Cited by

–61 (Minn. 2004) (holding that a statute that imposed a threshold vote percentage in the primary election for a major political party’s nominees to appear on the general election ballot violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those candidates and their supporters); –34 (Minn. 2003) (holding that a statute prohibiting the mailing of a replacement ballot for the general election to certain absentee voters after the death of a candidate violated constitutional rights to equal protecti

ting on the charter- amendment petition if respondents use the signature-verification procedures set forth in their informational document titled “Procedures When Processing Petitions.” 2 Appellant emphasizes that, as described by caselaw, section 204B.44 is intended to both “correct or prevent certain types of errors, omissions or wrongful acts related to elections.” (emphasis added).

at “[t]he statutes at issue, Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, and the first two lines of § 202A.13, are unconstitutional.” Because constitutional issues have been raised, we are mindful of our “general practice,” which is “to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be decided.” ( n.7 (Minn. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(noting that “[o]ur general practice is to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be decided” (alteration in original) ( n.7 (Minn. 2003))).

of Elections , 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (1966); Kahn, d at 830; State ex rel.

(explaining the State’s “compelling interest in preserving orderliness and integrity of the election process”); Bell v. Gannaway , (explaining that regulations for abse ntee voting “preserve the purity and integrity of elections” ).

See Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer , -31 (Minn. 2003) (denying petitioners’ requested relief for lack of any “sound legal basis”).

Subsection (a)(4) permits a petition that seeks relief for “any wrongful act, omission, or error” by an election official or other individual “charged with any duty concerning an election.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a)(4); (describing former subsection (d) of the statute as a “catch-all” provision that addresses errors or omissions other than those on a ballot).

732 n. 7 (Minn.2003) (noting that it is our general practice to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be decided).

Indeed, as the state official that has previously administered elections with ballot vacancies and substitutions, 731 (Minn.2003); it is logical to assume that county election officials who are required to prepare ballots subject to the Secretary’s rules would turn to the Secretary of State for guidance in this situation.

(stating that section 204B.44 “allows any person to file a petition to correct or prevent certain types of errors, omissions, or wrongful acts”).

( , 732 n. 7 (Minn.2003)); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that the courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

732 n. 7 (Minn.2003); see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 103-04 , 101 S.Ct.

-35 (Minn.2003), in which we struck down a statute on equal protection grounds without invoking the requirement of discriminatory intent.

[16] -35 (Minn.2003), in which we struck down a statute on equal protection grounds without invoking the requirement of discriminatory intent.

(stating that to determine whether a statute violates equal protection, this court first examines “whether the challenged classification must satisfy strict scrutiny or merely the rational basis standard.”).

We address Bourke’s statutory argument first because “[o]ur general practice is to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be decided.” , 732 n. 7 (Minn.2003); , 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

732 n. 7 (Minn.2003), that our general practice is to avoid a constitutional ruling if another basis is available on which to decide the case.

We begin every analysis of an equal-protection challenge by determining “whether the challenged classification must satisfy strict scrutiny or merely the rational basis standard.”