Troy Andre Amundson v. Lora Daly Amundson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1511

Troy Andre Amundson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Lora Daly Amundson,
Respondent.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-17-622

Troy Andre Amundson, Pensacola, Florida (self-represented appellant)

Michael G. Cain, Arnold & Cain, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Harris , Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In this appeal from a judgment enforcing collection of spousal-maintenance arrears,
appellant argues that the district court erred by violat ing his due-process rights, ordering
garnishment in violation of federal law, failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, and making
inadequate factual findings. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant Troy Andre Amundson and respondent Lora Daly Amundson married in
1992. They have one joint child, born in 2000. In 2015, the parties commenced dissolution
proceedings, formalized the terms of their divorce in a marital settlement agreement
(MSA), and received a judgment of divorce from the Superior Court of Guam . The
judgment provided that appellant would pay respondent $7,000 in monthly support. This
amount included $4,000 in spousal maintenance and $3,000 in child support. After the
child turned 18 years old, spousal maintenance increased to $7,000, leaving appellant’s
total monthly obligation unchanged. Beginning in early 2016, a ppellant failed to pay
spousal maintenance as ordered.
In 2017, appellant, having relocated to Minnesota, filed the divorce judgment in
Anoka County. Appellant subsequently moved to modify spousal maintenance, child
support, and arrears. The district court dismissed the motion, concluding that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child support and spousal maintenance.
In February 2025, respondent filed a motion in Anoka County District Court
requesting a money judgment against appellant in the amount of $411,891.82 for his
spousal-maintenance arrears . Additionally, respondent sought an order for income
withholding and an order directing Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to
withhold or garnish appellant’s “military retired pay.”
1 Appellant filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction. The district court den ied the motion concluding

1 Appellant was formerly in the United States military. DFAS administers appellant’s
military retired pay.

3
that, although it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify spousal maintenance based on
Guam’s continuing jurisdiction and respondent’s consent for it to be modified in
Minnesota, it had jurisdiction to enforce the foreign judgment. The parties then filed a
series of motions, including respondent’s request for an updated judgment in the amount
of $427,694.50.
Following a hearing on all pending motions , the district court entered a money
judgment against appellant in the amount of $427,694.50. The district court also granted
respondent’s motions for garnishment and income withholding of appellant’s military
retired pay and other income to satisfy arrears and his continuing maintenance obligation.
In a subsequent garnishment order , the district court directed DFAS to withhold the
maximum amount legally permitted from appellant’s disposable military retired pay.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
We review a district court’s judgment enforcing spousal-maintenance arrears for an
abuse of discretion. See Nelson v. Nelson , 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011)
(reviewing an order implementing or enforcing a dissolution judgment for an abuse of
discretion). A district court abuses its discretion when it makes factual findings without
evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or delivers a decision contrary to logic and the
record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Appellate courts review
de novo the district court’s application of the law. Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).

4
I. The district court did not violate appellant’s right to due process.
Appellant first argues that the district court’s denial of his motion to modify his
financial obligations , followed later by an enforcement order, created a “jurisdictional
‘gap.’” Specifically, appellant contends that the district court “created a one-sided
procedural outcome in which enforcement advanced while meaningful modification relief
remained unavailable.” We interpret appellant as raising a procedural -due-process
challenge.2
“Procedural due process protections restrain government action which deprives
individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the due process clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution.” Sweet v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 702 N.W.2d
314, 319 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005).
Procedural due process concerns whether an individual had “reasonable notice of hearing
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” Kletschka v. Le Sueur Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
277 N.W.2d 404, 405 (Minn. 1979). In evaluating a procedural -due-process claim,
appellate courts begin by considering whether the claimant has a protected liberty or
property interest and then apply a balancing test to determine the appropriate amount of

2 Appellant does not dispute that Minnesota ’s version of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (MUIFSA) allows a responding tribunal to enforce a registered support order
issued in another jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 518C.603(b) (2024). Rather, he focuses on
whether the district court exercised its enforcement authority in a manner consistent with
due process.

5
process due. Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 319 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 3 32,
335 (1976)).
As to the first part of a procedural -due-process analysis, appellant has a property
interest in the money he pays for support. See Machacek v. Voss , 361 N.W.2d 861, 86 3
(Minn. 1985) (discussing that parties have a “private interest in the money they pay for
temporary support”).
In considering the balancing test found in the second part of the analysis, appellate
courts examine the following three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by
the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substantive procedural requirement
would entail.” Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 314 (quotations omitted); accord Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 335.
Here, appellant’s spousal-maintenance obligation is significant; however, any risk
of error in the enforcement process was reduced by adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard. The record clearly demonstrates that appellant had notice of respondent’s
enforcement motion and responded both through written filings and participation at a
motion hearing. Further, appellant fails to identify any available procedures providing
additional safeguards to protect his interests. Finally, a ppellant’s concerns about a
“jurisdictional gap” are misplaced given that nothing in the district court’s judgment
precludes him from seeking modification of his support obligation in a court with

