Cited by

State v. Robinson , -66 (Minn. 2000).

“Cautionary instructions given by the trial court relating to allegations of misconduct are a significant factor favoring denial of a motion for a mistrial.” (quotation omitted).

“Cautionary instructions given by the trial court relating to allegations of misconduct are a significant factor favoring denial of a 8 motion for a mistrial.” (quotation omitted).

Wren, d at 392 (); see also Jackson, d at 695 (allowing prosecutor’s references to “gang world” where designed to introduce jurors to unfamiliar behaviors and customs of gang culture).

See Loving, d at 649 (“[A] general claim that the requested transcript will possibly reveal prosecutorial misconduct, especially in the face of a contrary finding by the district court, is not enough to demonstrate good cause.”); (explaining that the State is not obligated to put every available witness before the grand jury); see also United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249, 256 (2d.

A district court’s “repeated instruction on the state’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt leaves no doubt that the jury could not have been misled that it was the burden of the state to prove each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(concluding that the statement that “the appellant was not of the same world as the jurors and clearly was distinguishable from a businessman from Edina, Pope John Paul and Mother Teresa [did not] impermissibly appeal[] to the prejudice and passion of the jury”).

But “[i]nconsistencies in the state’s case are not grounds for reversing the jury verdict.” d 16, 20 (Minn. App. 2007) (“Inconsistencies in prosecution evidence do not require reversal.”), review denied (Minn. Feb.

in [the] potential [of the evidence] to influence the jury that if the defendant committed the Spreigl offense he must be guilty of the charged offense.”

But cautionary instructions weigh against granting a mistrial, and here, in response to the State’s argument, the district court gave an additional instruction to the jury that “mere presence” was not sufficient to convict appellant of murder.

-77 (Minn.2004); -66 (Minn.2000).

We have said that to determine “whether a prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct is largely within the discretion of the trial court and we will reverse only where the misconduct, viewed in light of the entire record, is of such serious and prejudicial nature that appellant’s constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired.”

that a statement describing a defendant as not being from the same world as the jurors was not misconduct when “these comments did little more than prepare the jury for evidence of an unfamiliar world involving drugs,” we have repeatedly emphasized that it is improper for the state to highlight a def

We have held that a prosecutor’s statement describing a defendant as not being from the same world as the jurors is not misconduct when “these comments did little more than prepare the jury for evidence of an unfamiliar world involving drugs.” denial of habeas corpus affirmed by Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862 (8th Cir.2002).

if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits.’ ” (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 , 76 S.Ct.

the defendant argued that there was prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument when the prosecutor reminded jurors that the defendant’s world was different from that of a “businessman from Edina, Pope John Paul, and Mother Teresa.” We found no misconduct because the comments were isolated and