Cited by

See, (holding that 10 prosecutor’s statement that victim was “awakened to probably one of the most terrible sights that any mother can see .

See, (holding that prosecutor’s statement that the witness was “awakened to probably one of the most terrible sights that any mother can see .

Id.; Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-90

Santos is correct that it is improper for the state to “invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim.” ().

“Valid consent for police entry of a dwelling may be given by a third party possessing common authority over the premises.” (citation omitted).

Metcalfe contends that these statements constitute plain error by improperly inviting the jurors to put themselves in E.W.’s shoes, relying on the supreme court’s statement that “arguments that invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim are considered improper.” ().

Generally, “arguments that invite the [fact-finder] to put themselves in the shoes of the victim are considered improper.” (quotation omitted).

However, “[c]onsent to entry is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”

–43 (Minn. 1998); –800 (Minn. 2000); – 28 (Minn. 2005); –64 (Minn. 2009); Peltier, d at 803–05.

(“Where common authority does not actually exist, consent to entry is still valid where, under an objective standard, an officer reasonably believes the third party has authority over the premises and could give consent to en ter.”) “The issue [of actual authority] also has relevance to the is

See, e.g., State v. Thompson , (holding that the prosecutor’s statement that the victim was “awakened to probably one of the most terrible sights that any mother can see .

The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted and applied this standard, stating, “Where common authority does not actually exist, consent to entry is still valid where, under an objective standard, an officer reasonably believes the third party has authority over the premises and could give consent to enter.”

d 734, 740 (Minn. 1998).

1997) (stating that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to characterize the defendant as “deliberately attempting to ‘mislead’ the jury”); (stating that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to “make statements urging the jury to protect society or to send a message with its verdict”), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000) ; State v. Thompson , d 734, 742 (Minn. 1998) (stating that arguments inviting the jur ors to put themselves in the victim’s shoes are generally improper); (stating that it is miscondu

See, (“[A] lawyer may not speculate without a factual basis.” ()); -20 (Minn. 1980) (“Counsel have the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (citing Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 258 Minn. 405 , 104

-41 (Minn. 1998) (giving no deference to district court when considering if apparent authority to consent to search existed).

at 586, 100 S. Ct. at 1380

Third-party consent is valid “where, under an objective standard, an officer reasonably believes the third party has authority over the premises and could give consent to enter.” (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2801 (1990)).

A warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area, such as one’s home, is “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980)

See, (holding that prosecution’s statements speculating about the crime and the state of mind of the victims were improper).

A warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area, such as one’s home, is “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980)

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2001); d 734, 740 (Minn. 1998).

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001)

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (2001)

(concluding that remarks that contained pure speculation without factual basis were improper).

–41 (Minn. 1998) (holding, without deference to the district court, that police obtained consent to search from someone with apparent authority).