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The scope of a traffic stop “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).

10 Minnesota Constitution.10 “We review de novo a lower court’s ruling on constitutional questions.”

-29, 136-37 (Minn. 2002).

When a law-enforcement officer conducts a traffic stop to investigate an offense, the scope of the stop “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.”

See Askerooth, d at 364 (noting that “intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 [of the Minnesota Constitution] unless there is independent probable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion”); see also Fort, d at 418; -36 (Minn. 2002).

(requiring reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity before conducting a dog sniff to detect the presence of narcotics).

(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

133 n. 8 (Minn.2002) (refusing to interpret the Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the United States Constitution with regard to dog sniffs and stating that “we do not resort to the Minnesota Constitution whenever we simply would have decided the matter differently”).

d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002).

An investigatory stop generally must be limited in scope to the original purpose of the stop, and “‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,’” (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

An investigatory stop “‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

The court noted that “[i]t is the extent of the interference with the defendant’s possessory interest in his property, not the physical movement of the property, that determines whether a seizure has 2 Although we have previously addressed the definition of a seizure in the context of detaining an individual, n.7 (Minn. 2002) (“[I]n Minnesota a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave.”), we have not addressed the meaning of a seizure in the context o

This requires the investigatory stop to “be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

(permitting expansion of scope of traffic stop “to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity” if officer has 6 “reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity”).

common hallway outside defendant’s apartment was a search that required reasonable, articulable suspicion under Minn. Const, art. I, § 10); (holding that narcotics dog sniff outside self-storage unit was a search within the meaning of Minn. Const, art. I, § 10, and required reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); -28, 136 (Minn.2002) (holding that narcotics dog sniff around exterior of motor vehicle stopped for routine equipment violation required reasonable, articulable suspici

(‘We review de novo a lower court’s ruling on constitutional, questions.”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is “textually identical to the Fourth Amendment” 2 and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are “inherently persuasive.”