Cited by

at 731 (quotation omitted) ; see also State v. Ihle , –14 (Minn. 2002) (holding that jury was not required to unanimously decide which of defendant’s modes of conduct constituted crime of obstructing legal process ).

But “if the statute establishes alternative means for satisfying an element, unanimity on the means is not required.” State v. Ihle

(holding that jury instructions need not include a unanimity instruction because the defendant’s different acts “were committed as part of a single behavioral incident”).

A plain error affects substantial rights when it is “prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Ihle

The burglary “statute establishes alternative means for satisfying an element.” d 910, 918 (Minn. 2002) .

Jury instructions must “fairly and adequa tely explain the law of the case.” State v. Ihle

Jury instructions must “fairly and adequately explain the law of the case.”

d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002).

was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, we consider, “among other fact ors, whether: (1) the defendant contested the omitted element and submitted evidence to support a contrary finding, (2) the State submitted overwhelming evidence to prove that element, and (3) the jury’s verdict nonetheless encompassed a finding on that element.” Watkins, d at 29; (i ndicating that an omission of a required instruction is harmless error when “there is no reasonable likelihood that a more accurate in

(quoting Schad, 501 U.S. at 631-32, 111 S. Ct. at 2497 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation omitted)) ; -19 (Minn. 2002).

“An instruction is in error if it materially misstates the law.”

“Plain error exists when the district court commits an obvious 9 error that affects the defendant ’s substantial rights.” State v. Barnslater , (citing State v. Ihle , ), review denied (Minn. Oct.

“[I]f the statute establishes alternative means for satisfying an element, unanimity on the means is not required.”

2, that determine the penalty that applies to the obstruction); (stating the jury found defendant guilty of gross misdemeanor obstructing legal process by answering “yes” to special verdict question indicating the obstruction was accompanied by “force or violence .”) Additionally, t he district cour t formally entered a conviction on the jury’s verdict but

5 government “has proved each element of the offense.” (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817- 18, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999).

The first element of the plain-error test “requires that we determine whether the instructions were in error.”

Because there was evidence that Kahn had been drinking alcohol, the district court instructed the jury: “It is not a defense to a crime that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the a ct if the defendant volu ntarily became intoxicated.” “District courts are allowed considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

tention at a given time to exercise authority and control over it, either directly or through another person, is then in constructive possession of it.” Roland argues that this instruction “relieved the [s]tate of its burden to prove a completed act of possession.” “District courts are allowed considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.” State v. Ihle

Because “district courts are allowed cons iderable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions,” appellate courts review a district court’s decision to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion

Moreover, the instruction included the admonition that “the evidence is being added only for your consideration in deciding whether Mr. Andersen is telling the truth in this case.” Although the instruction does not follow the CRIMJIG verbatim, the district court is “allowed considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

“District courts are allowed considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

But “the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“[I]t is well settled that the court’s instructions must define the crime charged and the court should explain the elements of the offense rather than simply read statutes.”

Although all criminal jury verdicts must be unanimous, “the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense.”

d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007) (-17 (Minn. 2002)); Mahkuk, d at 682.

“[Section 609.50] forbids intentional physical obstruction or interference with a police officer in the performance of his official duties.” (quotation omitted).

A district court is allowed “considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

Thus, “the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

But “the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 910, 918 (Minn. 2002).

A district court is allowed “considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

“[T]he jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (“[T]he jury does not have to unanimously agree on the facts underlying an element of a crime in all cases.”); (“[U]nanimity is not required with respect to the alternative means

1, 2015) (concluding that jury instruction was erroneous because it was broader than statutory definition of “domestic abuse”); -17 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that jury instruction was erroneous because it did not reflect narrow limits of prior supreme court opinion).

DECISION I. Jury Instructions A district court is allowed “considerable latitude in the selection of language for jury instructions.”

(holding that “a jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).

“[I]t is sufficient that the error is plain at the time of the appeal.” (quotation omitted).