Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317.

103 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
The supreme court has rejected “the argument that the legislature must append language prohibiting waiver to every mandatory statute to ensure that the statute is given effect,” reasoning that “[t]he canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.” State v. Humes , (applying Humes to consideration of a mandatory - minimum sentencing provision in Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd.
Dennis Walsh v. City of Orono, Minnesota Minn. 2025
Dennis Walsh v. City of Orono, Minnesota Minn. 2025
That clause establishes two things: (1) that a special election is required, (“The canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.”); and (2) a special election may occur at any proscribed date up to and including the date of the next regular election.
Fidel Pizarro-Rios v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2025
Fidel Pizarro-Rios v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2025
14 designated sex offenders.” (–74 (Minn. 2000); ); see also State ex rel.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “protect a criminal defendant from three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Humes
Berry Alexander Davis, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent Minn. 2025
Berry Alexander Davis, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent Minn. 2025
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Benson Minn. 2024
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Benson Minn. 2024
And although we have rejected the argument “that the legislature must append language prohibiting waiver to every mandatory statute to ensure that the statute is given effect,” we have also held that when a statute protects a person’s right or liberty interest, as it does here, a statute’s requirements can be waived if the statute does not expressly prohibit waiver.
State of Minnesota v. Kenneth Jagger Crawford Minn. Ct. App. 2024
State of Minnesota v. Kenneth Jagger Crawford Minn. Ct. App. 2024
The supreme court has rejected “the argument that the legislature must append language prohibiting waiver to every mandatory statute to ensure that the statute is given effect,” reasoning that “[t]he canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.” (applying Humes to consideration of a mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd 8(b) (1996), and stating that “[t]he legislature should not be expected to enumerate a prohibition against stayed executions
State of Minnesota, Minn. 2022
We have long held that these provisions “protect a criminal defendant from three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” d 317, 320 (Minn. 1998) (emphasis added); see also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727–28 (1998) (same).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
State v. Hill 918 N.W.2d 237 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Hill 918 N.W.2d 237 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Humes , , 320 (Minn. 1998).
State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Humes , see Minn. Stat. § 645.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The word “shall” is mandatory, and the plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the district court must ask the probationer to sign the written waiver form.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
4(c) (2014), which provides that “unless a concurrent term is specified by the court, a sentence under this section shall be consec utive to any sentence pr eviously imposed or which may be imposed for any crime or offense for which the person was in custody when the person escaped.” See State v. Humes , (applying cannon of statutory construction that “shall” is mandatory to conclude that plain language of a statute required a term of conditional release to be included in sex offenders’ sentence
Harry Jerome Evans v. State of Minnesota 880 N.W.2d 357 Minn. 2016
Harry Jerome Evans v. State of Minnesota 880 N.W.2d 357 Minn. 2016
Schnagl, d at 301 (-20 (Minn. 1998)).
State of Minnesota v. Shawn Theodore Hoshal Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Shawn Theodore Hoshal Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. William Francis Melchert-Dinkel Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. William Francis Melchert-Dinkel Minn. Ct. App. 2015
B. Double Jeopardy The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions “protect a criminal defendant from three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.”
State of Minnesota v. Forest Grant Noggle Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Forest Grant Noggle Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(stating that “shall” in conditional-release statute required imposition of conditional- release term).
Christopher Eugene Wheeler v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Christopher Eugene Wheeler v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
6, 2015) (d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998)).
Rodney Thundercloud v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Rodney Thundercloud v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
-20 (Minn. 1998) (holding that the conditional-release term imposed under Minn. Stat. § 609.346, subd.
Robel Belay Kubrom v. State of Minnesota 863 N.W.2d 88 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Robel Belay Kubrom v. State of Minnesota 863 N.W.2d 88 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
When a statute mandates a period of conditional release, any sentence that omits the conditional-release period is unauthorized.3
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Brian Keith Schnagl, a/k/a Brian Keith Schnagel, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. 859 N.W.2d 297 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Brian Keith Schnagl, a/k/a Brian Keith Schnagel, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. 859 N.W.2d 297 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. A. Y. G., a/k/a A. Y. L. Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. A. Y. G., a/k/a A. Y. L. Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Erik Alan Vacek Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Erik Alan Vacek Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“The United States and Minnesota Constitutions, through their due process clauses, ‘ensure that sentencing proceedings observe the standards of fundamental fairness essential to justice.’” ().
State of Minnesota v. Jack Perry Frazier Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Jack Perry Frazier Minn. Ct. App. 2014
-20 (Minn. 1998) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to amend a sentence, which had not yet expired, to include a conditional release term that had been omitted at sentencing in connection with a rule 27.03 motion brought by the state).
Maiers v. Roy 847 N.W.2d 524 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Maiers v. Roy 847 N.W.2d 524 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State v. R.H.B. 821 N.W.2d 817 Minn. 2012
State v. R.H.B. 821 N.W.2d 817 Minn. 2012
(“The canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.” (citing Minn.Stat.
State v. Castillo-Alvarez 820 N.W.2d 601 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. Castillo-Alvarez 820 N.W.2d 601 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
“This prohibition protects a criminal defendant from ‘three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” ().
State v. Jeffries 806 N.W.2d 56 Minn. 2011
State v. Jeffries 806 N.W.2d 56 Minn. 2011
2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)