State of Minnesota v. John Lee Edmondson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1681

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Lee Edmondson,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-1159

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this direct appeal from convictions for second-degree intentional murder and
unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant argues (1) that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his request for a justifiable-use-of-force jury instruction; (2) that
the district court also abused its discretion when it excluded testimony about the victim’s
previous violent acts; and (3) that the district court erred in determining that appellant’s
prior conviction for aiding-and-abetting second-degree murder was a heinous crime for
sentencing purposes. In a self-represented supplemental brief, appellant further contends
that the district court provided a plainly erroneous duty-to-retreat jury instruction. Because
we discern no errors or abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from a jury trial. On February 25, 2023, appellant John
Lee Edmondson attended a repass gathering in the community room of an apartment
building in St. Paul. 1 The gathering was attended by approximately 50 family members
and friends, including victims T.K. and L.J.
Later in the afternoon as the repass was winding down, T.K. and another attendee
began arguing in the community room, and their conflict spilled out into the building’s
parking lot. Witnesses reported seeing one of the individuals grab a gun or otherwise

1 A repass is a get-together held after a funeral to offer support and a meal to the family of
the individual who passed away.

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hearing that someone was getting a gun. A number of attendees were standing in the
parking lot, including L.J.
Edmondson was getting into his car with his mother and niec e to leave the repass,
unaware of the altercation. As Edmondson drove through the parking lot, Edmondson’s
mother testified that she saw L.J. “standing there with the gun” and told Edmondson to
stop the car. Witnesses described that they then saw Edmondson jump out of his car and
shoot L.J. twice in the back of the head and neck. L.J.’s sister testified that she attempted
to administer aid to L.J. and, at the same time, pulled a pistol out of L.J.’s waistband and
tossed it away.
After Edmondson fired the two shots, other armed attendees in the parking lot began
to shoot at Edmondson, who returned fire. T.K. was shot at some point during the shootout,
but amidst the chaos, it was unclear who had shot him. Before leaving the scene, some
witnesses recalled hearing Edmondson say, “If anybody else wants it, they can get it, too.”
L.J. died from his injuries in the parking lot. T.K. also succumbed to his injuries after being
driven to the hospital.
Edmondson was arrested at a hotel several days later in connection with both deaths.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Edmondson with first-degree premeditated murder
of L.J., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022); first- degree intentional murder
of L.J. while committing a felony, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022); two
counts of second-degree intentional murder for L.J. and T.K., in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2022); second-degree unintentional felony murder of

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T.K., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2022); and unlawful possession of a
firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022).
Trial
A jury trial was held between March 26 and April 14, 2025. The state presented
dozens of witnesses, including responding and investigating officers, forensic scientists,
and eyewitnesses who attended the repass and saw the events transpire in the parking lot.
The state also presented numerous exhibits, including photos taken at the scene, diagrams
of the parking lot, and surveillance video of different portions of the repass and ensuing
gunfight. The defense presented testimony from Edmondson and several other
eyewitnesses.
At trial, Edmondson argued that he acted in defense of others by shooting L.J. To
support that defense, Edmondson sought to introduce testimony about L.J.’s general
reputation for violence and prior violent acts. The district court allowed reputation evidence
to be admitted into evidence but prohibited Edmondson from introducing any testimony
about L.J.’s specific violent acts unless Edmondson had personal knowledge of them. Later
in the trial, defense counsel alerted the court that Edmondson did have personal knowledge
of one such specific instance in which L.J. shot a man “eight times around 2020 or 2021.”
Counsel argued that, based on L.J.’s reputation for violence and Edmondson’s knowledge
of the prior shooting, Edmondson made the decision to shoot L.J. in order to protect
“[e]verbody that was standing out there” in the parking lot. The district court still excluded
the testimony but did not elaborate on its reasoning.

