Cited by

(describing that “plain” is synonymous with “clear” or “obvious”).

Brown focused on the jury instructions as a whole, rather than on any single instruction, because we review jury instructions “in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law of the case.”

Nonetheless, when evaluating the second-prong of the plain-error analysis, “it is sufficient that the error is plain at the time of the appeal.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct”); (stating that error is “plain” when it is “clear” or “obvious”); (stating that to satisfy the second prong, “it is sufficient that the error is plain at the time of the appeal”).

But “if the statute establishes alternative means for satisfying an element, unanimity on the means is not required.” *356 (emphasis added) (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817-18 , 119 S.Ct.

403); (concluding that it was plain error to fail to instruct a jury that the State had the burden of proving the absence of a fact, when the absence of that fact was an element of the crime); (concluding that giving the jury an improper instruction was plain error because the court failed to include in the instruction factors that had been es *824 tablished as necessary for 13 years).

Plain error may only be found in jury instructions “if the instructions were misleading or confusing on fundamental points of law.”

(stating that an error in jury instruction is prejudicial if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the proper instruction “would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury”).

Yet plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered if an appellant establishes that “a district court’s ruling (1) was error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error affected appellant’s substantial rights.”

The State, citing our decision in State v. Ihle, reasons that “the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” , 918 (Minn.2002) (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817-18 , 119 S.Ct.

the supreme court held that jury instructions that omitted an element of the offense did not meet the third prong of the plain-error test where a special-verdict form required the jury to find the omitted element, and the jury found the defendant guilty of another offense that arguably required the f

If a defendant does not object to an instruction at trial, we will reverse for plain error “if the instructions were misleading or confusing on fundamental points of law.”

1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), ).

We have stated that “[district courts are allowed considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

If all three prongs of this test are satisfied, the court may “remedy the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.”

To achieve that end, a *731 jury must “unanimously find[ ] that the government has proved each element of the offense.” (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 , 119 S.Ct.

917 n. 5 (Minn.2002); (approving of CRIMJIG 7.08).

see Cross, d at 726 (finding that on appeal jury instructions are to be read in their entirety, and if the reviewing court determines that the instructions “correctly state[s] the law in language that can be understood by the jury there is no reversible error”).

1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)

1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)

For example, we recognized that a conviction could not be based on jury instructions that did not reflect our *455 narrow construction of the obstruction of legal process statute — a construction that required more than simply words.