Cited by

(“Proof of the subjective state of the misrepresenter’s mind, whether by direct evidence or by inference, is not needed to prove negligence.

See Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., -99 (Minn. 1976).

884, 887 (Minn. 1906), the estate argues that undue influence is a “subtle species of fraud” and that fraud, in turn, “is an intentional tort.”

“In Minnesota, an actionable misrepresentation requires proof either that the misrepresenter acted dishonestly or in bad faith, i.e. with fraudulent intent, or, alternatively, that the misrepresenter was negligent.”

See, -75 (Minn. 1986) (distinguishing between “intentional and negligent misrepresentation[s]” and determining the case involved a “negligent, not fraudulent misrepresentation”); see also Henning Nelson Constr.

Furthermore, allowing the jury to compare RCN’s fault to the intentional tortfeasors (i.e., the third-party defendants) is not contrary to the holding in Florenzano v. Olson that “principles of comparative negligence [do] not apply to an intentional tort.” d 168, 175 (Minn. 1986).

11 Williams, d at 815; (“[O]ne making representations is held to [a] duty of care only when supplying information, either for the guidance of others in the course of a transaction in which one has a pecuniary interest, or in the course of one’s business, profession or employment.”).

(providing that “[n]egligence is proved by measuring one’s conduct against an objective standard”).

What th e misrepresenter knows or believes is the key to proof of intent.”

“[A] representation is made with fraudulent intent when it is known to be false or, in the alternative, when it is asserted as of the representer’s own knowledge when he or she does not in fact know whether it is true or false.”

What the misrepresenter knows or believes is the key to proof of intent.”

-78 (Minn. 1986) (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (noting that negligent and reckless misrepresentation “both judge the representer’s state of mind by an objective standard of due care,” and reckless representation is wholly distinct from a claim of intentional misrepresentation, which requires the represen

16 (“Fraud is distinguished from negligence by the element of scienter required.”) Appellants also allege that the district court findings are clearly erroneous in regard to Ostigaard, because Ostigaard failed to rebut the evidence proffered by appellants at trial.

n.1–2 (Minn. 1986) (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (distinguishing “deceit .

Because we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time the cause of action arose, n.1 (Minn. 1986), the 2012 amendments to Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd.

(holding in an intentional murder case that "[ijntent can be inferred from the words and acts of the shooter before and after the incident”); (holding that intent may be proven circumstantially and "may be inferred from events occurring before and after the crime”); (holding in a civil fraud case that fraudulent intent "is normally established through circumstantial evidence”).

But “ ‘a representation is made with fraudulent intent when it is known to be false....’”

174 & n. 3 (Minn.1986); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 121-22 , -99 (1976).

In the context of proving fraud, we have held that “a representation is made with fraudulent intent when it is known to be false....”

Fraud is an intentional act that “is distinguished from negligence by the element of scienter required.”

(stating that “[a] misrepresentation is made negligently when the misrepresented has not * * ⅜ communicated certain information that the ordinary person in his or her position would have discovered or communicated”).