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Edmondson testified at length during the trial. Edmondson described that L.J.’s
reputation meant that “[y]ou just don’t want to be playing with him,” but at the time of the
repass, he had a good relationship with L.J. and there was “[a]bsolutely not” any friction
between the two.
Edmondson also provided his own narrative of the incident. He stated that he had
seen L.J. standing in the parking lot with a “gun behind his back,” which L.J. then cocked.
Edmondson stated that he felt “shocked” and he “just jumped out the door” and “moved
real fast . . . in front of [L.J.].” Edmondson stated that he saw L.J. begin to raise the gun at
a bystander, and he tried to grab the gun but “[L.J.] wouldn’t give it to [him].” Edmondson
then “just shot twice,” which he described as more of a reaction than a conscious choice.
Immediately after, “all of the shots start[ed] coming” from elsewhere in the parking lot,
and so Edmondson “just turned and defended [himself].”
On cross-examination, the prosecutor pushed Edmondson to admit that he intended
to kill L.J. or premeditated it. The following exchange occurred:
Q: And you shot without aiming is your testimony?
A: Well, I shot towards here (indicating), yes. Towards his
neck, yes. I guess, yes.

Q: And you shot more than once?
A: Yes, I shot twice.

Q: Shot the second time to make sure he was dead?
A: (No audible response.)

Q: Right?
A: I wouldn’t say that.

Q: You didn’t shoot him in the back of his head?
A: No.

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Q: Okay.
A: Back of his head? I thought he got shot in the neck.

Q: Neck, head, general area, do you agree you shot him in the
back of the neck or head?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that was to make sure you killed him?
A: I wouldn’t say that. It was just a reaction, and I just shot the
gun.

Based on that testimony, Edmondson’s counsel requested to include a general
justifiable-use-of-force jury instruction in addition to the specific justifiable-taking-a-life
instruction already included.
2 The district court denied the request because Edmondson did
not give a “complete denial” to the question about whether he intended to kill L.J., and so
the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction was more apt. The final jury instructions related to
the charge of second-degree intentional murder of L.J. therefore stated:
The Defendant asserts the defense of justifiable taking
of life in defense of others. Again, no crime is committed when
a person intentionally takes the life of another if the person’s
action was taken in resisting or preventing an offense that the
person reasonably believed exposed another person to death or
great bodily harm.

The instructions also noted that the defense-of -others defense is available “only to those
who act honestly and in good faith” and “only if the person was not the aggressor and did
not provoke the offense.”

2 The general justifiable-use-of-force instruction is appropriate when a defendant’s actions
taken in self- defense or in defense of others unintentionally resulted in another’s death.
10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 6.10 (2025). In contrast, the justifiable-taking-a-life
instruction applies when the defendant intentionally took another’s life but argues it was
justified to protect themselves or others. 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 6.12 (2025).

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The jury found Edmondson guilty of second-degree intentional murder of L.J. and
unlawful possession of a firearm. Edmondson was acquitted of the remaining charges.
Sentencing
Prior to sentencing, the state moved for a 40-year mandatory minimum sentence to
be applied to Edmondson’s second-degree murder conviction based on his prior conviction
for a “heinous crime”—aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder —under
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.106 and 609.107 (2022). Edmondson’s counsel filed a
responsive brief arguing that aiding and abetting an offense did not fall under the definition
of a “heinous crime.”
At the sentencing hearing the district court agreed with the state, determining that
Edmondson’s prior conviction was a heinous crime and that the mandatory sentence
applied. The district court sentenced Edmondson to 480 months’ imprisonment for second-
degree murder and a concurrent 72 months’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a
firearm.3
Edmondson appeals.
DECISION
Edmondson makes four arguments on appeal. First, Edmondson argues that the
district court abused its discretion at trial by rejecting his requested general justifiable-use-
of-force instruction. Second, he asserts that the court also abused its discretion by excluding

3 Edmondson later filed a preliminary application to vacate his aiding and abetting second-
degree intentional felony murder conviction, which the district court summarily denied. He
challenges the denial of that application in a separate appeal.

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testimony about L.J.’s prior act of violence. Third, Edmondson maintains that his prior
conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder was not a heinous crime
under Minn. Stat. § 609.106 (2022). And fourth, Edmondson argues in his self-represented
brief that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the duty to retreat. We consider
each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by omitting the general
justifiable-use-of-force instruction.

