State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1381

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ahmed Ali Abdi,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-20974

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS , Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree intentional murder, second-
degree unintentional murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony.
Appellant contends that, because of the district court’s errors, he was prejudiced at trial
and a reversal is required. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2024, a police officer was monitoring footage from a Milestone camera
of a homeless encampment on the 3300 block of 3rd Avenue South in Minneapolis.1 While
watching the live footage, the officer observed a group of people in the center of the
encampment appearing to engage in a verbal altercation. Eventually the altercation turned
physical, and the group moved to the middle of 3rd Avenue. The following parties were
involved in the altercation: a male with a black bucket hat and red shirt with a tan stripe
(later identified as J.H.), a male wearing a Timberwolves jersey, a male wearing a Twins
jersey, a male with no shirt on, and a male with a bright yellow jacket and a gray stocking
hat.
From the video footage, it appeared that the group was attempting to harm J.H.
When the group moved into the street, multiple people ran after J.H. J.H. attempted to get
away from the pursuing group and ran down the street as they followed him. The male in

1 Milestone cameras are cameras placed around Minneapolis that law enforcement can
access from any city computer to monitor potential criminal activity.
3
the yellow jacket continued down the sidewalk apart from the rest of the group, walking
toward J.H. J.H. then ran (or was pushed) up onto the sidewalk in front of the male in the
yellow jacket who then raised his arm at J.H., shot J.H. at close range, and quickly turned
around and walked in the other direction. A few seconds later J.H. fell to the ground.
Multiple 911 callers in the area reported that they saw an altercation break out at the
encampment and then heard a single gunshot. Paramedics arrived and took J.H. to the
hospital, but he died soon after from a single gunshot wound to the chest.
After reviewing footage from the Milestone camera, officers began investigating the
shooting and looking for the male in the yellow jacket as a suspect. One of the officers
(the first officer) watched the video of the offense multiple times and began investigating
the area for other cameras and potential witnesses. After speaking with witnesses, the first
officer learned that the male in the yellow jacket was known by the nickname “Curly.” The
first officer then ran the nickname through a police database, which returned four potential
suspects and one photograph that depicted Abdi. The first officer believed that t he still
photograph of the altercation from the Milestone camera matched the photograph of Abdi
from the police database.
Another officer (the second officer) was also consulted in the investigation because
he had a prior interaction with Abdi in November 2023. During that interaction, the second
officer was in contact with Abdi for about one hour and had body- worn camera (BWC)
footage of the interaction. The second officer was shown photographs of the male in the
yellow jacket from the Milestone footage that he then compared to his BWC footage from
4
November 2023 and confirmed his belief that the male in the yellow jacket and the
individual from his BWC footage from 2023 were the same person.2
In September 2024, respondent State of Minnesota arrested and charged Abdi with
second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2024),
and unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2024).
The state and Abdi submitted multiple motions in limine to the district court.
Among the defense’s motions, Abdi moved the district court to prevent the state from
introducing inadmissible hearsay through testimony from police officers about what
witnesses told the officers under the guise of explaining how the investigation focused on
the defendant; to preclude lay opinion testimony about the guilt or innocence of Abdi; and
to prohibit any officers from testifying that Abdi was the shooter.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before the jury was sworn in, the district court
heard arguments from the parties regarding the motions in limine. The district court
determined that, pursuant to the defense’s motion, “The way I read this is just there’s a
standing objection to inadmissible hearsay” and “defense can object as necessary, during
the course of the trial.” Regarding the motion concerning officer opinion testimony and
the surveillance footage of the offense, the state argued that, based on the caselaw, “officers
who review surveillance video and are investigating a crime can make determinations and

