Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Pettee, 538 N.W.2d 126.

37 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
“In limited situations in which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the defendant exercises a legal right, a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness will arise.” State v. Pettee , (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
caused a complete retrial after the defendant had already been tried and convicted.” (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 376 (1982)).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
alters the charging terms of the indictment after the grand jury has finally passed on them.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
As we concluded in Section III, a pretrial ruling on severance or joinder does not control the subsequent application of section 609.035, which bars later prosecution “only if the multiple offenses arise out of a single behavioral incident.”
State v. Sh aka 927 N.W.2d 762 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State v. Sh aka 927 N.W.2d 762 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
See State v. Pettee , , 132 (Minn. 1995) ("To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation 'of the most basic sort.'
State of Minnesota v. Mark William Latimer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Mark William Latimer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(“A mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify imposing an inflexible prophylactic presumption [of a due process violation].” (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1982))).
State of Minnesota v. Douglas John Olson 884 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Douglas John Olson 884 N.W.2d 395 Minn. 2016
n.5 (Minn. 1995); State v. Aubol, 309 Minn. 323, 325-26, .
State of Minnesota v. Rafael Alfonso Banks 875 N.W.2d 338 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Rafael Alfonso Banks 875 N.W.2d 338 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
( n.5 (Minn. 1995)); (holding that a prosecutor acts in bad faith by dismissing a complaint to circumvent denial of a continuance), review granted (Minn. Sept.
State of Minnesota v. Douglas John Olson 867 N.W.2d 258 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Douglas John Olson 867 N.W.2d 258 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
20, 1999); n.5 (Minn. 1995) (observing good-faith requirement for refiled indictments).
State of Minnesota v. Artis Iverson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Artis Iverson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“A mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify imposing an inflexible prophylactic presumption.”).
State v. Bakdash 830 N.W.2d 906 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Bakdash 830 N.W.2d 906 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
“Generally, an amendment to' an indictment made either before or after trial, must be of form, not of substance, which means the amendment may not charge a greater offense.”
State v. Hohenwald 815 N.W.2d 823 Minn. 2012
State v. Hohenwald 815 N.W.2d 823 Minn. 2012
State v. Rhoads 813 N.W.2d 880 Minn. 2012
State v. Whitley 649 N.W.2d 180 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
State v. Whitley 649 N.W.2d 180 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Id.; (“The state satisfies [the seven-day period] either by moving for a continuance of the stay or by filing a new or amended * * * complaint within that seven-day period.” (citations omitted)); review denied (Minn. Dec.
State v. Weltzin 618 N.W.2d 600 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
State v. Weltzin 618 N.W.2d 600 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
P. 30.01 (allowing prosecutor to dismiss a complaint without leave of court); , 131 n. 5 (Minn.1995) (stating dismissal under rule 30.01 is without prejudice and that state may re-indict defendant on same charge at later date); (same), review denied (Minn. Apr.
State v. Couture 587 N.W.2d 849 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
State v. Couture 587 N.W.2d 849 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
A dismissal under rule 30.01 is without prejudice, and the state, provided it is not acting in bad faith, may “later reindict based on the same or similar charges.” , 131 n. 5 (Minn.1995) (citation omitted).
State v. Nerz 572 N.W.2d 346 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Nerz 572 N.W.2d 346 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Martin 567 N.W.2d 62 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Martin 567 N.W.2d 62 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
See, (indictment for third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter) cert.
State v. Lory 559 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State v. Lory 559 N.W.2d 425 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
State, City of Crystal v. Kivi 554 N.W.2d 97 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State, City of Crystal v. Kivi 554 N.W.2d 97 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
(footnote omitted), cert.
State v. Caswell 551 N.W.2d 252 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Caswell 551 N.W.2d 252 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
(permitting a defendant to prove objectively that a prosecutor’s charging decision resulted from a desire to punish the defendant for exercising a legal right), cert.