Cited by

403, and if context and background can be established without admitting the hearsay

d 177, 183 (Minn. 2002 ) (“[A] party need not renew an objection to the admission of evidence to preserve a claim of error for appeal following a ruling on a motion in limine.”).

“This is so because a jury would be likely to infer from the testimony that the defendant was concealing his guilt.” (quotation omitted).

to argue that the district court erred by allowing the deputy “to testify about the substance of [the victim’s] hearsay statements .

“In criminal cases, evidence that an arresting or investigating officer received a tip for purposes of explaining why the police conducted surveillance is not hearsay.”

(“Ordinarily, a party need not renew an objection to the admission of evidence to preserve a claim of error for appeal following a ruling on a motion in limine.”).

the state first argues that the statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

“The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the identity of persons who provide information to law enforcement.”

801(c); - 83 (Minn. 2002).

The state supreme court reasoned that an informant’s statements were inadmissible hearsay when no other reason existed for “the officers’ testimony about the substance of the informant’s conversation which pointed directly to appellant’s guilt of the crime for which he was on trial.”

Yang’s does not convince us otherwise.

“[I]t has long been recognized that a defendant’s decision to exercise his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel may not be used against him at trial.”

801(c); -83 (Minn. 2002).

801(c); -83 (Minn. 2002).

“[A] party need not renew an objection to the admission of evidence to preserve a claim of error for appeal following a ruling on a motion in limine.” State v. Litzau , (citing Minn. R. Evid.

cmt.; see State v. Litzau , n.4 (Minn. 2002) (permitting testifying officer to reconstruct steps in a cr iminal investigation a nd testify that officer spoke to informant).

801(c); -83 (Minn. 2002).

State v. Litzau , n.3 (Minn. 2002) .

10 (Minn. 2002), for the proposition that the state may present evidence that police acted based on a tip but may not present any evidence as to the tip’s content, which is hearsay.

“The admission of expert opinion testimony is within the broad discretion of the [district] court.”

11 “Evidentiary rulings are comm itted to the [district] c ourt’s discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Litzau , (citation omitted).

n.4 (Minn. 2002) (“A police officer ‘may reconstruct the steps taken in a criminal investigation, m ay testify about his contact with an informant, and may describe the events leading up to a defendant’s arrest, but the officer’s testimony must be limited to the fact that he spoke t o an informant without dis

On appeal, a defendant may obtain “review and relief from plain errors affecting substantial rights if those errors had the effect of depriving the defendant of a fair trial.”

See State v. Litzau , (“[A] party need not renew an objection to the admission of evidence to preserve a claim of error for appeal following a ruling on a motion in limine.”).

Citing State v. Williams , -48 (Minn. 1994), Stauffer contends that a police officer “cannot testify about typical behaviors of criminals and claim that a defendant’s behavior meets that criteria to imply his guilt of the offense.” This argument is unavailing for two reasons.

State v. Litzau , , 183 (Minn. 2002).

801(c); –83 (Minn. 2002).

For example, the supreme court has stated that “evidence that an arresting or investig ating officer received a tip for purposes of explaining why the polic e conducted surveillance is not hearsay.” State v. Litzau

cmt.; see State v. Litzau , n.4 (Minn. 2002) (explaining that an officer may reconstruct the steps in a criminal investigation and testify that he spoke to an informant, but cannot disclose the substance of that conversation).

the firearm increased the risk of violence and the degree the risk was increased .” Menton contends that this instruction was plain error because it “included an improper inference and did not state the proper burden of proof.” A district court should avoid giving “jury instructions advising that a particular fact may be inferred from other particular facts, if proved.” -86 (Minn. 2002) (reversing for cumulative errors that included an erroneous inference instruction on possession of a controlle

cmt.; (stating that objection at trial is required only 8 if “excluded evidence is offered at trial because the court has changed its initial ruling”).

Brock cites State v. Litzau , in support of his argument that the admission of evidence of M.M.’s guilty plea affected his substantial rights.

Farah cites State v. Litzau, which states that “[w]here the evidence was aimed at having an impact on the verdict, we cannot say the verdict was surely unattributable to the error.”