Cited by

(stating that the court’s instructions “lessened the impact of the [prosecutor’s] improper comments”).

Whether offenses are part of a single behavioral incident “depends on the facts of the particular case.”

Whether multiple offenses occurred during a single behavioral incident “depends on the fa cts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Jones , (citing State v. Hawkins , ).

Whether multiple offenses arose from a single behavioral incident “depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.” ().

See Martinez , d at 851 ( d 623, 626 (Minn. 1980)).

In addition, the district court instructed the jury that the statements made by the attorneys during closing arguments were not evidence and that the jury was to “[d]eliberate without prejudice, bias or sympathy, and without regard to your own personal likes or dislikes .” See State v. Hawkins , (noting that the instruction that closing arguments are not evidence “lessened the impact of the improper comments”).

Nevertheless, the district court mitigated the effect of the prosecutor’s comments by instructing the jury that “[t] he law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.” See State v. Hawkins , (determining that instructions “lessened the impact of the improper comments”).

Jones, d at 693 (determining that because district court instructed the jury on “the difference between evidence and the arguments of counsel,” among other things, “the prosecutor’s misconduct was not prejudicial”); (deciding that prosecutor’s improper statements did not deny appellant a fair trial because “[t]here was overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt and because the trial court’s instructions—that the arguments 28 of counsel were not evidence”).

See, -14 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that defendant’s attempt to take the gun of an officer who kicked him down the stairs in order to “do” the officer was substantially contemporan eous with his aggravated robbery of the officer); State v. Gibson , (holding that criminal-vehicular-ope

prohibits multiple sentences for offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

see also State v. Washington , (“The [district] court’s instructions to the jury are als o relevant in determining wheth er the jury was unduly influenced by the improper comments.”).

See, e.g. , State v. Jones , , 531 n.1 (Minn. 2014) ; State v. Hawkins , , 11 (Minn. 1994).

“Whether two acts are part of a single course of conduct depends on the facts of the particular case.” (quoting State v. Hawkins , ).

“Whether two acts are part of a single course of conduct depends on the facts of the particular case.” ().

“[M]ultiple sentences may not be used for two offenses if the defendant[] substantially contemporaneously committed the second offense in order to avoid apprehension for the first offense.”

1, provides that, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” “Whether two acts are part of a single course of conduct depends on the facts of the particular case.”

male in the doorway of the next apartment); -95 (Minn.1994) (holding that murder and arson were committed as part of the same • behavioral incident under the avoidance-of-apprehension doctrine when the defendant shot the victim and then, along with his co-defendant, decided to burn down the victim’s house in an attempt to cover up the killing); 13-14 (Minn.1994) (holding that aggravated robbery and attempted murder were part of the same behavioral incident under the avoidance-of-apprehension doc

–96 (Minn. 1995) (stating that focus “is primarily on the defendant’s conduct rather than the elements of the crimes committed,” when determining if acts constitute a single behavioral incident).

Hartfield, d at 670 (citing State v. Norregaard )

The district court diminished the effect of the comments by instructing the jury that “the arguments or other remarks of an attorney are not evidence in this case” and that jurors “should not permit bias, prejudice, or sympathy to affect [their] judgment.” (court’s instructions “lessened the impact of the improper comments”).

Reiland , 274 Minn, at 124, d at 637 .

For purposes of criminal sentencing, whether multiple intentional acts are part of a “course of conduct” requires consideration of time and place, as well as whether the acts were motivated by the desire to obtain a “single criminal objective.”

1777 , 118 L.Ed.2d 434 ; (holding that no violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel occurs if, after right attaches, state does *290 not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the defendant).