Cited by

known to the court”) ; n.2 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]o properly preserve a claim that evidence should be excluded under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, a defendant must timely object and state the specific ground of objection.” (emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted)); (concluding that the appellant “did not properly preserve the claimed errors for review by making an offer of proof”).

A party preserves an evidentiary challenge for review by means of “an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded so that courts on appeal [can] determine if it was error to exclude the evidence and whether the error, if any, was prejudicial.”

See State v. Lee , (determining that a defendant did not preserve the claimed errors for review when he failed to make an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded).

See State v. Lee , (determining that the defendant did not preserve the claimed errors for review when he failed to ma ke an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded).

(conc luding that record did not show that the district court’s exclusion of defense evidence was prejudicial because it did not “establish that the defense had such evidence”).

Minnesota appellate courts have declined to review error in the exclusion of evidence when an appellant has made an insufficient “offer of proof.” See, -49 (Minn. 2006) (discussing appellant’s failure to make offer of proof regarding excluded evidence and that the evidence was not apparent from context); (stating errors raised on appeal were not properly preserved by offer of proof).

(citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867, 102 S. Ct. at 3446), rev’d on other grounds , .

See, e.g., State v. Lee , , 481 (Minn. 1992).

See State v. Lee , (“[D]efendant did not properly preserve the claimed errors for review by making an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded so that courts on appeal could determine if it was error to exclude the evidence and whether the error, if any, was prejudicial.”).

See, (affirming a durational departure based, in part, on the factor of violation of a position of trust where the defendant community leader sexually assaulted two women); (affirming a durational departure based, in part, on the factor of violation

103(a)(2); (“[Defendant did not properly preserve the claimed errors for review by making an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded so that courts on appeal could determine if it was error to exclude the evidence and whether the error, if any, was prejudicial.”).

(stating that claimed errors were not properly preserved for review by means of an offer of proof “showing the nature of the evidence excluded so that courts on appeal could determine if it was error to exclude the evidence and whether the error, if any, was prejudicial”).

*41 Respondent argues, however, in which the supreme court affirmed the district court’s use of the defendant’s position of power' as an aggravating factor when a Hmong community leader, who was also a teacher at a vocational school, raped two women in the Hmong community.

See Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th Cir.1991) (holding district court properly allowed epidemiologist to testify as expert on Hmong culture in civil action related to rapes of Hmong victims); (stating in dictum that university professor’s testimony on Hmong culture was helpful to jury in rape trial involving Hmong victims).

-81 (Minn.1992) (not reversible error to present facts of another Hmong rape case to counteract arguably misleading defense testimony about Hmong attitudes towards rape allegations).