Rondell Russell Camp v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0080

Rondell Russell Camp, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-2680

Christina Zauhar, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicholas G. Kimball, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his second petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that appellant
failed to show that newly discovered evidence could not have been obtained within the

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two-year time limit. Appellant raises additional claims in his pro se supplemental brief.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Rondell Russell Camp murdered S.P. Camp appealed his second-degree
intentional-murder conviction, arguing, among other things, that respondent State of
Minnesota failed to disprove his self-defense claim. In our opinion affirming Camp’s
conviction, we provided facts that are also relevant to the current postconviction appeal,
and we recite them here. See State v. Camp, No. A18-0329, 2019 WL 272879 (Minn. App.
Jan. 22, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019).
S.P. worked out of a residential garage as a mechanic. S.P. had worked on Camp’s
vehicles in the past. On January 29, 2017, Camp went to the garage. S.P. discovered an
oil leak and asked Camp to return later so that S.P. could repair it. Later that day, S.P.
contacted Camp and told him that he had enlisted another person to help repair the leak.
Camp returned late that afternoon. Soon after, a neighbor heard S.P. and another
man arguing in the garage, and a witness saw Camp dragging himself along the ground,
screaming for help and saying that somebody was trying to kill him. Camp’s leg was
injured, and he had blood on his body and clothing. Officers arrived at the garage and
discovered S.P.’s lifeless body on the floor with a bloody wrench under his head, a loaded
handgun on the passenger-side windshield of Camp’s car, and a bloody knife on the ground
near a wall.
At trial, a medical examiner opined that S.P. suffered a minimum of 29 incision
injuries, including sharp-force injuries of a cutting, rather than stabbing nature, and a deep

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incision on his neck. S.P. also had incision injuries to his fingers from a possible bite, and
the frontal bones of his head were “completely pulpified by a blunt force injury.”
Camp testified that he acted in self-defense and that S.P. was alive when he left the
garage. Camp testified that he pulled into the garage and asked S.P. where the other guy
was who was going to fix the car. S.P. said that the guy was on his way. Camp asked S.P.
to open the garage door so that he could leave. S.P. walked around the driver’s side, like
he was going to open the garage door. Camp started the car, and when he looked up, he
was struck in the head with an object, which turned out to be a gun. S.P. told Camp to get
out of the car and lie face down on the ground. Camp lunged for the gun and grabbed
S.P.’s wrist. Camp described a physical fight between him and S.P. After the fight, S.P.
told Camp, “[T]hey’re going to come back for you and try to kill you. Don’t let them do
like they did the rest.” Camp asked S.P. who wanted him dead but S.P. “kept shaking his
head” and “repeating the same things.”
In determining that the evidence was sufficient to disprove Camp’s self-defense
claim, we noted that the handgun was found nowhere near S.P.’s body and it did not have
blood on it, though there was a significant amount of blood by S.P.’s body. Id. at *5. And
despite the lack of a firearm near S.P., Camp constantly attacked S.P. “at some point
switch[ing] weapons, . . . causing 38 cutaneous groups of injuries [that] were devastating
and effectively pulpified the frontal bones of S.P.’s head, rendering him unconscious.” Id.
In 2021, Camp filed his first petition for postconviction relief, challenging the
district court’s decision to give the justifiable-taking-of-a-life jury instruction rather than
the general self-defense instruction. The district court denied Camp’s petition because the

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state established that Camp intentionally caused S.P.’s death. This court affirmed the
district court’s denial of Camp’s petition, concluding that Camp failed to show that the
result would have been different had counsel objected to the jury instruction because the
jury found that Camp intended to cause S.P.’s death. See Camp v. State, No. A21-1312
(Minn. App. July 25, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2022).
On March 6, 2025, Camp filed his second petition for postconviction relief,
asserting that, since September 2024, three witnesses had come forward with evidence that
S.P. had robbed or attempted to rob them. Camp also argued that law enforcement failed
to investigate A.B. as an alternative perpetrator because he worked with S.P., was at the
crime scene, and handled evidence.
At a hearing on the postconviction petition, two of the three witnesses testified. E.S.
testified that he came forward about “a year ago” after he saw a social-media post that an
“older guy was killed who was fixing a car.” He recognized the victim’s name because he
lived in the area in late 2016 and S.P. had worked on E.S.’s car. E.S. had been referred to
S.P. by a man named “Adam.” When E.S. realized that S.P. had not done the work
correctly, he returned to S.P. S.P. held a gun and yelled, “Give me the wallet. Give me
the cash. I want it all.” E.S. was in his vehicle, and he “ducked down and floored it.” E.S.
did not report the attempted robbery.
J.M. testified that, in early 2023, she saw a social-media post with a phone number
for a law office that said, “if you knew something come forward.” She came forward
because the post mentioned “a mechanic on the street where [she] went to see a mechanic”
in January 2017. She was referred to the mechanic by a man named “Adam.” J.M. stated:

