Jennifer Odegaard, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1845

Jennifer Odegaard,
Appellant,

vs.

610 MOB Partners, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-24-11038

Eric C. Arch, Pattee, Tewksbury & Kerfeld, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Christopher J. Van Rybroek, The Cincinnati Insurance Company, Coon Rapids,
Minnesota; and

Michael S. Rowley, Goetz & Eckland, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside the building in which she
worked, injuring her knee. She sued respondent limited-liability corporation, which owned
the building, alleging that its negligence resulted in the dangerous condition that led to her
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fall. Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
respondent, arguing that genuine issues of material fact make summary judgment
inappropriate. We conclude that no record evidence supports a reasonable inference that
respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of the icy sidewalk or that the icy
sidewalk actually resulted from the direct action of respondent or its employees. Thus , we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jennifer Odegaard worked for a medical-services tenant at the
610 Medical Building in Brooklyn Park (the property). Respondent 610 MOB Partners
LLC (MOB) owned the property. On December 27, 2022, Odegaard slipped and fell on an
icy sidewalk near the north entrance of the property, fracturing her kneecap. Odegaard was
placing garbage in a waste container on the sidewalk at the time she fell.
Odegaard sued MOB. The complaint alleged that MOB was (1) “negligent in the
design and construction of the entrance area” and (2) “negligent in maintaining the property
and failed to provide adequate warning of the hazards present on the property.” MOB
moved for summary judgment, arguing that no evidence showed that “anyone knew ice
formed in front of the trash cans before [Odegaard] fell” or that “MOB created the
condition based on the design” of the entrance. Odegaard opposed the motion, and both
parties submitted evidence in support of their positions.
We therefore summarize the record evidence in a light favorable to Odegaard, the
nonmoving party. The record establishes that the property’s north entrance is covered by
an overhang, which has a roof drain that opens above the sidewalk. The district court and
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the parties refer to the building overhang as an “awning” and the roof drain as a
“downspout” or “overflow spout.” Outside the north entrance, two waste containers sat on
the sidewalk that led to the parking lot . Two photographs, which Odegaard submitted in
response to MOB’s motion for summary judgment, depict the north entrance, overhang,
roof drain, waste containers, and sidewalk:

Davis Management Group managed the property. In a deposition, Davis
Management’s senior vice president of property management, Peggy Schatz, testified that
Davis Management opened the property in June 2022, six months before Odegaard’s fall.1
Schatz testified and agreed that she and other Davis Management employees inspected the

1 The relationship between MOB and Davis Management is somewhat unclear. Schatz
initially testified that Davis Management owned the property. When asked if Davi s
Management owned MOB, Schatz testified that she “couldn’t give specifics” and that she
did not know.

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property for “cosmetic” and “maintenance” issues “[o]nce a month” without a “set time”
or “schedule.”
Schatz also testified that Davis Management hired Curbside Landscape and
Irrigation to remove snow and ice from the property. Schatz testified and confirmed that
the written agreement between Davis Management and Curbside provided that Curbside
would “shovel or snow blow and salt” the sidewalks if there was “any amount of snow or
ice.”
Weather records show that, in the ten days before Odegaard fell, no significant
snowfall occurred and outside temperatures remained below freezing. 2 These records also
show that, on the day before Odegaard fell, it snowed 0.02 inches. It appears undisputed
that Curbside shoveled and salted the sidewalks the same day it snowed. The record
includes logs stating that Curbside plowed, shoveled, and salted the property between
1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on December 26, 2022.
Odegaard testified in her deposition that, before she fell on December 27, she “had
never noticed any ice . . . directly right in front of the [waste] cans” outside the north
entrance, even though Odegaard used the waste containers “almost on a daily basis.”
Odegaard testified that she did not recall seeing any ice on the sidewalk outside the north
entrance when she arrived at 8:00 a.m. on December 27, 2022, or when she left the property