2 The court ruled at trial that the officer could testify that he had an interaction with Abdi
in November 2023 but that the BWC footage and booking photos from that incident were
inadmissible as evidence.
5
express opinions to the jury about the time that they were viewing the video, who they
believed the individuals that were involved were, to assist the jury in following along with
that conduct.” The district court agreed with the state’s argument.
During trial, the state offered the Milestone footage of the offense and played it for
the jury. The officer who watched the footage live and operated the camera when the
altercation occurred described the video while it played for the jury. He stated that it
appeared the man in the yellow jacket raised his arm and shot J.H. before J.H. collapsed on
the sidewalk. The state also entered exhibits of still shots from the Milestone camera that
showed close-ups of the man in the yellow jacket and parts of the altercation.
The first officer and the second officer were called to testify about the investigation
of the shooting. During the first officer’ s testimony, he stated that he watched the
Milestone footage “ten or more times” before going out into the community to locate other
cameras or witnesses. The first officer testified that he learned from witnesses that the
male in the yellow jacket went by the nickname “Curly.” The first officer stated that he
ran the nickname through a police database to obtain the legal names of persons who used
that moniker and was provided with four suspects, which included Abdi, and one
photograph of Abdi. The first officer testified that, when he compared Abdi’s photograph
from the database with the still shot from the Milestone video of the male in the yellow
jacket, he believed that “they closely matched.” He then passed on the information to other
officers and investigators.
The second officer then testified that he had had a prior interaction with Abdi in
November 2023 and was sent still shots of the Milestone footage after this offense
6
occurred. The second officer explained that he compared the photographs of the man in
the yellow jacket from the Milestone camera to his BWC footage of Abdi from November
2023 and, after comparing each, he “believe[d] that they [we]re the same person.” He then
relayed this belief to other investigators.
J.H.’s mother also testified at trial that J.H. was dating Abdi’s ex-girlfriend at the
time of the shooting and that the three of them had spent time together in the past.
The arresting officer testified that he was told by homicide investigators about the
suspect’s identity and nickname, and that there was probable cause for an arrest. The
officer stated that he found Abdi in another encampment and addressed him as “Curly” to
which Abdi responded. Abdi was arrested and taken to the police station.
The state offered BWC footage of Abdi’s arrest into evidence with a photograph
showing Abdi’s face from the BWC footage. The state also moved the district court to add
the lesser-included charge of second-degree unintentional murder in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2024), as Count 2. Defense counsel did not object, and
the district court granted the motion.
After the state rested, defense counsel moved the district court for a directed verdict
of acquittal. The district court denied the motion.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:
How do we know Defendant was the shooter? We heard
testimony from [the first officer], who is the main investigator
on this case. You heard that he conducted significant
investigation into this case. He watched the Milestone video,
he said, over ten times, including stopping, starting it, going
through it with a fine-tooth comb. As part of his investigation,
he learned that the shooter’s nickname might be “C urly”.
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Using his investigative tools, [the first officer] ran that
nickname through a police database, and based on that
information, a photo of the Defendant came up. Now, [the first
officer] told you— when viewing that photo of the
Defendant . . . at the time, he compared it to the Milestone
video. He believed that that photo matched the person in the
Milestone video wearing the yellow shirt, and gray Carhartt
hat.

The district court then interjected and reminded the jury “whether or not [Abdi] is the one
pictured in the video is up to you all to decide” and that “the ultimate determination of who
is depicted in these pictures and videos is up to you.”
For the majority of the defense’s closing argument, counsel attacked the identity of
the shooter, pointing out that multiple witnesses did not see who the shooter was and that
officers jumped to conclusions about the identity of the man in the yellow jacket. Counsel
stated, in part:
Who is the guy in the yellow shirt and gray hat? This is
province of the jury. This is for the members of the jury panel
to decide. Who was that person?

Yellow shirt and gray hat is not Mr. Abdi. It’s not
Mr. Ahmed Abdi. They are different people.

So how did investigators draw that conclusion? It
started with a tip. There was an unknown someone who
provided a nickname to police. That nickname somehow
associated in some— was associated in some police database
with the name, Ahmed Abdi. Then, the Officer happened to
remember an interaction ten months prior.

And because Mr. Abdi is thin and dark skinned, the
investigators quickly jumped to conclusions. It fit their
narrative. They didn’t have eye witnesses from the scene
outside the encampment that day. There was a video, but there
were no eye witnesses.

8
And remember, no one who called 911 saw anything.
You didn’t—no one —no one testified about having eye-
witness observations of what actually happened. You have the
videos, but it is up to you, the jury, to decide.

And this was without any fingerprint or DNA evidence
linking Mr. Abdi to the yellow hat— yellow shirt and gray hat.
And this was a case of confirmation bias. An officer made a
determination that Mr. Abdi was the same person, was the—
with the yellow shirt and gray hat, and everybody ran with it.
It was just easier. And sure enough, Mr. Abdi was arrested and
charged. Here we are.

