Cited by

Second, Metzer argues that the district court erred when it imposed these probationary conditions because they departed “from the spirit of the Sentencing Guidelines.” To support his argument

Bogonko relies on two cases, to support his argument that the district courts erred by granting his demands to execute his sentences.

A district court should grant such a demand if “the conditions of probation make probation more onerous than prison and if it cannot be demonstrated that society’s interests suffer by vacating the probation 11 sentence.” Randolph, d at 510; (clarifying that “the ‘society’s interest’ language in Randolph [cannot be used as an] independent basis to deny a defendant’s request to refuse probation and execute sentence”).

Under Minnesota law, “a defendant has the right to refuse probation and demand execution of sentence when the 10 conditions of probation make probation more onerous than prison.” -84 (Minn. 1984).

But a defendant with a stayed sentence has the right to request execution of that sentence “when the conditions of probation make probation more onerous than prison.” ().

See State v. Rasinski , d 645, 647-51 (Minn. 1991) (reviewing stayed sentences for an offender who was placed on probation after convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in death ); -83 (Minn. App. 1987) (reviewing sentence of 36 months imprisonment, an upward durational departure), review de

In State v. Rasinski, the supreme court made clear that the relative onerousness of a probationary sentence and an executed sentence is not measured “only in terms of the relative lengths of incarceration.”

-51 (Minn. 1991); 1We note that Ambrose did not provide the district court with any transcripts or other records of his 2006 sentencing hearing.

This court has “sanctioned the stacking of consecutive probationary periods.” *276 524 (Minn.App.1990) (Rasinski I), rev’d on other grounds, (Rasinski II)

(refusing to address other grounds for departure after concluding that “the first two grounds used by the trial court to justify departure are sufficient”).

han that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)); (stating district court must look to see “whether a defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); (stating decision to depart is based on “whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the c

-50 (Minn.1991), wherein the sentencing court was allowed to consider prior D.W.I.’s as a factor in supporting an upward departure where priors were not included in the criminal history score.