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I Fleming argues that Officer Werner’s

801(c); -83 (Minn. 2002).

told us that [Brewer] assaulted her and he needed to go to jail.” Brewer argues that G.W.’s statements were inadmissible hearsay.

We also consider whether the alleged error “went to the critical issue at trial.”

“[I]t has long been recognized that a defendant’s decision to exercise his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel may not be used against him at trial.”

Appellant’s is unavailing.

(granting a new trial where “the cumulative effect” of multiple errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial).

Similarly, in State v. 5 Litzau, the supreme court held that expert testimony about how drug dealers typically acquire vehicles and transport drugs was “‘plainly inadmissible.’” Id.

and “does not provide this Court with facts that would establish that the in[]camera review would be helpful.” Minnesota law recognizes a privilege to withhold the identity of a CRI because of the state’s “‘legitimate interest in protecting the identity of persons who provide information to law enforcement.’” ().

“[I]t has long been recognized that a defendant's decision to exercise his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel may not be used against him at trial.”

“[A] police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining how the investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” (quotations omitted).

Porte argues that this instruction “violated the supreme court’s express disapproval of permissive-inference instructions.” He relies on three supreme court opinions:

(explaining that the erroneously admitted lab report impacted the verdict in part because the State presented the report as definitive evidence that the substance possessed by the defendant was cocaine); (explaining that the erroneously admitted evidence impacted the jury’s verdict in part because it went to the critical issue of whether the defendant possessed the drugs found in his car).

-87 (Minn.2002), the defendant’s conviction was reversed when the permissive-inference instruction on possession of a controlled substance contributed to the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in the defendant’s trial.

We have similarly recognized the State’s common law privilege to withhold a confidential informant’s identity because of the State’s “legitimate interest in protecting the identity of persons who provide information to law enforcement.”