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Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125.

197 citing documents.

  • State v. Smith 814 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 2012
    1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))
  • State v. Cox 807 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • State v. Cox 807 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • State v. Diede 795 N.W.2d 836 Minn. 2011
  • State v. Diede 795 N.W.2d 836 Minn. 2011
    The scope of a Terry investigation must be limited “to that which occasioned the stop, to the limited search for weapons, and to the investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.”
  • State v. Krenik 774 N.W.2d 178 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
  • State v. Krenik 774 N.W.2d 178 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
    1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (explaining that a vehicle stop is reasonable when officer has probable cause to believe driver committed traffic violation); (explaining that a traffic stop “is lawful if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity”) (citation omitted).
  • State v. Guillen 213 P.3d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Ortega 749 N.W.2d 851 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
  • State v. Ortega 749 N.W.2d 851 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
  • State v. Timberlake 744 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2008
  • State v. Timberlake 744 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2008
    We have held that the “principles and framework of Terry [apply when] evaluating the reasonableness of [searches and] seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.” (concluding that “the Terry principles are appropriately applied * * * when a motor vehicle is stopped”).
  • State v. Hussong 739 N.W.2d 922 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • State v. Hussong 739 N.W.2d 922 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • State v. Flowers 734 N.W.2d 239 Minn. 2007
  • State v. Flowers 734 N.W.2d 239 Minn. 2007
    Askerooth, d at 365 ; (“Expansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”).
  • State v. Anderson 733 N.W.2d 128 Minn. 2007
  • State v. Anderson 733 N.W.2d 128 Minn. 2007
  • State v. Davis 732 N.W.2d 173 Minn. 2007
  • State v. Davis 732 N.W.2d 173 Minn. 2007
    See Carter, d at 211-12 ; -35 (Minn.2002).
  • Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency 728 N.W.2d 510 Minn. 2007
  • Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency 728 N.W.2d 510 Minn. 2007
  • State v. Davis 711 N.W.2d 841 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
  • State v. Davis 711 N.W.2d 841 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
  • State v. Burbach 706 N.W.2d 484 Minn. 2005
  • State v. Burbach 706 N.W.2d 484 Minn. 2005
  • Kahn v. Griffin 701 N.W.2d 815 Minn. 2005
  • Kahn v. Griffin 701 N.W.2d 815 Minn. 2005
    We have repeatedly stated that we will not “cavalierly construe our state constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution.” -27 (Minn.1985); Wiegand, Harris, d at 98
  • State v. Carter 697 N.W.2d 199 Minn. 2005
  • State v. Carter 697 N.W.2d 199 Minn. 2005
    where we held that a police officer performing a traffic stop for a routine equipment violation must have reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before using a drug-detection dog to sniff the automobile’s exterior.
  • State v. White 692 N.W.2d 749 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
  • State v. White 692 N.W.2d 749 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
    (holding that search, even of automobile, is substantial invasion of privacy).
  • State v. Carter 682 N.W.2d 648 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • State v. Carter 682 N.W.2d 648 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    (concluding that a dog sniff around the exterior of a stopped motor vehicle is not a search requiring probable cause).
  • State v. Askerooth 681 N.W.2d 353 Minn. 2004
  • State v. Askerooth 681 N.W.2d 353 Minn. 2004
    360 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003); (concluding that “Terry principles are appropriately applied * * ⅜ when a motor vehicle is stopped for a routine equipment violation.”).
  • State v. Cham 680 N.W.2d 121 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • State v. Cham 680 N.W.2d 121 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    (“We review de novo a lower court’s ruling on constitutional questions.”); (We review constitutional issues de novo.), review denied (Minn. Aug.
  • State v. Kolb 674 N.W.2d 238 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • State v. Kolb 674 N.W.2d 238 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “a dog sniff around the exterior of a legitimately stopped motor vehicle is not a search requiring probable cause on the basis of either the Fourth Amendment or the Minnesota Constitution.” (footnote omitted).
  • State v. Colosimo 669 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2003
  • State v. Syhavong 661 N.W.2d 278 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
  • State v. Syhavong 661 N.W.2d 278 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
    1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (stating vehicle stop is reasonable where officer has probable cause to believe driver committed traffic violation); (stating “[a] limited investigative stop is lawful if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity” (citation omitted)).
  • State v. Fort 660 N.W.2d 415 Minn. 2003
  • State v. Fort 660 N.W.2d 415 Minn. 2003
  • State v. Miller 659 N.W.2d 275 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
  • State v. Miller 659 N.W.2d 275 Minn. Ct. App. 2003