Cited by

(noting this court considers the strength of the state’s case during harmless-error analysis).

d 872, 875 (Minn. 1986).

d 872, 875 (Minn. 1986).

If the district court erroneously excludes defense character evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, “the decision will not be reversed if it is found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing State v. Larson , ); see also Pak, d at 628 (“We will not reverse a district court’ s exclusion of defense character evidence if our examination of the record satisfies us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would not have acquitted even if it h ad t

Constitutional “error will be found prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi *318 nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid.

We recognize that “[c]onstitutional error is not reversible error, however, if it is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citations omitted).

A constitutional error “will be found prejudicial if there is ‘a reasonable possibility’ that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”

Applying our test for prejudicial error — “error will' be found prejudicial if there is ‘a reasonable possibility 1 that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction,” — we conclude that the trial court error in denying discovery of the journals and limiting cross-examination regarding them was clearly prejudicial because their exclusion from evidence could well have contributed to the conviction.

Constitutional error is not reversible error where the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Larson, *739

1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967)

Evidentiary errors may require reversal where there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility’ that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 , 87 S.Ct.

The trial court has broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings, and this court will reverse the trial court only if it abused its discretion.

Trial courts have “broad discretion to make evi-dentiary rulings.”

We are also mindful that “[cjonsti-tutional error is not reversible error, however, if it is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS Generally, “[a] trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings,” and absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling will stand.

(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct.

(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct.

It is similar to the complainant’s held properly excluded, which stated the defendant’s conduct was not so serious as to fit the criminal sexual conduct statute.

the supreme court stated: Evidence of the past sexual conduct of a criminal sexual conduct complainant with a defendant may be introduced when the evidence is shown to be material and where its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.