MJ aka Elissa Wall, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2146

MJ aka Elissa Wall,
Respondent,

vs.

Warren Jeffs,
Defendant,

Seth Jeffs, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Cook County District Court
File No. 16-CV-23-132

Tyson Smith, Richard T. Furlong III, Smith Law, PLLC, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for
respondent)

William D. Paul, William D. Paul Law Office, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s order denying their motions for judgment
as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent MJ aka Elissa Wall was born and raised in the Fundamentalist Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS). In 2007, Wall sued Warren Jeffs,1 the leader
of the church, in Utah state court. After years of litigation, the Utah district court entered
a $10,025,000 judgment against Warren and in favor of Wall on October 5, 2017.
In 2015, appellant Seth Jeffs, Warren’s brother, established appellant Emerald
Industries, LLC. In 2018, Seth registered Emerald Industries in Minnesota and Emerald
Industries bought property in Cook County, Minnesota.
In 2023, Emerald Industries advertised the property for sale. A few months later,
Wall sued Warren,2 Seth, and Emerald Industries. Wall alleged that Warren had conveyed
funds to Emerald Industries through Seth to purchase the property, with the intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud Wall in violation of section 513.44 of the Minnesota Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act (MUVTA). Minn. Stat. § 513.44 (2024). Wall also alleged that Emerald
Industries violated Minnesota Statutes section 570.02 (2024) by advertising the property

1 Warren Jeffs and his brother, Seth Jeffs, are both parties to this lawsuit. We refer to them
by their first names for clarity.

2 Warren, who is serving a life sentence in Texas for separate criminal matters,
acknowledged service of the summons and complaint, but did not file an answer. The
district court later entered default judgment against Warren.
3
for sale “with the intent to convert the Property back to money to further hinder, delay, and
defraud their creditors, including [Wall.]”
Seth and Emerald Industries moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion because a jury needed to resolve genuine issues of material fact. After
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wall.
Seth and Emerald Industries moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
The district court denied the motions and entered judgment.
Seth and Emerald Industries appeal.
DECISION
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it denied their motions for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. We address each challenge in turn.
I. The district court’s order denying appellants’ motion for summary judgment
is outside the scope of our review on appeal.

Appellants challenged the district court’s denial of their motion for summary
judgment. At oral argument, counsel for appellants acknowledged that the denial of a
motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on an appeal from judgment entered after
a jury verdict. See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 2009)
(holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not within the scope of review
on an appeal from judgment entered after a jury verdict). We appreciate counsel’s candor
to the court and do not consider the issue further.
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II. The district court did not err in denying appellants’ posttrial motion for
judgment as a matter of law or their motion for a new trial.

Appellants argue the district court erred when it denied their motion for judgment
as a matter of law or for a new trial. We review a district court’s denial of judgment as a
matter of law de novo, Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC, 969 N.W.2d 610,
618 (Minn. 2022), and denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion,
Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).
Seth and Emerald Industries raise numerous appellate arguments, including
that: (A) Minnesota lacks personal jurisdiction over Seth; (B) Wall’s claims are barred by
the six-year statute of limitations; and (C) Wall’s fraudulent-conveyance claim was not
pleaded with specificity. Appellants also argue the district court abused its discretion
by: (D) allowing Wall to change the theory of her case; (E) not conforming the special
verdict form to Wall’s theory of the case; (F) not allowing Seth and Emerald Industries to
submit a copy of Wall’s complaint as an exhibit; and (G) allowing Wall to present evidence
of damages that was not disclosed during discovery.
3 We address each argument in turn.

3 After providing a list of reasons why appellants believe a new trial is required, they note
that these are “just a few examples of erroneous rulings made during the trial, any one of
which entitles [them] to a new trial.” But we do not presume error on appeal and will not
speculate as to what other supposedly erroneous rulings might exist in the record that could
require a new trial. Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (holding appellant
must affirmatively demonstrate error before we may reverse for a new trial); see also
Christie, 911 N.W.2d at 837-38 n.4 (citation omitted) (stating that arguments without
analysis or citation to legal authority are forfeited). We, therefore, decline to address any
generalized assertions of error. Instead, we consider only those arguments that appellants
have supported with legal reasoning and authority.
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A. The district court had personal jurisdiction over Seth.
Seth argues he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the district court
did not have personal jurisdiction over him as an out-of-state resident and because any
fraudulent conveyances occurred while he was in a different state. We are not persuaded.
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident if the nonresident
has an interest in real property within the state, transacts business in the state, commits an
act in the state that causes injury or damage, or commits an act outside the state that causes
injury or damage in the state. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1 (2024). We review issues of
personal jurisdiction de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of Nielsen , 863 N.W.2d 399, 402
(Minn. App. 2015) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2015).
The record demonstrates that Seth registered Emerald Industries in Minnesota six
months after Wall obtained a judgment against Warren. Seth then transacted business in
Minnesota, through Emerald Industries, by purchasing the subject property in Minnesota.
Seth’s own testimony corroborated these facts. Seth admitted that he moved to Minnesota
to find work, worked in Minnesota as a contractor, and continued to use Emerald Industries
to conduct business in Minnesota. These admissions, alone, grant the district court
personal jurisdiction over Seth. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(2).
On appeal, Seth asserts that Wall’s evidence against him consisted of fraudulent
transfers that occurred outside of Minnesota and that the property at issue had nothing to
do with those transfers. But the evidence established that Wall has a judgment for more
than ten million dollars against Warren and has been unable to collect “a dime.” Wall
proved that Warren funneled money to Seth and Emerald Industries to avoid paying that
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judgment. Seth’s own testimony established that money controlled by Warren was sent to
Emerald Industries “on a regular basis.” The evidence also established that Emerald
Industries used funds received from Warren to purchase the subject property in Minnesota.
Thus, the district court did not err in exercising personal jurisdiction over Seth.
B. Wall’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment
as a matter of law because Wall’s fraudulent-conveyance claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. We review a district court’s application of a statute of limitations de novo.
Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013).
Minnesota imposes a six-year statute of limitations on actions that seek “relief on
the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn. Stat.
§ 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2024). “[A]ctual- fraud claims [under MUVTA] are subject to the
limitations period applicable to actions ‘for relief on the ground of fraud.’” Finn v. All .
Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 657 (Minn. 2015). Thus, Wall’s fraudulent-conveyance claim,
brought under MUVTA, is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.
Here, Wall obtained judgment against Warren in October 2017. She brought her
lawsuit in August 2023. The MUVTA claims were timely brought.
4

