster, 18 N.W.3d at 83 (collecting cases); In re Brown, 28
N.W.3d 486, 498-99 (Minn. App. 2025) (explaining that the city’s denial of an employee’s
claim for defense and indemnification was quasi-judicial), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 21,
2026).
9
The city’s denial of Schlichter’s application for a cannabis business registration
bears all the hallmarks of quasi-judicial decision-making. Deciding whether Schlichter was
entitled to a cannabis business registration required the council to determine facts about
Schlichter and his business and then apply the city’s ordinances. The city’s decision had a
binding effect on Schlichter, as it precluded him from operating his cannabis business in
the city. And importantly, only Schlichter’s rights, not the public’s rights generally, were
affected by the city’s decision. See Reetz, 956 N.W.2d at 243; Brown, 28 N.W.3d at 499.
To convince us otherwise, the council argues that its decision here is legislative
because the decision was premised on the city’s “inherent police power to regulate
businesses posing public safety risks” and that the decision is “indistinguishable from
legislative liquor-licensing decisions.” We are not persuaded.
The city’s authority in the cannabis-regulatory context is defined by state law. “A
municipality has no inherent powers, but only such powers as are expressly conferred by
statute or are implied as necessary in aid of those powers which are expressly conferred.”
Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984). Rather than conferring broad
authority on municipalities to regulate cannabis businesses within their jurisdictions,
Minnesota Statutes chapter 342 constrains local regulatory authority. For example, local
governments are barred from prohibiting the operation of cannabis businesses within their
jurisdictions; instead, local governments must authorize a minimum number of cannabis
business registrations, based on their population. Minn. Stat. § 342.13(b), (h). Local
governments are also directed to issue a retail registration to a cannabis business that has a
valid OCM-issued license and meets other criteria not contested here. Minn. Stat. § 342.22,
10
subd. 3(a) (stating that a local government “shall issue a retail registration to a cannabis
microbusiness” that has a valid OCM-issued license and satisfie s other criteria (emphasis
added)). Although the city’s decision to adopt ordinances consistent with this statutory
framework was undoubtedly legislative, once the city adopted a clear standard by which
applicants for cannabis business registrations would be evaluated, its decision applying that
standard to Schlichter was quasi-judicial.
The city’s contention that its decision on Schlichter’s application is
“indistinguishable from legislative liquor-licensing decisions” does not convince us
otherwise. The statutory regulatory frameworks for liquor and cannabis are distinguishable.
Whereas state liquor-licensing laws grant local authorities some discretion in issuing liquor
licenses, state cannabis laws make local registration of OCM-licensed cannabis businesses
mandatory, subject to a limited set of permissible restrictions. Compare Minn. S tat.
§ 340A.509 (2024) (authorizing local authorities to “impose further restrictions and
regulations on the sale and possession of alcoholic beverages within its limits”), and Wajda
v. City of Minneapolis, 246 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1976) (stating that state law grants
“broad discretion ” in determining whether to issue a liquor license), with Minn. Stat.
§ 342.22, subd. 3(a) (stating that local governments “shall issue a retail registration to a
cannabis microbusiness” that OCM has licensed (emphasis added)).
Because of the differences in the statutory regulatory frameworks for cannabis and
liquor, we are not persuaded that the city possesses the same broad authority over cannabis
business registrations that it does over liquor licenses. But even if it did , the city, in
adopting the cannabis ordinance in effect at the time of its decision on Schlichter’s
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application, chose to constrain its own authority and adopt a first-come, first-served rule
for registering OCM-licensed cannabis businesses, so long as the applicant is not past due
on certain enumerated obligations or in violation of state or local law. ALCO § 5.030(1)
(stating that the city “will register cannabis businesses on a first- come, first-served basis,
which will be based solely on a time-stamped State of Minnesota, OCM issued license”
(emphasis added)); id. (2)-(3). Applying that standard to Schlichter’s application did not
require or invite the council to exercise broad discretion and consider the general welfare.
