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“[A] party seeking review has a duty to see that the appellate court is presented with a record which is sufficient to show the alleged errors and all matters necessary to consider the questions presented.” State v. Carlson, 281 Minn. 564, 566, State v. Taylor , n. 12 (Minn. 2002) (“On appeal, the appellant is responsible for providing th e court with an adequate record ”).

Possibilities of innocence do not require reversal if “the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted).

“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” State v. Taylor

at 724 ; (agreeing that a prima facie case “was made” when the district court “cit[ed] juror 25’s race (biraeial with one African American parent and one Caucasian parent) and the fact that she was the first minority juror questioned”).

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor

(“To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.”); (“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.”); (rev

Possibilities of 11 innocence do not require a directed verdict of acquittal as long as “the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

Engen has the burden to “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

See, (“[Eight] blows shows that the act was intentional, and the use of a heavy object on the victim’s head shows that the assailant intended to kill.” (citation omitted)); (“The nature of [the victim’s]

Because we presume that the jury followed the district court’s instructions, the prosecutor’s references to a “certified demand letter” did not have a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, see Ramey, d at 302.

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.”

(quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362); (emphasizing that disparate impact is “simply one” relevant consideration and is “not determinative” of pretext).

205 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that district court properly ruled that recording of 911 call qualified as, among other things, excited utterance, where defendant argued with and struck declarant); Edwards, d at 912, 914 (concluding that district court abused its discretion by ruling that declarant’s s

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence 10 taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted).

State v. Taylor (Taylor I)

verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

“Appellate courts give considerable deference to the district court’s 6 finding on the issue of the prosecutor’s intent because the court’s finding typically turns largely on credibility.” (“We afford great deference because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the [district] court may consider.”) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Taylor, 13 (stating that appellate courts “presume the jury followed the [district] court’s instructions”).