Cited by

(holding that an indetermin ate commitment to state hospita ls for mentally disabled individuals was not unreasonable because it was “the more effective and efficient way to deal with the state’s responsibility to treat mentally [disabled] persons”); Bituminous Cas.

ocation matter); Martin v. Itasca County , , 370 (Minn. 1989) (applying Mathews in evaluating a procedural due process challenge to a leave-of-absence policy); Violette v. Midwest Printing Co.-Webb Publ'g , , 323 (Minn. 1987) (noting that Mathews is the "proper test for determining whether [a statute] affords all process that is constitutionally due"); In re Harhut , , 311 (Minn. 1986) (applying Mathews to a procedural due process challenge to indeterminate civil commitment statute); Machacek v.

(identifying examples of suspect classifications).

We need not resolve that thorny separation of powers problem here, however, because “we are to construe statutes to avoid a constitutional confrontation if it is possible to do so.” see also Giem, d at 429 (“We have held that if we can construe a statute to avoid a constitutional confrontation, we are to do so.”); (“Again, we employ the principle that this court must construe a statute in such a way as to avoid constitutional conflict.”).

“Equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be treated similarly.” (“The equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”).

“The equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”

The equal-protection clause “require[s] that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”

(equal protection clauses of federal and state constitutions require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under law).

146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994); -13 (Minn.1986) (holding that at hearing on judicial review under Minn. Stat. § 253B.17 (1984) of indeterminate commitment as mentally retarded, burden of proof is on state to avoid serious due process concerns).

*42 A. Equal Protection Argument The equal protection clauses of both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”

As this court noted in with regard to an individual committed to a state hospital as mentally retarded, an individual committed as MI & D who desires release should have the assistance of counsel, and moreover counsel who is regularly informed about the individual’s condition.

at 3255 (mental retardation not a quasi-suspect classification)

Another hearing was held in 1987 pursuant to in which the supreme court required that all indeterminate commitments for mentally retarded persons be reviewed at least every three years.

“The equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”

In the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a legislative classification which is based on mental retardation must be upheld if that classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.