Instead, it required the council to consider whether Schlichter met the standard for a
cannabis business registration, which was a quasi-judicial decision.
III.
We review a city council’s quasi-judicial decision using a limited and
“nonintrusive” standard of review and will only reverse the city council’s decision if it was
“arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or
without any evidence to support it.” Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn.
1992) (quotation omitted). Schlichter argues that the city’s decision should be reversed
because it was both contrary to law and arbitrary. We consider each issue in turn.
A.
In arguing that the city’s decision on his application was contrary to law, Schlichter
relies on both the city’s ordinances and state law. We first observe that a city is obligated
to follow its own ordinances. See, e.g., Hamline-Midway Neighborhood Stability Coal. v.
City of St. Paul, 547 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. App. 1996) (concluding that a city’s decision
was voidable for failure to follow its ordinance), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1996); Curtis
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Oil v. City of North Branch, 364 N.W.2d 880 , 884 (Minn. App. 1985) (explaining that a
city council’s failure to consider factors required by ordinance rendered the decision
arbitrary). The city ordinance in effect when the council considered Schlichter’s
application unambiguously stated that the city “will register cannabis businesses on a first-
come, first-served basis, which will be based solely on a time-stamped State of Minnesota,
OCM issued license.” ALCO § 5.030(1) (emphasis added). The ordinance further
conditioned registration on the applicant being current on “property taxes, development
agreements, local development loans, assessment, or municipal utilities,” and on the
registrant not being “in current violation of local ordinances or state laws.” Id. (2)-(3).
Section 5.023 also stated that “[t]he city shall issue a retail registration to a state-licensed
cannabis retail business that adheres to the requirements of Minn. Stat[]. § 342.22.” ALCO
§ 5.023(b) (emphasis added).
During the July 28 council meeting, the city manager advised the council that
Schlichter’s application satisfied all the requirements of the city’s cannabis ordinance. The
city manager also explained that the ordinance reflected the extent of the city’s authority
under state law to limit cannabis businesses in the city. Nothing in state law required the
city to adopt a “first-come, first-served” policy for deciding which applicants would receive
the limited number of cannabis business registrations the city planned to issue. But once
the city enacted that policy into law, the council was not free to disregard it. The discussions
during the July 28 meeting and during the work session that preceded it reflected a clear
understanding that, if the council chose to reject Schlichter’s application, it would be doing
13
so contrary to its own ordinance. And yet it did so anyway. That decision was contrary to
law and cannot be sustained.
Schlichter urges us to go further and conclude that Minnesota Statutes chapter 342
limits the city’s authority to consider any factors not specifically enumerated in the statute
when evaluating cannabis business registration applications. We acknowledge that, since
the city’s denial of Schlichter’s application, the city has amended its cannabis ordinance,
raising the number of available cannabis business registrations in the city to four and
outlining other criteria by which it will evaluate would-be cannabis business registrants.
But because the city has not yet applied those criteria to Schlichter, the question of whether
the city’s amended cannabis ordinance is within the authority granted to the city under
chapter 342 is not presently before us.
B.
Schlichter also argues that the city’s rejection of his application was arbitrary. In
analyzing the arbitrariness of a quasi-judicial decision, we have considered whether the
decision-maker (1) relied on factors not intended by the legislature, (2) “entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem,” (3) “offered an explanation for the decision
that runs counter to the evidence,” or (4) rendered a decision “so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of [the decision-maker’s] expertise.”
Brown, 28 N.W.3d at 505 (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Transitions Charter Sch.
v. Comm’r of the Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 844 N.W.2d 223, 235 (Minn. App. 2014), rev.
denied (Minn. May 28, 2014)).
