Cited by

rson may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.” This statute “generally ‘prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.’ ” ().

He claims that even if the district court could impose separate sentences for multiple victims, his sentence “unfairly exaggerates the degree of his culpability.” Generally, a district court is prohibited from imposing multiple sentences for offenses “committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

“Section 609.035 prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committ ed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

See Minn. Stat. 4 § 609.035 (2016); see also State v. Norregaard , .

–86 (Minn. 1989); d 517, 521–22 (Minn. 1966).

See, e.g. , State v. Bakken , , 270-72 (Minn. 2016) ; State v. Cole , , 53 (Minn. 1996) ; State v. Norregaard , , 449 (Minn. 1986).

State v. Norregaard , , 449 (Minn. 1986).

State v. Norregaard , , 449 (Minn. 1986).

Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2016) generally “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident,” State v. Norregaard , and contemplates that a defendant will be punished for the “m ost serious” of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident, State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394, 399

In such instances, multiple sentences are strictly prohibite d to “protect a defendant co nvicted of multiple offenses 11 against unfair exaggeration of the criminality of his conduct.”

In these instances, multiple prosecutions are strictly prohibited to “protect a defendant convicted of multiple offenses against unfair exaggeration of the criminality of his conduct.”

to impeach an accused is not favored” because “[t]his type of conviction does not directly relate to an accused’s truthfulness and honesty”), aff’d as modified

Thus, the law generally “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.” ().

.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that the rationale for admitting prior felonies “that do not directly implicate honesty” to allow a jury to assess credibility has been heavily criticized); (stating that “using prior drug convictions and terroristic threat convictions to impeach an accused is not favored”), aff’d as modified

Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2014) generally “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

(holding that section 609.035 prohibited concurrent sentences for aggravated robbery and third-degree assault because defendant “was convicted of the more serious form of robbery and received additional punishment for the robbery because it was a robbery accompanied by the infliction of bodily har

to ascertain which offense is the most serious, leaving the longest sentence in place.” ( ).

The policy of this rule is “to protect a defendant convicted of multiple offenses against unfair exaggeration of the criminality of his conduct.”

I. Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 generally “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

riticism of whole-person rationale, rule 609 reflects broader credibility concept and court of appeals lacks authority to alter rule adopted by supreme court); (noting that use of prior controlled-substance and terroristic-threats convictions to impeach is disfavored but nonetheless affirming admission of that conviction), ajfd as modified

(holding that separate sentences for aggravated robbery and third-degree assault were barred by Minn.Stat.

5 Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single-behavioral incident.”

aff'd as modified, (testimony as to the truthfulness or.

Hartfield, d at 670 (citing State v. Norregaard )

(holding that defendant’s conviction of burglary and defendant’s conviction of rape arose out of single behavioral incident because ”[t]he purpose of the burglarious entry was to rape the victim”); (concluding that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 609.035 to allow separate punishment both for assault and for aggravated robbery where the assault is what transformed what would otherwise have been a simple robbery into an aggravated robbery).