6
appropriate jurisdiction. Appellant fails to demonstrate that the deprivation of his property
interest constitutes a procedural -due-process violation within the meaning of the
three-factor test. Accordingly, appellant’s procedural-due-process argument fails.
II. The garnishment order does not conflict with federal law.
Appellant contends that the district court’s garnishment order violates federal law
relating to both his disability benefits and retirement pay. We address each argument
below.
A. Disability Benefits

Appellant suggests that the garnishment order may conflict with a federal
prohibition against collection from disability benefits administered by the U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs . We are not persuaded. We do not presume error on appeal, and
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error. White v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 567
N.W.2d 724, 734 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997). The arrears
judgment and corresponding garnishment order do not include language that expressly
authorizes respondent to seek garnishment of appellant’s disability benefits. Rather, DFAS
is directed to withhold funds from appellant’s “disposable military retired pay” in the
“maximum amount legally permitted.” Appellant accordingly fails to demonstrate that the
district court ordered garnishment from his disability benefits. Because appellant failed to
meet this threshold requirement, we decline to address whether it would have been lawful
for the district court to allow garnishment from appellant’s disability benefits.

7
B. Retirement Pay
Appellant next argues that the district court erred by failing to specify that
“enforcement is confined to disposable retired pay within federal limits and does not
acknowledge that [his] retirement pay is already divided to the maximum extent permitted
under federal law.” We disagree.
Federal law places a ceiling on the amount of disposable military retired pay that a
court may order garnished for support purposes broadly. Specifically, the amount subject
to garnishment shall not exceed 50% of an individual’s disposable earnings. 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(e)(1) (2024); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2024) (referring to “the support of
any person”).
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the district court did specify the limits for
garnishing his military retired pay. The judgment recognized the limitations that 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408 and 15 U.S.C. § 1673 place on garnishment of military retired earnings. The
accompanying garnishment order specifies that “[f]rom all uniformed services retired pay
received after August 1, 2025, [appellant] shall pay Respondent additional funds each
month towards [appellant’s] support arrears owed to Respondent to the maximum amount
legally permitted.” (Emphasis added.) It similarly provides that “ [DFAS] is directed to
withhold from the disposable military retired pay of [appellant] the maximum amount
legally permitted towards [appellant’s] monthly support obligation and support arrears .”
(Emphasis added.) As the district court’s order recognized the federal limitations on
garnishing military retire d pay, appellant’s argument that the district court’s order is
defective accordingly fails.

8
III. The district court did not err by entering the judgment without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.

Appellant contends that the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine the amount of arrears. As an initial matter, we conclude that appellant
forfeits this argument by failing to present it to the district court. Upon careful review of
the record, we discern no request for an evidentiary hearing. Although appellant, as a
self-represented party, “is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with
court rules,” he still has the burden of “adequately communicating to the court what it is
he wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727,
729 (Minn. 1987). Because he did not present this issue to the district court, it is beyond
the scope of appellate review. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented [to] and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation
omitted)).
Even if not forfeited, we conclude appellant’s argument also fails on the merits. We
review a district court’s decision regarding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for an
abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 429-30 (Minn. App. 2007).
“Under the Minnesota Rules of General Practice, it is presumed that a motion in family
law, other than a motion for contempt, will be decided without an evidentiary hearing,
unless the district court determines that there is good cause for a hearing.” Id. at 430 (citing
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303 .03(d)). We have previously applied the summary -judgment
standard in evaluating whether good cause existed to grant an evidentiary hearing, which

9
“requires a determination of whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether
the movant is entitled to the requested relief as a matter of law.” Id.
Although appellant made passing reference to other payments, he did not offer the
requisite “specific, admissible facts” to create good cause for granting an evidentiary
hearing. Cf. Beecroft v. Deutsche Bank Nat ’l Tr. Co., 798 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Minn. App.
2011) (emphasis and quotation omitted) (applying summary- judgment standard), rev.
denied (Minn. July 19, 2011).
As appellant’s argument both fails on the merits and is forfeit ed, we find no error
by the district court in denying an evidentiary hearing.
IV. The district court made sufficient findings.

Appellant last argues that the district court made insufficient findings for appellate
review by failing to demonstrate how it “calculated arrears and resolved contested
payments.” A district court is required to “find the facts specially and state separa tely its
conclusions of law” in actions tried without a jury or advisory jury. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
Put differently, an order or judgment must “identify the facts that the district court has
determined to be true and the facts on which the district co urt’s decision is based.” In re
Civ. Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014). This court has
determined findings to be insufficient for appellate review when, for example, a district
court determines that claims are frivolous in denying a fee -waiver application without
articulating a basis for this determination. Nelson v. Arroyo Ins. Servs., Inc., 23 N.W.3d
415, 419 (Minn. App. 2025).

10
Here, the district court noted that respondent requested a judgment of $427,694.50
based upon her affidavit specifically setting forth her calculations for this exact amount.
The district court then found that appellant owes $427,694.50 in support arrears after
calculating the total support payments due, the total amount that appellant paid, the total
amount respondent received from DFAS, and subtract ing the latter two from the first to
derive the amount owing . Even if appellant offered facts supporting certain “contested
payments,” implicit in the district court’s calculation is that it found respondent’s
submissions credible. The district court accordingly made sufficient findings for appellate
review.
Affirmed.