2 Weather records show that, the day before Odegaard fell, the high temperature was
12 degrees Fahrenheit. On the day Odegaard fell, the high temperature was 25 degrees
Fahrenheit.
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for her lunch break. Odegaard stated that the weather “was not extremely sunny” but “was
a little bit wet out, a little bit snowy, a little bit of snow cover.”
As Odegaard returned from her lunch break, she walked from the parking lot toward
the waste containers by the north entrance to throw away some trash. Odegaard “noticed
the entire sidewalk had a little bit of dusting of snow on it,” but she “did not see any ice or
anything out of the ordinary.” Odegaard fell on her left knee; she then saw ice where she
“had fallen in the snow.”
A surveillance camera captured a ten-second recording of Odegaard walking to the
north entrance; Odegaard fell in front of the waste containers. The quality of the video is
poor and does not show the surface of the sidewalk. According to Odegaard, nobody told
her there was ice near the waste containers that day, and she did not “know if anybody else
in the building was aware there was ice there or not.”
Odegaard testified that she “did not know how the ice had gotten” on the sidewalk.
On January 11, 2023, Odegaard gave a recorded statement to a claims adjuster about her
fall. When asked if there were “any drain spouts or eaves or pipes” that caused the ic y
sidewalk in front of the waste containers, Odegaard responded that she was “not sure what
caused the wetness in the area because it didn’t seem to be anywhere else on the sidewalk”
and she did not “know what caused the ice there honestly.”
After her fall, Odegaard returned to the north entrance and saw the roof drain in the
overhang. Odegaard testified that it was “actively draining” water near where she fell. She
testified that the waste containers were “not directly under the spout.” But Odegaard did
not recall seeing “melted snow drip from [ the] awning or spout” on the day she fell and
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testified that she did not feel “anything dripping on” her after her fall. Odegaard agreed
that, before she fell, nobody told her about water dripping from the overhang above the
north entrance or from the roof drain.
In her deposition, Schatz agreed that there was “a roof drain that drains water from
the awning” above the north entrance. She added that no changes had occurred to the roof
drain “since the opening of the building.” Schatz denied ever seeing “water actively
flowing out of that spout” and denied that “any tenants complained about the water running
from the spout before.” Schatz explained that, after Odegaard fell, Davis Management
“moved” the waste containers to a place under the overhang and “away from the elements.”
After a hearing, the district court granted MOB’s motion for summary judgment. In
a written memorandum, the district court determined that Odegaard “failed to demonstrate
that [MOB] knew or should have known of the small patch of ice that was covered by a
dusting of snow upon which she fell.” The district court also determined that Odegaard
“has not shown the awning at [the property], or the overflow spout dripped water prior to
her injury.” The district court concluded that “the information presented was mere
supposition that would not permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.”
Odegaard appeals.
DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; see also Justice v. Marvel, LLC , 979 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn.
2022). Appellate courts “review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
7
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolving all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving party.” Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC ,
964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021). But “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete
evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v.
Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993); see also Gradjelick v. Hance ,
646 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002) (“A nonmoving party cannot defeat a summary
judgment motion with unverified and conclusory allegations or by postulating evidence
that might be developed at trial.”). “Instead, if the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proof on an issue, that party must present sufficient evidence to permit reasonable persons
to draw different conclusions.” Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 231.
“Negligence is the failure to exercise the level of care that a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” Doe 169 v. Brandon,
845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014). “To recover on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and
(4) that the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of the injury.” Id. A district court
must grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant if the record contains “a complete
lack of proof on any of the four essential elements of the negligence claim.” Funchess v.
Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn. 2001).
Here, the parties dispute MOB’s duty of care, an issue that we review de novo. Louis
v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001). “A property owner has a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent persons from being injured by conditions on the property that
represent foreseeable risk of injury.” Rinn v. Minn. State Agric. Soc ’y, 611 N.W.2d 361,
8
364-65 (Minn. App. 2000). This includes “an ongoing duty to inspect and maintain” the
property to ensure that visitors are “not exposed to unreasonable risks of harm.” Olmanson
v. LeSueur County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2005). Property owners, however, are not
“insurers of safety.” Rinn, 611 N.W.2d at 365. A dangerous condition poses a foreseeable
risk of injury when a property owner has actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition or when the property owner’s “direct actions” actually resulted in the dangerous
condition. Id.
Odegaard argues that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of
material fact require that a jury determine whether MOB had actual or constructive
knowledge of the icy sidewalk or whether MOB’s direct actions caused the icy sidewalk.
We address each issue in turn.
I. No record evidence supports a reasonable inference that MOB had actual
knowledge of the icy sidewalk before Odegaard fell.

