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Ultimately, we will reverse a conviction “only if the [prosecutorial] misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

Ultimately, we will reverse a conviction “only if the [prosecutorial] misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired [appellant’s] right to a fair trial.”

“When assessing prosecutorial misconduct, the closing argument will be considered as a whole.”

Serious misconduct is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.”

Generally, if a defendant fails to object to misconduct at trial, he “forfeits the right to have the issue considered on appeal.”

See id.; (directing that closing arguments should be considered as a whole).

Furthermore, we “will reverse [a claim of generalized prosecutorial misconduct] only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

v. 14 McDaniel, (quotation omitted).8 Serious misconduct is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error,” while less serious misconduct is harmless unless “the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” (quotations omitted).

(“If the defendant failed to object to the misconduct at trial, he forfeits the right to have the issue considered on appeal, but if the error is sufficient, this court may review.”).

at 770, and the state does not argue that J.M.’s affidavit was not sufficiently trustworthy, (“Issues not addressed by a party's brief are considered waived .

Ultimately, we will reverse a conviction “only if the [prosecutorial] misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired [appellant’s] right to a fair trial.” d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003).

Serious misconduct is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error,” while less serious misconduct is harmless unless “the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

We “will reverse only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we “will reverse only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we “will reverse only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

Therefore we conclude that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” (quotation omitted).

For less serious misconduct, the standard is whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted).

We will reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct “only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant's right to a fair trial.”

We “will reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct at trial only if the misconduct, ‘when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” ().

We will reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct “only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

n.3 (Minn. 2012); (“Issues not addressed by a party’s brief are considered waived, and we will not address those .

-81 (Minn.2003) (concluding that the defendant’s absence from the motion hearing was not prejudicial because the defendant’s presence would not have changed the outcome of the motion hearing); (concluding that the omission of allegedly exculpatory evidence was not pr

We will reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct “only if the misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”