Edmondson first challenges the district court’s omission of his requested jury
instruction for general justifiable use of force, and inclusion of only the specific justifiable-
taking-a-life instruction, as related to the defense of others.
District courts have “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions.”
State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). We review the district court’s decision
to deny a jury instruction request for an abuse of discretion. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d
130, 142 (Minn. 2012). “It is an abuse of the district court’s discretion to refuse to give an
instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if there is evidence to support it.”
State v. Baker, 13 N.W.3d 401, 408 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). If a district court
erred in its instructions, appellate courts then consider whether the error was “harmless,”
meaning that, “beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction had no significant impact on the
verdict rendered.” State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010).
Under Minnesota law, there are certain circumstances in which one may use
reasonable force to defend others. State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. App.
2017). A person may generally use “reasonable force” when “resisting or aiding another to

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resist an offense against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022). This general
authorization, however, does not permit the intentional taking of a life.
Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2022). Instead, a person may only intentionally take the life of
another “when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the [person]
reasonably believes exposes . . . another to great bodily harm or death.” Id. This is known
as the justifiable-taking-of-life defense. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 179.
It is appropriate for a district court to instruct the jury on justifiable taking of life
“where the defendant admits that the killing was intentional but claims that it was justified.”
State v. Malaski, 330 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Minn. 1983) (emphasis added). When a defendant
claims that the victim’s death was “not the intended result,” it is error to provide a specific
justifiable-taking-of-life instruction, and a general justifiable-use -of-force instruction
should be given instead. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 179.
Edmondson asserts that, because he did not admit that he intended to kill L.J. and
he was “just reacting in the moment,” the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction. We are not persuaded.
Edmondson was only entitled to the general instruction if it was supported by the evidence.
Baker, 13 N.W.3d at 408; see also State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 n.6 (Minn. 1998)
(“Obviously, when the record before the trial court does not contain evidence from which
an inference could be drawn that the death was unintentional, the use of [the general
instruction] is not required.”). Edmondson testified that he intentionally shot L.J. twice and
he aimed “[t]owards his neck.” And, as the district court pointed out, Edmondson did not
fully deny that he intended to kill L.J. —instead, when the prosecutor asked whether

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Edmondson meant to “make sure [he] killed [L.J.],” Edmondson only answered that he
“wouldn’t say that.” Little evidence supports the conclusion that Edmondson lacked the
intent to kill sufficient to justify including a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction.
We are further convinced that the district court acted within its discretion here when
viewing these facts in comparison with other murder cases where courts have provided the
general justifiable-use-of-force instruction to the jury. For example, in Baker, the supreme
court held that Baker was entitled to a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction with
respect to defense of others after Baker reacted to an armed carjacking by shooting one of
the assailants eleven times, killing him. 13 N.W.3d at 405-06, 411-12. The supreme court
stated that there was “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
the degree of force used was reasonable,” and so a new trial was appropriate. Id. at 411-
12. Similarly, in State v. Valdez, a general defense-of-others instruction was given whe n
Valdez shot and killed a man who was choking his stepbrother and who had already been
struck over the head with a pool cue but had remained undeterred in his attack. 12 N.W.3d
191, 194-95, 201 (Minn. 2024). Edmondson, by contrast, was not involved in any ongoing
altercation with L.J. as in Baker, nor did he witness L.J. in an active altercation with anyone
else like Valdez. Even accepting Edmondson’s version of events as true, he instead inserted
himself into the situation and almost immediately reacted with deadly force. In light of the
facts in Baker and Valdez, Edmondson’s argument that he was entitled to a general
justifiable-use-of-force instruction is not persuasive.
Although a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction is typically required when a
defendant does not claim intent to kill, see Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 179, here, there is

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insufficient evidence to support that Edmondson did not intend to kill L.J. We discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to instruct the jury only on justifi able
taking of a life.4
II. The district court’s exclusion of testimony about L.J.’s prior act of violence was
harmless.

Edmondson next argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
relevant and admissible testimony about L.J. previously shooting a man in 2020 or 2021.
Edmondson further argues that the exclusion of this evidence was not harmless because the
jury was deprived of hearing all evidence necessary to consider Edmondson’s defense.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the “meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense,” which includes presenting witness testimony to support a
defense. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006); see also U.S. Const. amend.
XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