A property owner has the duty to use reasonable care to protect visitors from
“conditions on the property that represent foreseeable risk of injury,” including any known
dangerous conditions. Id. at 364-65. Odegaard contends that the evidence shows that
Curbside “shoveled and salted the sidewalk” the day before she fell and that “it had not
snowed or gotten above freezing since the day before.” Odegaard seems to suggest that
Curbside left the icy sidewalk untreated when it shoveled and salted before Odegaard’s
fall. MOB counters that no evidence shows that “anyone associated with [MOB] actually
knew this ice patch existed before Odegaard encountered it” or that “there were issues with
ice in this area before” Odegaard’s fall.
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We agree with MOB. No record evidence supports a reasonable inference that MOB
or its employees knew about the ic y sidewalk and failed to remedy it. Odegaard testified
that she “had never noticed any ice” in front of the waste containers, even though she
stopped there almost daily and passed it more than once on her way into and out of the
property before her fall. She also testified that she did not know if anyone else at the
property knew about the icy sidewalk.
Odegaard testified that she did not see the icy sidewalk before she fell because it
was covered in snow. In its order, the district court stated that the “surveillance video of
the area did not show snow on the sidewalk where [Odegaard] fell.” We disagree with this
description of the video recording, which does not show what is on the sidewalk. And
because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Odegaard as the nonmoving
party, we assume that the icy sidewalk was covered in snow at the time of Odegaard’s fall.
But evidence that the icy sidewalk was covered in snow such that Odegaard could not see
any ice does not support the inference that MOB had actual knowledge of the icy condition.
No record evidence supports a reasonable inference that Curbside knew about the
icy sidewalk and failed to treat it. To the contrary, the only evidence on summary judgment
proves that Curbside shoveled and salted the sidewalks the day before Odegaard fell. And
Odegaard’s photographs of the sidewalk and waste containers —which depict ice on the
sidewalk where she fell—postdate her fall . Even if we assume the photographs are
evidence of conditions at the time of her fall, they do not support an inference that MOB
knew of or was notified about the icy sidewalk before Odegaard fell. Thus, the district court
10
did not err by determining that no evidence supports a reasonable inference that MOB had
actual knowledge of the icy sidewalk.
II. No record evidence supports a reasonable inference that MOB had
constructive knowledge of the icy sidewalk before Odegaard fell.

Constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition “may be established through
evidence that the condition was present for such a period of time so as to constitute
constructive notice of the hazard.” Rinn, 611 N.W.2d at 365. A property owner’s duty to
remove snow and ice is triggered when “a reasonable length of time” elapses after the snow
and ice is formed. Mattson v. St. Luke’s Hosp ., 89 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 1958). “But
speculation as to who caused the dangerous condition, or how long it existed, warrant s
judgment” in favor of the property owner. Rinn, 611 N.W.2d at 365.
Odegaard relies on Schatz’s testimony that she and other Davis Management
employees conducted “multiple walkthroughs of the property” during the six months the
property was open to the public. Odegaard argues that “the lack of precipitation or melting”
in the days leading up to the fall is evidence that either the icy sidewalk “was present prior
to [Curbside’s] mitigation efforts and [MOB] negligently failed to clear it or the condition
developed after the mitigation efforts because of a dangerous condition that had been on
the property for six months.” Odegaard maintains that the photographs show that the icy
sidewalk was caused by the roof drain and “had been present for a significant period of
time.”
MOB responds that Odegaard’s evidence cannot establish constructive knowledge
“without speculating [about] how long the ice existed or how the ice formed —either left
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behind after Curbside cleared the property on December 26; or from blowing snow
trampled down by foot traffic; or from a thaw and refreeze event.” MOB maintains that
there is no evidence that “water dripped from the awning before” Odegaard’s fall or that
“ice was left behind” by Curbside.
This court’s decision in Rinn is instructive. 611 N.W.2d at 361. Rinn sued multiple
defendants after she slipped and fell at the state fair. Id. at 363. Rinn slipped on a puddle
around 10:30 p.m. as she descended the stairs in a coliseum. Id. Rinn testified that “a liquid
covered the entire step, she did not know what it was, and it was not there when she
ascended the stairs half an hour earlier” at 10:00 p.m. Id. The record showed that fair staff
“completely cleaned, swept, and inspected” the coliseum each night “but did not disrupt
the events by cleaning during the day.” Id. If someone brought cleaning issues to the staff,
“they were resolved on an ‘as needed’ basis.” Id. There was no evidence that the staff “were
notified or had knowledge of, or created, the puddle that caused [Rinn’s] fall.” Id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding
in part that Rinn “failed to present any genuine issue of material fact relating to how long
the liquid had been on the steps, which was essential to establishing that respondents owed
a duty to [her] under the constructive notice doctrine.” Id. at 362-63. This court affirmed,
concluding that, “[e]ven when viewed in the light most favorable to [Rinn], and assuming
the puddle was made just after 10:00 p.m., 30 minutes was not sufficient time to give
respondents constructive notice of the late-night puddle made” at the coliseum. Id. at 365.
Like Rinn, Odegaard did not see the icy sidewalk before she fell—not when she
arrived at work at 8:00 a.m., when she left for her lunch break, or when she slipped and fell
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on the sidewalk. Therefore, the evidence Odegaard offered on summary judgment was
insufficient to support a finding or reasonable inference that the dangerous condition
existed for “a reasonable length of time” before Odegaard fell. Mattson, 89 N.W.2d at 746.
Neither Odegaard’s photographs nor the weather data provide evidence from which a
reasonable juror may infer when the icy sidewalk was formed before Odegaard’s fall .
Instead, the record evidence shows that Curbside salted the property the day before
Odegaard fell and the weather data shows no new precipitation before her fall.
Odegaard offers only speculation about when ice formed on the sidewalk, which is
not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Rinn, 611 N.W.2d at 365 (stating that a
plaintiff cannot speculate about who caused a dangerous condition or how long it existed
to overcome summary judgment). Because no record evidence suggests when the ice
formed on the sidewalk where Odegaard fell, there is no genuine issue of material fact
about MOB’s constructive knowledge of the icy sidewalk. Thus, the district court did not
err by granting summary judgment in favor of MOB on this issue.
III. No record evidence supports a reasonable inference that MOB’s direct actions
actually resulted in the icy sidewalk.

