Cited by

In a variation of this same argument, Diarra also contends that the district court abused its discretion because there was no present intent to inflict harm or to create fear of imminent harm, overruled by Thompson, d at 495.

in which this court reasoned that a physical assault occurring four years earlier was "in the past" and could not contribute to a finding of a "present intention to do harm or inflict fear of harm."

The court’s erroneous interpretation of “domestic abuse”

Chosa v. Tagliente , (“In order to establish domestic abuse, [the petitioner] must show present harm or an intention on the part of the [respondent] to do present harm.” (quotation omitted)); (“[W]e construe the definition of ‘domestic abuse’ under Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act to require either a showin g of present harm, or an intention on the part of [the respondent] to do present harm.”).

in support of his argument that reasonable grounds do not exist for the grant of an HRO because four years have passed since the last incident of harassment.

The statutory definition of domestic abuse “require[s] either a showing of present harm, or an intention on the part of [the abusing party] to do present harm.”

(concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant “inflicted physical harm” without addressing whether a present intent to harm was shown); (construing the statute to “require either a showing of present harm or an intention on the part of [the defendant] to do present harm”) (emphasis added); cf. Kass, d at 337 (stating that the record did not contain a “showing of [a] present intention to do harm or inflict fear of har

The phrase “infliction of fear” “implies that the legislature intended that there be some overt action to indicate that appellant intended to put respondent in fear of imminent physical harm.”

1 (2014) (defining criminal domestic assault as an act committed with intent to cause fear or an intent to inflict bodily harm), (defining domestic abuse for OFP purposes as requiring “either a showing of present harm, or an intention on the part of appellant to do present harm”).

The use of the phrase “infliction of fear” in subdivision 2(a)(2) “implies that the legislature intended that there be some overt action to indicate that appellant intended to put respondent in fear of imminent physical harm.” (emphasis omitted).

Thus, to obtain an OFP, a petitioner must show “present harm, or an intention on the part of [the responding party] to do present harm.”

Robert Hall maintains that present threats do not con *629 stitute domestic abuse because they are not “overt” acts, -06 (Minn.Ct.App.1986).

this court reversed the trial court’s determination that four-year-old allegations of physical abuse provided a sufficient basis for a protection order.