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Here, the record indicates that the city’s denial of Schlichter’s application relied on
factors the city had not intended , as reflected in its adoption of an ordinance requiring
cannabis business registrations to be awarded on a first-come, first -served basis. To the
extent the council gave reasons for its decision on Schlichter’s application, those reasons
related not to the merits of his application under the governing ordinance but to
disagreement with the state’s cannabis-related policy decisions. During the July 28 council
meeting, the city manager informed the council that Schlichter’s application met all the
requirements of the city’s cannabis ordinance. The discussion that followed had little, if
anything, to do with Schlichter or his application. No city official identified any deficiency
with Schlichter’s application or articulated any reason why Schlichter—based on his
criminal history or any other reason—should not be permitted to operate a cannabis retail
business in the city.
Instead, the council’s discussion focused on dissatisfaction with the state’s assertion
of authority over cannabis policy and opposition to cannabis legalization generally. For
example, one councilmember stated, “The fact that this is on the agenda tonight is giving
a lot of people the illusion that we have a choice in this matter. There is a reason it was
under the . . . consent and approval agenda because it is a rubber stamp item.” Another
stated, “I get tired of control being taken by whether it’s state or federal government in
things that they know nothing about. And, so I’m not for this.” And the mayor, who is a
voting member of the council, expressed broad disagreement with the state’s cannabis
policy, stating, “I have not been a fan of this since the subject first came up a year ago. It
seems like just two years ago we were locking people up for . . . smoking cannabis. And
15
now we’re promoting it.” Following this discussion, the motion to approve Schlichter’s
application failed.
Considering the council’s extensive discussion both before and during the July 28
meeting, we also conclude that the city council’s decision to deny Schlichter’s business
registration was arbitrary. Councilmembers expressed both clear understanding and
dissatisfaction that their role in the cannabis registration process is limited, yet they
disregarded those limitations by denying Schlichter’s application, despite city staff’s
evaluation that it complied with all requirements of the city’s ordinance. See Amoco Oil
Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 395 N.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a city
council’s denial of a conditional-use permit was arbitrary when the city council relied on a
factor to justify denial, but that factor was not a relevant factor listed in its ordinance).
Because we conclude that the denial of Schlichter’s application for a cannabis
business registration was contrary to law and arbitrary, we reverse.
IV.
Having concluded that the council’s decision must be reversed, the only remaining
question is what constitutes an appropriate remedy. Schlichter asks us to direct the city to
issue him a cannabis business registration, but we decline to do so. At oral argument and
then in a citation of supplemental authority, Schlichter informed us that the city amended
its cannabis ordinance shortly before oral argument in this case. See Albert Lea, Minn.,
Ordinance 26- 150 (Feb. 23, 2026). Ordinarily, we would apply the city’s existing
ordinance to determine whether Schlichter should be issued a cannabis business
registration. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566,
16
575 (Minn. 2000). But the record before us does not permit us to reach a conclusion as to
whether Schlichter’s application should be evaluated under the amended ordinance or
whether he would be entitled to a cannabis business registration under the current
ordinance, and we express no opinion on those issues. We conclude only that the city’s
July 28 denial of Schlichter’s application cannot be sustained.3
Reversed; motion denied.

3 Schlichter moved to strike from the city’s brief portions of the statement of facts and all
arguments relying on materials outside the record. He asserts that sections A, C, E, and I
rely on materials outside the record; sections C, D, and E “editorialize[] extensively”; and
that sections C and E address matters irrelevant to issues on appeal.
We decline to strike portions of the city’s brief relying on materials outside the
record and addressing matters irrelevant to the issues on appeal as moot because we have
not considered these materials. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2
(Minn. 2007) (denying motion to strike as moot after not considering challenged portions
of brief). We also decline to strike portions of the city’s brief that “editorialize[]
extensively” because we are not persuaded that the city’s presentation of the facts or
arguments strayed beyond permissible persuasive rhetoric. See State v. Duncan, 608
N.W.2d 551, 559 (Minn. App. 2000) (denying a motion to strike “arguments that are not
supported by legal citations and arguments with which [the movant] disagrees”), rev.
denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).