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“[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations omitted).

This holding was further developed by our decision in Linehan IV, in which we held that to commit a person as an SDP, the district court must find that it is “ ‘difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.’ ” In re Linehan (Linehan IV), (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 , 117 S.Ct.

The petitioner can establish the third element only by proving that the person is “ ‘highly likely [to] engage in harmful sexual acts in the future.’” (), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).

“[S]ubstantive due process protects individuals from ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct.

“[Sjubstantive due process protects individuals from ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct.

By contrast, “substantive due process protects individuals from ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct.

() (other citations omitted).

See In re Linchan (Linehan IV), -72 (Minn.1999) (hold *140 ing that the .civil commitment statutes are civil for ex post facto and double jeopardy-purposes and noting that “the SDP Act was adjudged a civil and not a criminal law” in In re Linehan (Linehan III), -89 (Minn.1996)).

To satisfy this element, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the individual is “highly likely [to] engage in harmful sexual acts in the future.” , 840 (Minn.App.2006) (alteration in original) ( (.Linehan IV)), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).

1804, 1812-13 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (holding that the rea *279 sonable-doubt standard does not apply in civil-commitment proceedings); -72 (Minn.1999) (holding that the statute providing for SDP commitment does not violate protections against double jeopardy because its purpose is treatment and not punishment); Joelson v. O’Keefe, (rejecting argument that a jury trial is constitutionally required in commitment

596 , 139 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997), aff'd, (Linehan IV), the Minnesota Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the sexually dangerous person act (the SDP Act) in response to Linehan’s substantive due process, equal protection, ex post facto, and double jeopardy challenges.

Our precedent recognizes that the constitutional guarantees of due process in the United States and Minnesota Constitutions include substantive components prohibiting ‘“certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” ’ ” (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct.

“[Substantive due process[ 1 ] protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (quotations and citations omitted).

1209 , 1212 n. 3, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (noting that a former version of the Minnesota psychopathic-personality-commitment law is not criminal in nature); -72 (Minn.1999) (following the holding of Hendricks).

We have said that “freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 , 117 S.Ct.