4 Appellants contend that Wall could have filed her fraudulent-conveyance claim before
she obtained a judgment against Warren in 2017. Appellants did not raise this argument
to the district court and we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See
Thiele v. Sitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (citation omitted). The argument also
runs contrary to the requirement that a plaintiff be a creditor before filing a MUVTA claim.
Minn. Stat. § 513.44(a)(1); Finn v. All. Bank, 860 N.W.2d at 644.
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C. Wall did not need to plead her MUVTA claim with particularity.
Appellants argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Wall did
not plead her fraudulent-conveyance claim with specificity. We disagree.
Appellants correctly note that a common-law fraud claim requires the circumstances
constituting fraud to be stated “with particularity.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. A claim under
MUVTA is not, however, a common-law fraud claim. Instead, a statutory MUVTA claim
required Wall to allege: (1) she is a creditor; (2) a transfer of assets was made by the debtor;
and (3) the transfer was done with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her as a creditor.
Minn. Stat. § 513.44. Wall’s complaint met these requirements.
Wall alleged that she is a creditor due to her 2017 judgment against Warren. The
complaint identified appellants’ 2018 purchase of the property as the fraudulent transaction
that transferred Warren’s assets. The complaint also alleged that the conveyance of funds
to purchase the property was made with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud her.
The district court did not err in denying appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter
of law because Wall’s complaint sufficiently alleged a MUVTA claim.
D. Wall did not change her theory after trial began.

Appellants argue that the district court impermissibly allowed Wall to change her
theory of the case during trial. We are not persuaded.
Wall’s theory consisted of establishing that Warren directed funds to Seth and
Emerald Industries to avoid paying Wall on her ten- million-dollar judgment against
Warren. The evidence appellants cite as so-called changes of theory are, in fact, consistent
8
with Wall’s complaint and her theory of the case throughout the trial. 5 We discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for a new trial.
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to admit
a copy of Wall’s complaint into evidence.

Appellants argue the district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit a copy
of Wall’s complaint into evidence. 6 “We afford the district court broad discretion when
ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of
that discretion[.]” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N. W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015).
The district court decided that the jury would not have a copy of the complaint
during deliberations. There are circumstances under which the pleadings in a case may be
provided to the jury. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ellefson, 712 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 2006); In re
Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1992). But those circumstances did not exist here.
Seth and Emerald Industries did not assert that they offered a copy of the complaint
for impeachment purposes. Nor did appellants articulate why they should have been
permitted to admit a copy of the complaint under the narrow circumstances in which the
supreme court has held it is acceptable to do so. See Kelly, 712 N.W.2d at 767 (noting
circumstances in which a complaint could be admitted into evidence). Based on the record
before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision.

5 Because we conclude that Wall did not change her theory of the case during trial, we also
reject appellants’ argument that the district court abused its discretion by not including
additional questions on the special verdict form.

6 During trial, the complaint was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 113. Before the jury
began its deliberations, the district court determined that the jury would not have the
pleadings, including the complaint, during deliberations.
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Additionally, as the district court determined, any error in preventing the jury from
reviewing the complaint during deliberations was harmless. McBee v. Team Industries,
Inc., 26 N.W.3d 847, 857 (2025) (articulating the harmless-error standard for the exclusion
of evidence); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error). Appellants
read the complaint into the record during their cross-examination of Wall. The jury was
aware of the contents of the complaint and any possible error was harmless.
F. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new-trial
motion because the damages evidence was disclosed during discovery.

Appellants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Wall
“never claimed that her damages w[ere] equal to the value of . . . benefits Seth [] and his
family received from the . . . storehouse from 2005 through 2026.” We review new trial
arguments regarding discovery violations de novo. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476,
489 (Minn. 2005). A new trial is not required to remedy a discovery violation unless there
is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial.
State v. Clobes, 422 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1988).
Appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law before the district court, asserted
that Wall, “in her discovery responses[,] claimed that her damages w[ere] equal to the value
of goods and food and other benefits Seth [] and his family received from the . . . storehouse
from 2005 through 2026.” Appellants’ own motion revealed that the damages evidence
was disclosed in discovery. The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in
denying appellants’ motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.