Unfortunately, they have the wrong guy. This is yellow
shirt and gray hat.

You’ve seen these photos. You’ve seen the video.
That’s the guy. This is the guy arrested, Mr. Ahmed Abdi.
Mr. Ahmed Abdi, who was arrested, charged, and here he is.
But these are different people. Take a close look at yellow shirt
and gray hat. Look at the features of his face. Yellow shirt and
gray hat has a pointy nose, narrow-set eyes, a pronounced
cheekbone, no dimples, thin lips. Mr. Ahmed Abdi, has a
round nose, wide-set eyes, soft cheekbone, large dimples, and
full lips. They’re different people, which makes this a case of
mistaken identity.

Defense counsel also pointed out that no firearms or discharged bullet casings were found
at the crime scene.
During deliberation, the jury asked to view the BWC footage of the second officer’s
prior interaction with Abdi in November 2023. The district court had earlier ruled that the
previous BWC footage was inadmissible and, therefore, instructed the jury to come to a
decision based on the record in front of them. The jury found Abdi guilty on Count 1 —
second-degree intentional murder; Count 2 —second-degree unintentional murder; and
Count 3—unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Abdi to 386
9
months’ imprisonment on Count 1, 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 3, and reserved
restitution for 60 days. The district court did not adjudicate Count 2.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellate courts “will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a district court “misapplies the law, makes findings unsupported by the record, or
resolves discretionary questions in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on
record.” State v. Johnson, 979 N.W.2d 483, 502 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d
155 (Minn. 2023). “A defendant who claims the [district] court erred in admitting evidence
bears the burden of showing the error and any resulting prejudice.” State v. Kennedy, 585
N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). “This court generally will not decide issues which were
not raised before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal
procedure.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
I. “Curly” Testimony

Abdi argues for the first time on appeal that admission of the first officer’s testimony
regarding the nickname “Curly” was inadmissible because it was hearsay that violated his
constitutional right to confrontation. 3 Abdi’s counsel objected to the admission of any
hearsay testimony in a blanket motion in limine before trial, and the district court ruled that

3 Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid.
801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls into an exception set forth in the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
10
the defense could object as necessary during trial. The defense, however, did not object to
any of the first officer’s testimony during trial as either inadmissible hearsay or as a
violation of Abdi’s confrontation rights. See State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 618
(Minn. 2014) (reasoning that a defendant’s “exclusive focus” at trial on the residual hearsay
exception indicated that “a Confrontation Clause challenge was not apparent from the
context of the objection”). We therefore apply the plain-error standard of review. See id.;
see also State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) (stating that this court will
review an unobjected-to error under the “plain error test”); State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91,
100 (Minn. 2010) (applying plain-error to review Confrontation Clause issue when the
objection at trial was on hearsay grounds and declining to consider the effect of a hearsay
objection on the appropriate standard of review); State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 863-64
(Minn. 2008) (applying plain-error standard of review to forfeited Confrontation Clause
issue).
“In order to meet the plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that
(1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’ s
substantial rights.” Id. (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). We
have noted that to satisfy the third element, a defendant must show prejudice that creates a
reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict. State v. Strommen,
648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002) (citing State v. Smith, 582 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn.
1998)). If all three conditions are satisfied, we proceed to determine whether it is necessary
to address the error to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. State v.
Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001) (citing Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740).
11
Under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions,
a defendant has the right to confront witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 6. A defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause are violated when
a court admits a statement and (1) “the statement in question was testimonial,” (2) “the
statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted,” and (3) “the defendant was
unable to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 765 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
Abdi cites State v. Ramsey, No. A23-1554, 2024 WL 4587915 (Minn. App. Oct. 28,
2024), to assert that the first officer’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because
it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
4 We note the similarities between this
case and Ramsey; however, assuming the admission of the first officer’s testimony
regarding the nickname “Curly” was plain error, Abdi still cannot prove that his substantial
rights were violated because the state relied on additional identification testimony that
removes any reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different if the
“Curly” testimony had been excluded.
“The defendant has the burden of proof on the third element of the [plain-error] test,
and it is considered a ‘heavy burden.’” State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012)
(quoting Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741). An error affects substantial rights “if the error was
prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. An error
is prejudicial “if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the

