Cited by

Co., (declining to admit new evidence on appeal “because the letter is offered for the purpose of reversing the district court”).

Co., (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by treating a “motion in limine” that “functioned as a motion for summary judgment” as a motion for summary judgment).

Mecc Alte relies on this court’s to support its argument.

Co, we held that a district court has the authority to grant summary judgment sua sponte when (1) “no genuine issues of material fact remain,” (2) “one of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law, ” and (3) “the absence of a formal motion creates no prejudice to the party against whom summary judgment is granted .”

Co., (concluding that the district court erred in its sua sponte grant of summary judgment because “no evidence in the record .

Co. , -20 (Minn. App. 2003).

Co., -19 (Minn. App. 2003).

Co., d 414, 418-20 (Minn. App. 2003).

Co., for the proposition that “[p]rejudice is unavoidable when a trial court denies any opportunity to marshal evidence in opposition to a basis for summary judgment raised sua sponte.” (quotation omitted).

Co., –19 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that a motion in limine may be treated as a motion for summary judgment if it results in the dismissal or barring of a claim).

Co., see Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 281, (affirming a district court’s grant of summary judgment sua sponte).

Co., (“A party opposing a district court’s sua sponte order for summary judgment must be given a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to acquire evidence to oppose the motion.”).

Co., (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1977)).