Cited by

“[A] transcript is important to, but not always essential for, a meaningful appeal.”

We “cannot consider a sufficiency- of- evidence issue unless provided with a trial transcript.” d 531, 534, 536 (Minn. 1994) (vacating the postconviction court’s denial of a petition where no record of the defendant’s trial was available and “state court personnel [we]re directly responsible for th[is] inability to review the record”).

In Hoagland v. State, the supreme court noted that “a transcript is important to, but not always essential for, a meaningful appeal.”

7 see also, (declining to address appellant’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim due to the incomplete record).

(finding that this court could not provide meaningful review of a conviction when no record of the trial was available); (“Governmental bodies must take seriously their responsibility to develop and preserve a record that allows for meaningful, revi

ne substantive review” allowed this court to review the merits of defendant’s petition despite a 22-month delay in obtaining appellate review); (finding defendant’s delay in filing a postconviction petition was outweighed by “our commitment to convicted defendants’ rights to substantive review” under the postconviction statute); (determining that an 8-year delay did not prevent this court from reviewing the petitioner’s substantive claims); Riggers v. State, 284 Minn. 543, 543-44 , (per curiam)

onable result to permit a proposed patient to *431 avoid commitment simply by not appearing in court.”); (noting that “[a] patient may waive [the] requirements” of section 253B.08), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995); (finding waiver of the section 253B.08, subdivision 1 deadlines), aff'd

(waiver of forty-four-day period provided under predecessor statute), aff'd

*491 Although a convicted defendant does not have a constitutional right to appeal under either the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution, we have determined in Minnesota that “a convicted defendant is entitled to at least one right of review by an appellate or postconviction court.” 2 (quoting State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , ); see also Minn. R.Crim.

Rairdon, d at 322 (9-year delay did not preclude review on the merits); (8-year delay alone did not preclude relief because the burden is on the state to establish undue prejudice by delay); Riggers v. State, 284 Minn. 543, 543-44 , (33-year delay did not preclude relief).

to support his claim that the reversal of his convictions is required.

But in Minnesota, “a convicted defendant is entitled to at least one right of review by an appellate or postconviction court.” (quotation omitted); see also Minn.Stat.

Rairdon, d at 322 (9-year delay did not preclude review on the merits); (8-year delay alone did not preclude relief because the burden is on the state to establish undue prejudice by delay); Riggers v. State, 284 Minn. 543, 543-44 , (33-year delay did not preclude relief).

(citing Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16-17 , -01 (1968), and Hoag- *525 -37 (Minn.1994)).

See Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16-17 , -01 (1968)) (noting that a plea should not be withdrawn and judgment vacated without the strongest of reasons, if serious prejudice to state); -37 (Minn.1994) (discussing factors considered in determining whether state is unduly prejudiced by award of new trial).

(initial commitment), aff'd, In re Buckhalton, No. C2-93-2428, 1994 WL 43870 (Minn.App.

(lidding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial “unless he has abused the judicial process or the state can establish that it would be unduly prejudiced by a new trial”).

ORDER Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order of the district court dated March 2,1995, denying defendant, Leland M. Hoagland, a new trial after a be, and the same is, affirmed.