4 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be used for persuasive value.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
12
verdict.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 688. This is “the equivalent of a harmless error
analysis.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011). When conducting a
harmless-error analysis, we determine whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10
N.W.3d 48, 55 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). When “assessing whether an error is
harmless, the question is not whether the other evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction, but rather whether the error substantially influenced the verdict.” Id. at 54
(quotation omitted).
We consider several “[n]on-exclusive factors . . . to determine whether a reasonable
possibility exists that the erroneously admitted evidence significantly affected the jury’s
verdict.” Id. These factors include “(1) the manner in which the party presented the
evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who
offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence.” State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020). We also
consider whether there is “[s]trong evidence of guilt” that “undermines the persuasive
value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id.
Manner Presented
The only evidence Abdi challenges here is the first officer’s testimony regarding the
nickname “Curly.” In analyzing the first factor, we consider the relative number of
transcript pages and whether the evidence was used throughout the state’s case. Bigbear,
10 N.W.3d at 56. The first officer’s contested testimony only takes up approximately half
a page out of 475 pages of trial transcript. The only other time that the first officer’s
13
testimony is addressed is during the state’s closing argument, addressed below. Therefore,
this factor weighs in favor of the state.
Persuasiveness
Abdi argues that the first officer’s testimony was persuasive because it was offered
by a law-enforcement officer who the jury was likely to view as credible. Though a jury
may give greater weight to law-enforcement testimony, here the defense counsel and
district court reminded the jury throughout trial that it was the jury’s responsibility to
determine identity and that the officers’ beliefs were not facts when determining identity.
And because the jury is presumed to have followed that instruction, any alleged improper
suggestion to the jury was mitigated. See State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn.
2009). Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of the state.
Closing Arguments
The prosecutor mentioned the first officer ’s testimony once during closing
arguments, addressing it in what amounted to approximately two paragraphs of a 16-page
closing argument. In addition, the district court reiterated during jury instructions that the
remarks or arguments of the attorneys during trial are not evidence. “[T]he arguments or
other remarks by an attorney are not evidence. If the attorneys or I have made or should
make any statement as to what the evidence is, which differs from your recollection of the
evidence, you should disregard the statement and rely solely on your own memory.” And,
as jurors are presumed to follow limiting instructions with respect to the proper use of
evidence, see id., and Abdi has not provided any reason to doubt that the jurors followed
the instructions here, this factor weighs in favor of the state.
14
Effectively Countered
Abdi’s entire defense at trial centered around denying the state’s identification and
his involvement in the shooting. During defense counsel’s closing argument, counsel made
extensive comments that it was up to the jury to decide the identity of the shooter, and the
district court issued a limiting instruction regarding the issue of identity, stating that it was
ultimately a decision of the jury to determine if Abdi was the one depicted in the
surveillance footage, not based on the first officer’s testimony about the nickname “Curly.”
See State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 162- 63 (Minn. 2024) (holding that a trial court’s
instructions to the jury are relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly influenced
by potential improper prosecutor comments).
After hearing arguments from both sides, the jury still found Abdi guilty of all three
counts. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of the state.
Strong Evidence of Guilt
“Finally, overwhelming evidence of guilt is a factor, often a very important one, in
determining whether . . . the error has no impact on the verdict.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at
59 (quotation omitted). “Strong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of
wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. (citing Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505). “This factor focuses
exclusively on evidence of guilt.” Id. at 60.
Here, the state offered strong evidence of guilt against Abdi. Abdi and victim J.H.
had prior interactions before the offense, and J.H. was reportedly dating Abdi’s
ex-girlfriend at the time of the offense. During the course of their investigation, officers
were able to identify four suspects, one of whom was Abdi, and obtained a picture of Abdi
15
that matched the male in the Milestone footage. The officer who had an hour-long
interaction with Abdi in November 2023 was able to review his BWC footage from the
interaction and communicate his belief that the man in the yellow jacket was in fact the
same individual from the BWC footage . And, finally, the jury was able to observe
photographic and video evidence of the offense and compare those with their own
observations of Abdi while in the courtroom. Based on the totality of the circumstances
that pointed to Abdi’s guilt, this factor weighs in favor of the state.
In sum, Abdi did not “meet his burden of showing that there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. Id.
(quotation omitted). Therefore, because we conclude that Abdi does not satisfy the plain-
error test, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
II. Surveillance Footage

