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Pursuant to the constitutional amendment, the Legislature created the Racing Commission and “detailed that body’s licensing and regulatory powers over the establishment and operation of parimutuel betting on horseracing in Minnesota.”

(noting that complex issues of “public significance” in challenges to the constitutionality of legislation expanding licensing authority for Racing Commission required the district court to develop a record, “a function that an appellate court is ill-equipped to perform”); Seventy-Seventh Minn. St

(refusing to consider extrinsic factors when analyzing a constitutional provision because “we cannot ignore our own mandate — to refrain from expansive interpretation ...

In examining constitutional provisions, we “give effect to the clear, explicit, unambiguous and ordinary meaning of the language.”

“When considering the ordinary meaning of the words of a constitutional provision, we construe them ‘in the light of the social, economic, and political situation of the people at the time of its adoption, as well as subsequent changes in such conditions.’ ” Hartmann, d at 453 ().

When examining constitutional provisions, our task is “to give effect to the clear, explicit, unambiguous and ordinary meaning of the language.”

See, -43 (Minn.1992) (issuing quo warranto writ invalidating legislation authorizing teleracing and telephone betting and requiring discontinuance of all off-track betting); State ex rel.

When examining constitutional provisions, we “give effect to the clear, explicit, unambiguous and ordinary meaning of the language.” (construing the meaning of the words “on-track betting” to determine that telephone wagering and tele-racing were not allowable forms of betting under the Minnesota Constitution because they take place away from the track); State ex rel.

(requiring quo warranto petitions to be commenced in the district court).

The entire article is to be construed as a whole, and receive a practical, common sense construction.” (quoting State ex rel.