4 Indeed, we are not convinced that Edmondson was entitled to any defense-of- others
instruction under these facts. Edmondson unlawfully brought a gun to a gathering where
he knew others were likely armed. Then, based on the mere sight of L.J. holding a gun,
Edmondson leapt from his car and shot L.J., instigating a shootout in a busy parking lot
that resulted in multiple casualties. Not only could Edmondson be viewed as the aggressor
of this conflict, but his actions also represent the type of unnecessary escalation that courts
aim to discourage under longstanding public policy related to self-defense claims. See, e.g.,
State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 232 (1865) (“Where the party has not retreated from or
attempted to shun the combat, but has as in this case unnecessarily entered into it, his act
is not one of self-defense.”); State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Minn. 2014) (declining
to extend the castle doctrine where it “might encourage, rather than discourage,
unnecessary and potentially deadly confrontations”); State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 37
(Minn. 2024) (“[W]e have described the public policy interests underlying the judicially
created duty to retreat . . . to include avoiding potentially deadly confrontations.” (quotation
omitted)). Although a self-defense claim is not at issue here, defense-of-others claims
nevertheless “parallel[]” self-defense, Valdez, 12 N.W.3d at 197, and so Edmondson’s
actions still ought to be discouraged under the same general policy.

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discretion “even when . . . the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived
him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). Reversal is appropriate “only if
the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
A defense-of-others claim requires the defendant to establish four elements: (1) the
defendant was not the aggressor, (2) the defendant held an “actual and honest belief
that . . . another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,” (3) that belief was
reasonable, and (4) there was no “reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger.” Id. The
defendant has the burden to present evidence supporting each element, and the prosecution
has the burden to disprove at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
Prior-acts evidence may be relevant and admissible to show that the defendant
reasonably apprehended death or great bodily harm. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 202; see also
State v. Matthews, 221 N.W.2d 563, 564 ( Minn. 1974) (“[E]vidence of a specific act of
violence is admissible in the discretion of the trial court where commonsense indicates that
these acts could legitimately affect a defendant’s apprehensions.”). But even if evidence is
relevant to show reasonable apprehension, the rules of evidence may still provide reason
to exclude it. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 203.
Edmondson asserts that the district court improperly excluded testimony about
L.J.’s prior act—which Edmondson claimed to have personal knowledge of—because that
testimony was relevant, admissible, and highly probative. Evidence is relevant if it has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

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Minn. R. Evid. 401. But relevant evidence may still be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
It is difficult to fully discern the relevance and the potential probative value of L.J.’s
prior act because Edmondson provided scant details about the act and his knowledge of it.
The testimony was proffered in a sidebar at trial, and Edmondson’s attorney even said that
he “presume[d]” the testimony was “not coming in.” The evidence may have corroborated
Edmondson’s argument that he acted in defense of others and reasonably apprehended
harm, suggesting that it was relevant and admissible. Cf. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 203
(concluding that a district court abused its discretion by excluding specific acts testimony
that would have corroborated the defendant’s defense- of-others claim). But without
additional information about the testimony , the district court was limited in its ability to
weigh the testimony’s probative or prejudicial value, or to assess whether the testimony
made it more probable that Edmondson believed that L.J. posed an imminent danger to
others. See Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403.
Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
the evidence, we nevertheless are convinced that the exclusion was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We “may consider the strength of each party’s evidence when
determining whether admitting excluded evidence would have led to a different result.”
Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d at 697. The state presented compelling evidence that Edmondson
did not reasonably or honestly believe that L.J. posed an imminent danger to others in the
moments before the shooting, and it therefore made a strong case to disprove two elements

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of Edmondson’s defense. See id. at 694 (listing elements of a defense-of-others claim).
During cross-examination of Edmondson, the state elicited testimony that L.J. had not fully
raised his gun when Edmondson shot him, and that there was “[n]othing about . . . previous
interactions [with L.J.] that caused [Edmondson] any concern that day.” Edmondson also
had no knowledge of the conflict that broke out at the end of the repass, as he left prior to
the argument starting. Additionally, several of the state’s witnesses cast doubt on
Edmondson’s account of the shooting, testifying that L.J. was not holding a gun when he
was shot.
Moreover, Edmondson did not provide strong evidence proving the other elements
of his defense—namely, that he was not the aggressor and that there was no reasonable
possibility of retreat. As we have already discussed, Edmondson inserted himself into this
situation, fired the first shot, and testified that he and L.J. had no problems at the repass.
The only other evidence Edmondson presented to support his defense theory was that L.J.
had a reputation as someone you did not want to be “playing” with and that L.J. was raising
a gun, which was disputed by other witnesses. Taken together, these facts do not strongly
support all four elements of a defense-of-others defense . Even if Edmondson’s testimony
about L.J.’s prior act was admitted, we are persuaded that the state’s strong case against
Edmondson would have still led the jury to reject Edmondson’s defense. We conclude that
the exclusion of Edmondson’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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III. The district court did not err in determining that Edmondson’s prior
conviction was a “heinous crime” under Minn. Stat. § 609.106.

