Cited by

Attorney disqualification is a “special proceeding under the court’s inherent power to supervise the attorneys who appear before it.”

In another context, the supreme court has “defined a final order as one that ends the proceeding as far as the court is concerned or that finally determines some positive legal right of the appellant relating to the action.” (quotation omitted); see also T.A.

Contrary to Randy’s argument, the matter can be addressed in the probate proceeding because probate courts have “been consolidated into district courts of general jurisdiction.”

Premier Pr ops., LLC , (citations omitted), aff’d, see also Minn. Stat. § 484.011 (2020) (“The district court shall also be a probate court.”); (stating that probate courts have “been consolidated into district courts of general jurisdiction ”).

In other words, a special proc eeding “is not part of the underlying action and that is brought by motion or petition, upon notice, for action by the court independent of the merits of the underlying action.” In re Estate of Janecek

But in the early 1980s, Minnesota’s district courts and probate courts were “consolidated,” -41 (Minn. 2000), or “merge[d],” review denied (Minn. Mar.

The proceeding was over “as far as the court is concerned.” ().

A final order is one that “ends the proceeding as far as the court is concerned.” In re Estate of Janacek

Even so, the City’s appeal was premature because it did not involve a final order, decision, or judgment that “end[ed] the proceedings as far as the [district] court was concerned,” or that “finally determine[d] some positive legal right” belonging to the City, id.

Probate courts have “been consolidated into district courts of general jurisdiction.”

A special proceeding is “a remedy that is not part of the underlying action and that is brought by motion or petition, upon notice, for action by the court independent of the merits of the underlying action.”

§ 351.02(4), "the probate, municipal and county courts of the state ha[ve now] been consolidated into district courts of general jurisdiction.”

This perspective is countered by the recognition that parties have a substantial right to the counsel of their choice, (citing Kerling v. G.W.

The dissent cites our decision in for the specific proposition that "an order is 'final,' and is therefore appealable under the plain language of section 271.10, if it 'finally determines some positive legal right.'

“[A] special proceeding is a generic term for a remedy that is not part of the underlying action and that is brought by motion or petition, upon notice, for action by the court independent of the merits of the underlying action.” see also In re Objections and Defenses to Real Property Taxes for the 1980 Assessment, , 731 n. 3 (Minn.1982) (listing “certiorari, contempt, corporate dissolution, garnishment, and receivership” as examples of special proceedings).

We have defined a final order as one that “ends the proceeding as far as the court is concerned or that ‘finally determines some positive legal right of the appellant relating to the action.’ ” (holding that the order disqualifying an attorney in a probate proceeding was a final order, and citing Weinzierl v. Lien, 296 Minn. 539, 540 , ).

(noting that district court relied on Jenson); Star Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson L.L.P., No. C0-00-2075, 2001 WL 605088 at *4-5 (Minn.App.)

(stating that a party has a substantial right to be represented by its attorney of choice).