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“I just remember pulling up and then them telling me to shut the car off and I shut it off
and then I’m being pulled . . . but I couldn’t tell you step by step what happened. I just
know I gave [S.P. and two other people] my money because they asked for it.” J.M. stated
that S.P. had a gun, and she gave S.P. her money and he walked away without hurting her.
J.M. did not report the robbery.
On November 10, 2025, the district court denied Camp’s petition because it
determined that, although the witnesses were credible, the evidence could have been
discovered at an earlier date. The district court further determined that Camp’s claim that
law enforcement failed to investigate an alternative perpetrator was Knaffla barred. See
State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). This appeal followed.
DECISION
Postconviction Relief
Camp argues that the district court should have granted his petition for
postconviction relief because the newly discovered evidence showed that S.P. was the
aggressor in the altercation between Camp and S.P. and law enforcement failed to
investigate an alternative perpetrator.
This court reviews the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion
when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on
an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. This
court reviews a district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear
error. Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013).

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A petition for postconviction relief may not be filed more than two years after an
appellate court’s disposition of a direct appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2024).
The disposition of Camp’s direct appeal occurred in 2019. His second petition filed in
March 2025 is time barred unless it falls under an exception enumerated in Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2024).
Camp argues that his petition falls under two exceptions to the statutory time bar—
the newly-discovered-evidence and the interests-of-justice exceptions.
Newly Discovered Evidence
Camp first argues that the newly discovered evidence supports his self-defense
claim because the evidence shows that S.P. was the aggressor.
Under the newly-discovered-evidence exception,
the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered
evidence, including scientific evidence, that provides facts
necessary to sustain one or more legally cognizable claims for
postconviction relief, if such evidence could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner
or petitioner’s attorney within the two- year time period for
filing a postconviction petition, is not cumulative to evidence
presented at trial, and is not for impeachment purposes.

Id., subd. 4(b)(2).1 All requirements must be satisfied to obtain relief. Riley v. State, 819
N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012).

1 The district court and the parties analyzed the newly-discovered-evidence claim under an
earlier version of the statute that required the petitioner to establish actual innocence. We
do not need to review the district court’s determination that Camp failed to establish that
the evidence showed his innocence because Camp failed to meet the statutory requirement
that he show that the evidence could not have been obtained within the two-year time
period.

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The district court determined that Camp was not entitled to relief because he was
required to satisfy all requirements, see id., and he failed to show that the evidence could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. We agree.
Camp murdered S.P. in 2017, and his conviction became final in 2019. In 2023, the
witnesses responded to a social-media post. While the record does not show who created
the social-media post or when it was made, it is undisputed that the social- media post
occurred after the two-year time bar. It was Camp’s burden to show that he could not have
ascertained the evidence with the exercise of due diligence within the two-year time bar,
but he has provided no explanation as to why he could not have made efforts to identify
witnesses, including using social media before the two-year period elapsed. The district
court noted that social media was well developed in 2017. We agree with the district court
that “[t]he fact that no such post was made before trial or within the two-year time bar after
the appeal order supports the conclusion that [Camp] was not duly diligent and this
information could have been obtained within the two-year time bar.”
Camp argues that the district court “unreasonably” construed the due-diligence
requirement and that he is not expected to “magically divine the existence of unknown
witnesses to uncharged and unreported crimes .” But Camp introduced no evidence at the
evidentiary hearing to show that he could not have discovered these witnesses sooner than
2023. And the district court’s reasoning did not require Camp to “divine the existence of
unknown witnesses” because after the 2023 social-media post, the witnesses came forward
on their own. There is nothing in the record showing that the witnesses would not have
come forward in the years between 2017 and 2023. Therefore, the district court did not

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abuse its discretion by denying Camp’s petition because he failed to show that the evidence
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence within the two-year time-
bar for filing a petition.
Interests of Justice
Camp also argues that the district court should have granted his petition in the
interests of justice because his due-process rights were violated when law enforcement
failed to investigate an alternative perpetrator. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5)
(stating that a court may hear a postconviction petition if “the petitioner establishes to the
satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice ”).
However, this claim is one that would have been known at the time of direct appeal or the
first postconviction petition. See Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d at 741 (stating that when direct
appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will
not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”). Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Camp’s second petition for
postconviction relief.
Pro se Brief
In his pro se supplemental brief, Camp seeks to “highlight trial errors that . . .
undermined the jury’s ability to determine . . . intent.”
2 Specifically, Camp claims that the
jury’s extended deliberation demonstrated that it was confused about the law and did not

2 Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 5(17), a pro se supplemental brief is permitted in
direct appeals when the defendant is represented by the state public defender’s office.
Although there is no authority that permits a pro se supplemental brief in a postconviction
appeal, because Camp’s pro se supplemental brief was accepted, we will address it.

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understand the intent element. He also claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to object to the prosecutor’s statement that at some point intent “takes over.”
Camp did not raise these claims in his postconviction petition. As such, these
alleged trial-error issues were not considered by the district court in its consideration of the
postconviction petition. “It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time
on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447
(Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). Because Camp failed to raise these issues in his
postconviction petition, the issues are forfeited. See id.
Affirmed.