Cited by

Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff’d on remand

d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999); Gustafson v. Comm’r of Human Servs.

Under Bell, appellant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his smartphone must be balanced against the state’s compelling interest in “both protecting the public from sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill.”

The doctrine “protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

But the statute does require a showing that the person’s disorder “does not allow [him] to adequately control [his] sexual impulses.” d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV) (emphasis added).

The district court also considered the six factors listed in (Linehan I), and the five factors from -77 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV), and determined that the factors supported commitment.

In re Linehan (Linehan IV), -76 (Minn. 11 1999); review denied (Minn. Sept.

XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.3 In addition, substantive due process protects individuals from “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

The doctrine “protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

See generally Lonergan, d at 641-42; -76 (Minn. 1999); -71 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Sept.

Hogy argues that “this case turns on whether the state has demonstrated that the [MCTA] is narrowly tailored” to meet the interests of “protecting the public from sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill,”

We have interpreted the substantive component of the right to due process as protecting an individual from “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” 5 d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).

(Linehan IV); review denied (Minn. Aug.

After finding each of their opinions to be credible, the district court considered the six factors listed in (Linehan 2 I), and the five factors from (Linehan IV), concluding that each factor supported commitment.

“[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

“[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

“[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

The statute also requires the commitment court to find future dangerousness, coupled with additional factors, and is intended to “‘limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.’” Ince, d at 23 (quoting In re Linehan (Linehan IV), ).

–74 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV).

(Linehan III), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff'd on remand