Abdi argues that the testimonies of the first and second officers that he “closely
matched” or was “indeed, the same person” as the man in the yellow jacket was improper
opinion testimony because it likely influenced the jury. Abdi objected to the testimony at
trial and now asserts that officers “may not testify to an opinion that the defendant
committed the charged crimes.”
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and [this
court] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Ali, 855
N.W.2d at 249. “A defendant who claims the [district] court erred in admitting evidence
bears the burden of showing the error and any resulting prejudice.” Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d
at 389. Harmless error does not require reversal. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. “Reversal is
16
warranted only when the error substantially influences the jury’s decision.” State v. Nunn,
561 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1997).
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 701 allows a lay witness to provide “testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences” so long as those opinions and inferences are “rationally
based on the perception of the witness” or “helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue” and are “not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Lay-opinion testimony of a
surveillance video’s contents may also be helpful to a jury when it is used to explain the
context of a police investigation. Ali, 855 N.W.2d at 249-50.
This court has concluded in numerous nonprecedential decisions—albeit most often
on plain-error review— that a police officer may testify as to their opinion and observations
about surveillance footage.5

5 See, e.g., State v. Williams, No. A22-1573, 2024 WL 1044815, at *8-9 (Minn. App.
Mar. 11, 2024) (concluding that the district court did not plainly err when it admitted
detective testimony that a “person depicted in the security-camera video . . . was the same
person who appear[ed] in [other] security-camera video” and that “the person depicted in
both videos was [the defendant]”); State v. Kasim, No. 18-1322, 2019 WL 2415974,
at *4-6 (Minn. App. June 10, 2019) (concluding that the district court did not plainly err
when it admitted a police officer’s testimony asserting he thought, based on a picture of
the defendant, that the defendant resembled a suspect seen in surveillance footage “because
[the testimony] was rationally based on [the police officer’s] perception and helped the jury
to understand his investigation”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019); State v. Clement,
No. A14-1646, 2015 WL 4393559, at *4- 5 (Minn. App. July 20, 2015) (concluding that
the district court did not plainly err when it admitted a police officer’s testimony “that he
observed appellant concealing merchandise on [surveillance] video” and “that he observed
nothing indicating that any other patron in the video should be considered a su spect”
because the testimony “was rationally based on [the police officer’s] perception of the
video, and was helpful to the jury’s clear understanding of his testimony regarding the
investigation”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2015).
17
Abdi relies on State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 915-16 (Minn. App. 2001), rev.
denied (Minn. May 29, 2001), to assert that a police officer may not testify to their belief
that the defendant committed the charged offense. However, as the state points out, that
case is distinguishable. The officer in Hogetvedt testified that when the victim indicated
to him that she was changing her mind and that it was not the appellant who assaulted her,
he responded that he believed it was the appellant that assaulted her. Id. at 915. The officer
there expressed his opinion that the appellant was guilty of the charged offense, after
previously having been warned by the district court not to do so, which is not the case here.
Id.
Here, the officers’ testimony did not contain any legal analysis or a mixture of law
and fact. Their testimonies were based on their own perceptions, were helpful to determine
a fact at issue in trial (the identity of the male in the yellow jacket), and were not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
Abdi also argues that he was prejudiced by this testimony because it invaded the
province of the jury and was therefore inadmissible. However, pursuant to Minn. R. Evid.
704, “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
Comments to the rule also state:
Expert and lay witnesses will not be precluded from giving an
opinion merely because the opinion embraces an ultimate fact
issue to be determined by the jury. . . . In determining whether
or not an opinion would be helpful or of assistance under these
rules a distinction should be made between opinions as to
factual matters, and opinions involving a legal analysis or
18
mixed questions of law and fact. Opinions of the latter nature
are not deemed to be of any use to the trier of fact.

Minn. R. Evid. 704 1977 comm. cmt; see also State v. DeWald , 463 N.W.2d 741, 744
(Minn. 1990) (holding that an officer’s opinion testimony that the defendant killed the
victim was admissible because it was “factual rather than legal”). As noted above, the
testimony from the officers did not involve legal conclusions or legal analysis and,
therefore, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in this matter.
Affirmed.