A property owner has a duty of care to protect others if a “dangerous condition
actually resulted from the direct actions” of the property owner. Id. Odegaard contends that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether “the ice patch ‘actually resulted from
the direct actions of’” MOB. She points to Schatz’s testimony that “MOB constructed the
building” and that the roof drain above the sidewalk where Odegaard fell “had not been
changed since it was constructed.”
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In support of her opposition to summary judgment, Odegaard submitted
photographs that depict the north entrance where she fell. These photographs were taken
after her fall and include the two photographs shown above. Odegaard argued in her
memorandum opposing summary judgment that these photographs showed that “an
overflow spout above the trash can drained water onto the surface in front of the trash can.”
Odegaard also argued that the photographs “taken after [her] fall clearly show that that area
of the sidewalk is consistently icy or wet when other areas are not.” Odegaard maintains
that, based on her evidence, “a jury could reasonably conclude that [MOB] actually knew
about the overflow spout which caused the ice patch.”
Odegaard also argues that, as to these photographs, the district court “improperly
weighed evidence by viewing it in the light most favorable to” MOB on summary
judgment. In its order, the district court stated that Odegaard’s photographs “do not show
any water drainage, ice, or icicles on the overflow spout”; “do not conclusively establish
the ice was, in fact, from water emptying from the spout”; and “do not eliminate other
sources of liquid from which the ice could have formed for which [MOB] could not have
been aware of and therefore address.”
We agree with Odegaard that she need not “conclusively establish” that MOB’s
direct actions actually resulted in the icy sidewalk, as implied by the district court. A
nonmoving party “does not need to produce clear and convincing evidence to defeat a
summary judgment motion.” Anderson v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 191
(Minn. 2005). But the nonmoving party must “present specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial”; they cannot rely on “evidence which merely creates a
14
metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.” Ariola v. City of Stillwater, 889 N.W.2d 340, 353
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017).
MOB contends that “there is no evidence to support” Odegaard’s claim that the roof
drain “caused the water to drip onto the ground” or that the property’s “design or
construction was faulty.” MOB emphasizes that Odegaard did not offer any evidence
“about commercial building design or construction” and urges that there is no evidence of
any “structural defect,” “code violations,” or “how the ‘overflow spout’ operates.”
We conclude that Odegaard’s evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material
fact about whether MOB’s direct actions caused the icy sidewalk . Odegaard testified that
she did not see water dripping from the roof drain before or at the time that she fell on the
icy sidewalk and that she did not know how the ice formed. There is no evidence that
anyone saw water dripping onto the sidewalk before Odegaard fell. And although Schatz
testified that the roof drain empties water from the overhang, there is no evidence that water
from the roof drain caused the icy sidewalk where Odegaard fell. Schatz denied seeing
water drip from the roof drain or hearing complaints about the same before Odegaard fell.
Thus, no evidence supports a reasonable inference that water from the roof drain caused
the icy sidewalk at the property.3

3 This court addressed a similar issue in a nonprecedential opinion that is persuasive in its
reasoning. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential
opinions are not binding but “may be cited as persuasive authority”). In Gehrke v.
McCabe’s Ace Hardware, Inc., this court considered a tort claim by Gehrke, who slipped
on ice outside a hardware store and sued the store owner, alleging that water dripped from
the store’s awning and caused the sidewalk to be slippery. No. C4- 01-1408, 2002 WL
15679, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Jan. 8, 2002). The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the store owner, and this court affirmed. Id. at *1, *3. We determined that the
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In sum, because Odegaard’s evidence does not support a genuine issue of material
fact on MOB’s actual or constructive knowledge of the icy sidewalk or that MOB’s direct
actions actually caused the icy sidewalk, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment in favor of MOB.
Affirmed.

evidence showed that “no one, not even Gehrke, noticed any ice on the sidewalk the night
he slipped; rather, the sidewalk merely looked wet.” Id. at *2. This court added that,
“although there was testimony that water did ordinarily drip from the drain holes in the
awning onto the sidewalk, no evidence was offered showing that water was dripping onto
the sidewalk at the time of Gehrke’s fall, or at any other time that day.” Id. Based on the
lack of evidence, this court agreed with the district court “that Gehrke’s theory of causation
rests upon speculation and conjecture.” Id. Gehrke reinforces our conclusion that
Odegaard’s evidence requires speculation to infer that MOB’s roof drain caused the icy
sidewalk where Odegaard fell.