State of Minnesota v. Alujonae Sherae Fowler

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1736

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alujonae Sherae Fowler,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-7218

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Irene Kao, St. Paul City Attorney, Keiran Bleich, Steven Heng, Assistant City Attorneys,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Alujonae Sherae Fowler, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of violating a harassment restraining order
(HRO), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly violated the
HRO. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In October 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Alujonae Sherae
Fowler with violating an HRO. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b) (2022).
At Fowler’s jury trial, T.S. testified that she knew Fowler because “at one point
[they] were dating” the same man. T.S. obtained an HRO against Fowler because Fowler
made threats and knew where T.S. lived. The HRO prohibited Fowler “from being within
two city blocks or one -fourth of a mile in all directions of [T.S.]’s home.” The HRO
identified T.S.’s street address and apartment number. A police officer testified that he
served Fowler with the HRO, and she acknowledged service.
T.S. testified that, on July 6, 2024, she placed an order with a food-delivery service.
She let the delivery person in from downstairs and the person knocked on her door. When
she opened the door, Fowler was “standing there with her feet shoulder width apart, arms
crossed over her . . . chest, and she said, ‘What’s up,’ with a smirk.” T.S. “jolted back,”
slammed the door, and called the police.
T.S. testified that her apartment building is clearly marked and “a person would
know where they are.” She also testified that the “buzzer box” that a delivery person uses
to be permitted into the building “says [her] name and apartment number.” T.S. testified
that the delivery application selects a nearby driver, and a driver has the option to cancel.
Fowler testified that she does not receive a customer’s information until after she
picks up an order. She testified that, after she picks up an order, she receives the customer’s
first name, last initial, and address for the delivery.

3
Fowler testified that, on July 6, the order generated an address, and she entered the
address in her GPS not thinking that it was T.S. ’s address. She testified that she followed
someone inside the building, went to the apartment, and dropped the bags at the door.
Fowler testified that T.S. “peeked around the corner of the door, slid the bags into the
house, and closed the door.” Fowler stated: “[W]hen I noticed that it was her, I left
immediately. I looked at her and went on about my business. I wasn’t there on intentional
purposes.”
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fowler if she took the order to the
address identified in the HRO. She replied: “That’s correct.” The prosecutor asked: “And
you knew . . . this [HRO] . . . prohibit[ed] you from being within a quarter mile of that
address; correct?” She replied: “Correct.” The prosecutor asked: “[Y]ou continued to
drive to that address having knowledge that this [HRO] was still in full effect?” Fowler
replied: “Correct.”
The jury found Fowler guilty of violating the HRO. The district court sentenced
Fowler to 90 days in jail, stayed for one year while she was on supervised probation. This
appeal followed.
DECISION
Fowler argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly
violated the HRO. When considering an insufficient-evidence claim, this court analyzes
the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

4
conviction, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.1 State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86,
100 (Minn. 2012). This court “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard
for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Fowler claims that she did not know that the address belonged to T.S., and that she
left as soon as she realized that she was at the prohibited address. She asserts that nothing
in the record shows that she intentionally sought out T.S.’s residence and claims that the
state was required to prove that she knew about the HRO and that she knowingly violated
the terms of the HRO.
But Fowler was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of an HRO. The elements of
the offense are as follows: (1) an order existed, (2) the prohibited person knew of the order,
and (3) the prohibited person violated the order. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b).
The district court properly instructed the jury on these elements. Fowler incorrectly asserts

1 Fowler’s admissions on cross-examination are direct evidence supporting her conviction.
She claims, however, that we should analyze her claim under the two-step circumstantial-
evidence test. See State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (stating that in
reviewing circumstantial evidence, this court resolves questions of fact in favor of verdict,
which provides circumstances proved; this court then decides whether the circumstances
proved allow for a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt). Even if we were to apply
the circumstantial-evidence test, it sustains Fowler’s conviction. As an initial matter, we
are not persuaded that Fowler’s claim that she did not realize that the apartment was the
victim’s is part of the circumstances proved because it is not consistent with the verdict.
But if we accept Fowler’s claim, the evidence still establishes (1) that Fowler knew of the
HRO, which included the victim’s address ; (2) her input of the address into the GPS ;
(3) her use of the buzzer box bearing the victim’s name and apartment number; and
(4) Fowler’s stance in greeting the victim when the victim opened the door. This evidence
allows for no reasonable inference other than Fowler knew that she was at the victim’s
apartment in violation of the HRO.

5
that the offense includes an additional knowledge element requiring proof that she
knowingly violated the HRO. See State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 160-61 (Minn.
App. 2012).
For the misdemeanor offense, the jury had to find only that Fowler knew of the HRO
and that she violated a term. T.S. testified that the delivery person (Fowler) used the buzzer
box, which showed her name and apartment number, for access to the building. T.S. let
the delivery person in from downstairs, and when she opened the door, Fowler was
standing outside the door, smirking. On cross -examination, Fowler admitted to knowing
she was restricted from the address indicated in the HRO and admitted to going to the
restricted address. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Fowler
violated the HRO.
Affirmed.