Cited by

We will not reverse the district court’s factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1 The state did not attempt to justify the search of the vehicle based on the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which permits admission of evidence seized without a warrant, if the evidence “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means .” (quotation omitted ).

“The state bears the burden of establishi ng the applicability of an exception [to the warrant requirement].” State v. Licari

The supreme court has said that a warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and well-de lineated exceptions applies.” State v. Licari , (quotation omitted).

“The state bears the burden of establishi ng the applicability of an exception [to the warrant requirement].” State v. Licari

Warrantless searches are presumpt ively unreasonable, subject to a few well-established exceptions, and “[c]ourts are particularly reluctant to find exceptions to this rule in the context of a warrantless search or seizure in a home.”

(stating that “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amend ment”).

IV; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 10

In support of this contention, -56 (Minn. 2003), for the proposition that a remand is appropriate to allow for further proceedings.

Minnesota recognizes that an officer’s “honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.”

d 147, 147 (Minn. 1972) (remanding for findings where district court failed to make factual findings justifying suppression order); see also State v. Licari , -56 (Minn. 2003) (remanding to allow district court to conduct hearing and make findings of fact regarding issues it did not reach).

5 “honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.”

And, “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.”

Even if Wenzel was wrong, his mistake was reasonable and provided a legal basis to stop Peterson because “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” (affirming a vehicle stop because the officers made a reasonable mistake of fact regarding appellant’s identity); City of St.

Appellant points only to a generalized common-law right to privacy and the holding in State v. Licari , , 250-52 (Minn. 2003), on Fourth Amendment principles, that a person who grants another rights of access to a rented storage unit does not thereby grant actual authority to consent to a search.

State v. Licari , , 254 (Minn. 2003) ; see also State v. Sanders , , 558-60 (Minn. 1983) (upholding vehicle stop based on a reasonable mistake of fact).

IV; accord Minn. Const. art. I, § 10

507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ; see also State v. Licari , , 250 (Minn. 2003) (citing Katz for the same proposition).

If “the 6 fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimatel y or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search vio lated the warrant requirement.” ( quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S .

See, e.g., State v. Licari , (remanding with instructions to reopen the record).

(stating that while a landlord might reserve "rights of access," he or she typically does not have "rights of use”).

“The state bears the burden of establishing the applicability of an exception.”

See State v. Sanders , (stating that an officer’s reasonable mistake of fact does not invalidate a search if the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); (stating that “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment”).

But in order to contest a search of property, “a defendant must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched or the item[s] seized.” d 243, 249 (Minn. 2003) (alteration in original) (q uotation omitted); (determining that a defendant must show that 8 he or she personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable).

If “the fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.” State v. Licari , (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984)).

[and] must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”); (“The plain view exception to the warrant requirement contemplates that the police are lawfully in a place that produces plain view 9 of an incriminating article.”).

“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of ‘a few 4 specifically established and well -delineated exceptions’ applies.” State v. Licari , (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).

But “[i]f the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.” Diede, 795 d at 849 ().

“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well -delineated exceptions’ applies.” State v. Licari , (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).

d 557, 559 (Minn. 1983); (stating that “searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment”).