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in which the supreme court concluded that a manager of a storage facility “did not have actual authority to consent to the search of [Licari’s] storage unit.” Id.

The Minnesota Supreme Court articulated a more stringent standard, noting that “a finding of ‘mutual use’ is the essential ingredient of effective consent.” (quotation omitted).

en of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.1 (1978); d 173, 178 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that the defendant had the burden of showing that a dog sniff occurring in a common hallway violated his Fourth Amendment rights); (explaining that a defendant must first establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a storage unit before contesting its search).

has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.”); (explaining that the defendant had the burden of showing that a dog sniff which occurred 4 in a common hallway violated his Fourth Amendment rights); (explaining that a defendant must first establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a storage unit before contesting its search).

But if the state can prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.” (quotations omitted).

“If the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful 7 means, then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.”

“[W]arrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ applies.” ().

(discussing the proper application of the inevitable discovery exception).

A third party has actual authority to consent to a search if that person has “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974); –51 (Minn. 2003) (applying Matlock in 6 Minnesota).

But “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.”

2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)

We also ordered a remand for further proceedings rather than a

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, “[wjarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ applies.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct.

“It is a basic principle of constitutional law that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” ().

We will not remand a case “for more definite findings when it is clear that the district court considered and decided the fact issue in question.”

(where intrusion into a place is not justified by an exception to *851 the warrant requirement, the seizure of evidence found inside is also invalid).

Therefore, we remand to the court of appeals for reconsideration of Wurtzberger’s actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the garage, consistent with this court’s