Cited by

Rule 401 “adopts a minimal relevancy approach.”

ned whether or not Hussein acquiesced in the trial strategy, this Court may decline to decide on the issue and allow Hussein to seek postconviction relief.” 17 Generally, “[a]dmitting a client’s guilt without the client’s consent or acquiescence is deemed ineffective assistance of counsel and is grounds for a new trial.”

see also Anderson, d at 237 (“Minnesota does not recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity or diminished responsibility.”); (concluding “psychiatric opinion testimony is not admissible on whether, in fact, the defendant had the capacity to form the requisite subjective state of mind” because such testimony “impermissibly introduces diminished capacity into the jury’s deliberations”).

-97 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]he rescue doctrine is applicable in emergency situations where exigent circumstances may excuse compliance with the Miranda rules in instances of overriding need to save human life or to rescue persons whose lives are in danger.” (quotation omitted)).

See, e.g., State v. Provost , -02 (Mi nn.

See, -02 (Minn. 1992) (rejecting expert psychiatric opinion for embracing issue of criminal intent); (explaining that testimony should not embrace “legal conclusions or terms of art”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has found acquiescence based on a trial-long strategy where “ [f]rom his opening statement through his closing argument, defense counsel consistently took the position that [the] defendant had caused the victim’s death.”

see McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018) (violation of a defendant’s constitutionally protected autonomy right is structural error “not subject to harmless-error review”); (“Admitting a client ’s guilt 7 without the client’s consent or acquiescence is deemed ineffective assistance of counsel and is grounds for a new trial.”), cert.

See State v. Provost , (refusing to requir e “a 6 ‘contemporaneous’ record made of the defendant’s consent to his counsel’s strategy of admitting guilt to a lesser charge”).

State v. Provost , , 97 (Minn. 1992).

In contrast, expert psychiatric testimony is not admissible during the guilt phase of trial to establish the defendant’s “capacity to form the requisite subjective state of mind” and “on the ultimate question of 8 whether in fact the defendant had the requisite mens rea when he co mmitted the crime.”

A defendant acquiesces in his trial counsel’s concession “when trial counsel uses the same strategy from beginning to end of trial and the defendant does not object.” Prtine , d at 318 9 ().

intoxication is ordinarily inadmissible because most jurors have some experience with [this] condition[].” (concluding that expert testimony “in regard to t he general effects of alcohol” would not have aided the jury).

(recognizing an express concession); (recognizing an implied concession).

-38 (Minn. 2010) (- 04 (Minn. 1995)).

(deeming that the defendant acquiesced to a trial strategy of conceding guilt when “[f]rom his opening statement through his closing argument, defense counsel consistently took the position that defendant had caused the 5 victim’s death,” and the def

d 237, 239 (Minn. 1993); –03 (Minn. 1992); –32 (Minn. 1982).

345, 348 (1974) (holding that absence of one indicator of intoxication does not render layperson’s observations insufficient to offer opinion testimony about defendant’s intoxication); State v. Peterson, 266 Minn. 77, 80, 82 , -81 (1963) (holding sufficient foundation exists for police officers to offer opinion testimony about defendant’s impairment); (noting that “[ojpinion testimony on a person’s blood alcohol content and on the fact of intoxication is admissible,” but Minnesota case-law conce

(stating that state of mind is the type of difficult judgment jurors regularly make in their everyday lives).

(noting that psychiatric opinion testimony is not admissible “on whether, in fact, the defendant had the capacity to form the requisite subjective state of mind”).