Cited by

.”); (holding that expert testimony into “puzzling aspects of the child’s conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation” of a child-victim of criminal sexual conduct was helpful to the jury).

“Corroboration of an allegation of sexual abuse of a child is required only if the evidence otherwise adduced is insufficient to sustain [a] conviction.”

However, “[c]ross-examination is recognized as the principal means by which a defendant may test the credibility of his accuser’s testimony.”

is admissible in the proper exercise of discretion by the [district] court”); (stating that, in cases involving a sexually abused child, the fact-finder is “often faced with determining the veracity of a young child who tells of a course of conduct carried on over an ill-defined time frame and who appears an uncertain or ambivalent accuser and who may even recant,” and thu

.” (holding that an expert’s background information on abused children was “helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children, and particularly of children as young as this complainant,” who was seven at the time of the abuse).

(finding that victim’s testimony was unnecessarily but effectively corroborated by her general, consistent reports to others).

But a complainant’s testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case generally does not require corroboration, and corroboration of a child’s allegations is required “only if the evidence otherwise adduced is insufficient to sustain conviction.”

d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984).

(“[I]n cases where a sexual assault victim is an adolescent, [general] expert testimony as to the reporting conduct of such victims and as to continued contact by the adolescent with the assailant is admissible in the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court....”); (holding that expert testimony into “puzzling aspects of the child’s conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation” of a child-victim of criminal sexual conduct was helpful to the jury).

a. Vouching testimony is inadmissible except in unusual cases “With respect to most crimes the credibility of a witness is peculiarly within the competence of the jury, whose common experience affords sufficient basis for the assessment of credibility.” -10 (Minn.1984).

(noting that in general “were they lying” questions are improper); (concluding that prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony from witnesses that they believed the victim’s version of events was improper); -10 (Minn.1984) (“With respect to most crimes the credibility of a witness is peculiarly within the competence of the jury, whose common experience affords sufficient basis for the assessment of credibility.”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that, in most criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses “is peculiarly within the competence of the jury, whose common experience affords sufficient basis for assessment of credibility.” -10 (Minn.1984).

personality assessment), (holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible); (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony concerning the behavioral characteristics typically displayed by adolescent victims of sexual assault); (holding that expert testimony about the emotional and psychological characteristics often observed in children who are victims of sexual abuse was admissible); (holding that expert testimony on rape trauma s

More specifically, we generally “reject expert opinion testimony regarding the truth or falsity of a witness’ allegations about a crime, for the expert’s status may lend an unwarranted stamp of scientific legitimacy to the allegations.” (quotation omitted).

we held that an expert could offer an opinion *742 that a specific minor complainant’s allegations about sexual abuse were not fabricated, in addition to testifying about the behavior and symptoms typically exhibited by sexually abused children.

-10 (Minn.1984) (stating that even though an expert’s testimony may arguably provide the jury with potentially useful information, “[i]n most cases * * ¾ the possibility that the jury may be unduly influenced by an expert’s opinion mitigates against admission.”).

611 (Minn.1984) (stating that reliability of clinical psychologist’s testimony with regard to the cause of alleged sexual abuse victim’s condition, in a criminal trial, went to weight of evidence not admissibility).

More specifically, “[a]s a general rule * * * we would reject expert opinion testimony regarding the truth or falsity of a witness’ allegations about a crime, for the expert’s status may lend an unwarranted ‘stamp of scientific legitimacy’ to the allegations.”

A reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent an “apparent error.”