Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Marriage of Landwehr v. Landwehr, 380 N.W.2d 136.

37 citing documents.

In re the Marriage of: Stefanie R. Varga v. Michael E. Kangas Minn. Ct. App. 2026
mother’s Minnesota time such that the business-travel provision is not, as father claims, “unambiguously broad.” (stating that deciding whether an ambiguity exists “cannot be made by reading words in isolation”).
GGG, Incorporation v. Jon T. Samuelson Minn. Ct. App. 2020
For example, w e determine ambiguity “without resort to parol evidence.”
In re the Marriage of: Jane Swenson Amdal v. Keith Solomon Moheban Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“[A] dissolution provision is unambiguous if its meaning can be determined without any guide other than knowledge of the facts on which the language depends for meaning.” (quotation omitted).
In re the Marriage of: Christina L. Suhsen v. Karl W. Suhsen Minn. Ct. App. 2020
A requirement that a party provide security against nonpayment of the property settlement is “an inherent part of the property division.”
In re the Marriage of: Lakmini Yamuna Herath v. Susantha Herath Minn. Ct. App. 2019
A requirement that a party provide security against nonpayment of the property settlement is “an inherent part of the property division.” Landwehr v. Landwehr
In re the Marriage of: Matthew Durand Dornquast v. Dianne Yanovick Dornquast, n/k/a Diana Yanovick Dornquast Minn. Ct. App. 2018
A stipulated judgment and decree is ambiguous if “judged by its language alone and without resort to parol evidence, it is reasonably susceptib le of more than one meaning.” Landwehr v. Landwehr
In re the Marriage of: Sonja Vogen Baertsch v. Andrew Baertsch Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Deciding whether an ambiguity exists “cannot be made by reading words in isolation.” (citing Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 352, ).
In re the Marriage of: Mary Ann Fenlon v. Steven Robert Fenlon Minn. Ct. App. 2017
To determine whether a spousal-maintenance award actually is a disguised property settlement, the courts look to “the true nature of the award, not the method of identification chosen by the parties in drafting their agreement.” -40 (Minn. App. 1985).
In re the Marriage of: Amy Daiker Werger v. Brett Michael Werger Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In re the Marriage of: Amy Daiker Werger v. Brett Michael Werger Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Generally, a document is ambiguous if it “is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” (making a similar statement regarding a provision in a stipulated dissolution judgment).
Leon Asle Baxter v. Debra Kay Baxter Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Leon Asle Baxter v. Debra Kay Baxter Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“[A] dissolution provision is unambiguous if its meaning can be determined without any guide other than knowledge of the facts on which the language depends for meaning.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
In the Matter of the Petition of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation for a New Certificate of Title … Minn. Ct. App. 2015
In the Matter of the Petition of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation for a New Certificate of Title … Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(–40 (Minn. App. 1985)).
In re the Marriage of: David Lee Christensen v. Kathryn Florence Kladek Minn. Ct. App. 2015
In re the Marriage of: David Lee Christensen v. Kathryn Florence Kladek Minn. Ct. App. 2015
In re the Marriage of: Becki Anne Suleski, f/k/a Becki Anne Rupe v. Ryan Michael Rupe 855 N.W.2d 330 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
In re the Marriage of: Becki Anne Suleski, f/k/a Becki Anne Rupe v. Ryan Michael Rupe 855 N.W.2d 330 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Generally, a document is ambiguous if it “is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” d 136, 138 (Minn. App. 1985) (making a similar statement regarding a provision in a stipulated dissolution judgment and decree).
In re the Marriage of: Charles A. T. Gill v. Kathryn E. K. Gill Minn. Ct. App. 2014
In re the Marriage of: Charles A. T. Gill v. Kathryn E. K. Gill Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Language within a judgment and decree is ambiguous if it “is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning.”
Marriage of Tarlan v. Sorensen 702 N.W.2d 915 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Marriage of Tarlan v. Sorensen 702 N.W.2d 915 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Eid v. Hodson 542 N.W.2d 402 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
Eid v. Hodson 542 N.W.2d 402 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
“[T]he trial court may clarify the terms of the order if they are ambiguous.” (citing Landwehr v. Landwehr, *406 ), review denied (Minn. Dec.
Marriage of Anderson v. Archer 510 N.W.2d 1 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
Marriage of Anderson v. Archer 510 N.W.2d 1 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
(writing is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation when judged by its language alone).
Cadle v. Cadle 457 N.W.2d 736 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
Marriage of Erickson v. Erickson 435 N.W.2d 145 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
Marriage of Erickson v. Erickson 435 N.W.2d 145 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
(payment characterized as alimony was actually intended to be part of property settlement and must be construed according to its characteristics and intent).
Marriage of Merickel v. Merickel 414 N.W.2d 208 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Merickel v. Merickel 414 N.W.2d 208 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
for support, that appeal was from the trial court’s decision on a motion to reduce a maintenance award which the court found was ambiguous.
Marriage of Nelson v. Quade 413 N.W.2d 824 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Nelson v. Quade 413 N.W.2d 824 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Kiffer v. Kiffer 410 N.W.2d 454 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Kiffer v. Kiffer 410 N.W.2d 454 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Gunderson v. Gunderson 399 N.W.2d 570 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
Marriage of Gunderson v. Gunderson 399 N.W.2d 570 Minn. Ct. App. 1987