Edmondson next maintains that the district court erroneously concluded that his
prior conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder was a “heinous
crime,” resulting in the court wrongfully sentencing Edmondson to the maximum sentence
duration under Minnesota Statutes section 609.107. Edmondson specifically argues that
aiding and abetting is not a “heinous crime.”
We review statutory interpretation questions de novo. State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d
803, 808 (Minn. 2021). A defendant convicted of second-degree intentional murder must
be sentenced to the “statutory maximum sentence for the offense” if they were “previously
convicted of a heinous crime as defined in section 609.106.” Minn. Stat. § 609.107. A
“heinous crime” means “a violation or attempted violation of section . . . 609.19,” which
includes second-degree felony murder. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.106, subd. 1(a)(1), .19, subd.
2(1) (2022). Edmondson was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree felony
murder in 1994. See State v. Edmondson, No. C0-94-1708, 1995 WL 254354, at *2-3
(Minn. App. May 2, 1995), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 1995).
In Browder v. State, this court recognized “a long-standing precept of
statutory criminal law, which is that there is no distinction between a principal offender and
an accomplice who aids and abets the principal’s crime.” 899 N.W.2d 525, 528
(Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2017). The statutory language
interpreted in Browder to encompass aiding-and-abetting crimes mirrors the language of
the “heinous crime” statute, and so we are convinced that the same precept applies. Id.

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Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2012) (imposing a ten-year conditional-release
period for “a violation of” an enumerated offense); with
Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 1(a)(1) (defining as a heinous crime “a violation of” an
enumerated homicide offense). We conclude, as the district court did, that Edmondson’s
prior conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder therefore meets the
definition of a “heinous crime.”5
IV. The district court’s duty-to-retreat instruction was not plainly erroneous.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Edmondson last argues that the district court
improperly instructed the jury on the duty-to -retreat element of his defense-of -others
defense.
Edmondson objected to the jury instruction during sentencing but not during trial.
We review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789,
805 (Minn. 2012). “Under our plain-error test, we consider whether the jury instructions
contained an (1) error (2) that was plain and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial
rights.” Id. If all three prongs are met, we then consider “whether we must address the error
to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).

5 Edmondson also requested that, if this court concludes that his prior conviction was a
heinous crime, we also specifically preserve his ability to request resentencing. We note
that Edmondson is entitled to seek a sentencing correction “at any time” under Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, and no specific permission is required
from this court to do so. And we note that Edmondson’s other appeal in
Edmondson v. State, __N.W.3d __ (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2026), that was released on
August 24, 2026, would only impact our opinion if the conviction at issue in that case is
vacated on remand following the remand ordered by this court.

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Edmondson argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the
persons in peril that he sought to defend “had a duty to retreat before Edmondson could
defend them.” The jury instruction stated: “Fourth, the Defendant must have reasonably
believed, based on the information available to the Defendant at the time the Defendant
acted, that the person or persons the Defendant sought to defend had no reasonable
possibility of safely retreating from or avoiding the danger.” This instruction plainly
required that the persons in peril “had no reasonable possibility of safely retreating,” not
that they must retreat. This wording is accurate to the rule recently stated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court regarding the duty to retreat in a defense-of-others claim, which is that “the
person in peril must not have had a reasonable possibility of safe retreat.” Valdez, 12
N.W.3d at 199 (emphasis omitted). The instruction given at trial accurately stated the rule
and was not erroneous.
Edmondson also argues that, under Baker, people in peril have no duty to retreat
when firearms are involved. But Baker does not provide any broad exception to the duty-
to-retreat. Rather, the supreme court determined under the specific facts of that case that
the individuals in peril did not have a reasonable possibility of retreating because they were
in a car and within an armed assailant’s line of fire. 13 N.W.3d at 411. Because Baker
simply applied the Valdez duty-to-retreat rule , we again identify no error in the district
court’s instruction.

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In sum, we detect no error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s duty-to-retreat
instructions. We therefore do not reach the remaining prongs of the plain-error test.
State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012) (“If we conclude that any prong of the
plain error analysis is not satisfied, we need not consider the other prongs.).
Affirmed.