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the district court has the inherent authority to consider such a motion.” -57 (Minn. App. 2002); see also State 6 v. Montjoy, -49 (Minn. 2008).

The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “[i]t is pr oper for a prosecutor to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.”

See State v. Montjoy , , 107-08 (Minn. 1985) ; see also State v. Papadakis , , 356-57 (Minn. App. 2002) (acknowledging district court's authority to consider motions to reconsider and stating that a motion to reconsider "may be the most efficient and preferable course of action" because it can spare parties the time and expen

A prosecutor may talk about accountability “in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.” State v. Montjoy , , 109 (Minn. 1985).

-57 (Minn. App. 2002) (-08 (Minn. 1985)).

It is acceptable “for a prosecutor to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.” State v. Montjoy

A prosecutor may “talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant,” provided the prosecutor does not emphasize accountability to the extent that it diverts the jury’s attention away from its role of “deciding whether the state has met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(prosecutors “should not emphasize accountability to such an extent as to divert the jury’s attention from its true role”).

The supreme court has also considered reopening an omnibus hearing preferable in situations where denying a motion to reopen would entail the “time, trouble and expense of an appeal.”

d 103, 109 (Minn. 1985).

rcumstances, and not when a prosecutor’s comments are merely likely to confuse.” d 739, 752 (Minn. 2010); see, -64 (Minn. 1995) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor told the jury that they would be “suckers” if they believed a defense witness and would need a sedative if they acquitted the defendant); -09 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that 20 misconduct occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly asked the jury to teach the defendant a lesson and stated that a defendant’s “rights end” when he commits

See, -64 (Minn.1995) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor told the jury that they would be “suckers” if they believed a defense witness and would need a sedative if they acquitted the defendant); -09 (Minn.1985) (concluding that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly asked the jury to teach the defendant a lesson and stated that a defendant’s “rights end” when he commits a crime).

Jones argues that the testimony prejudiced his ability to establish “Mr. Jensen as an alternative perpetrator.” A prosecutor is permitted “to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.”

For example, “[i]t is proper for a prosecutor to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.”

110— 11 (Minn.1985) (rejecting appellant's argument that the district court should have submitted an interrogatory to the jury regarding a statutory element of his sentence because a jury could not malte a factual finding where the statute required that the finding be “determined by the court”).

We have stated that “[i]t is proper for a prosecutor to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant.”

-08 (Minn.1985) (holding that prosecutor properly moved for clarification and reconsideration of omnibus order).

One that is a confirmation of the truth.” The prosecutor’s -09 (Minn. 1985), where the prosecutor essentially asked the jury to teach the defendant a lesson.

-11 (Minn.1985) (“a defendant does not have to be convicted of an offense that has use of a firearm or dangerous weapon as an element in order for section 609.11 to apply,” and holding that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to submit a special verdict form asking whether a dangerous weapon had been us

In Salitros , in addition to disparaging the defense, the prosecutor also repeated almost verbatim an “accountability” -09 (Minn.1985), and, more importantly, suggested that constitutional rights “have never been designed to serve as a shield for the guilty to hide behind.” Salitros, d at 819 .

(prosecutors “should not emphasize accountability to such an extent as to divert the jury’s attention from its true role”); (comments suggesting that the jury represented the people of the community and that the verdict would determine the kind of con

In the present case, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comments did not “divert the jury’s attention from its true role of deciding whether the state has met its burden of proving [the] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Appellant asserts the photographic line-up employed by police was “so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a ‘very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifieation.’ ” -07 (Minn.1985) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct.

(c) -09 (Minn.1985), we criticized the following argument by a prosecutor to the jury to think about “accountability”: This whole trial — you stop to think about it, the whole trial boils down to one word.

17, 1986) (two counts of second degree assault arose from a single incident); (attempted first degree murder and criminal sexual conduct; prior conviction for aggravated robbery); aff'd, (aggravated robbery and kidnapping; prior convictions for aggravated robbery).

(timely motion to reopen and clarify an omnibus order granted by a second judge).

Identification procedures may be rendered impermissibly suggestive if “under all the circumstances it appears that the identification procedures were so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a ‘very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” -07 (Minn.1985) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct.

(lineup not impermissibly suggestive even though defendant was the only person with a beard and ages of participants varied within 12-year range).

II Lineup identification Appellant claims that the lineup violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights because it was “so unnecessarily suggestive as to create a ‘very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct.

for rev. granted, (applying principle to deny obligor father’s request for reimbursement of payments he made to obligee while the children were living with the father).