Cited by

See State v. Gates , overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime”); (stating, “ [t]o impose liability for aiding and abetting, the state must show that the defendant played a knowing role in the commission of the crime” (quotation omitted)) , overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

“For a statement to be admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, there must have been a startling event or condition, the statement must relate to the event or condition, and the statement must be made under the stress caused by the event or condition.” overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 1245 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

Liability for the crimes of another, or aiding and abetting, requires the state to show, in addition to the elements of the underlying offense, that a defendant played a “knowing role in the commission of the crime.” overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct.

But “active participation in the overt act that constitutes the substantive offense is not required, and a defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense is committed are relevant circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent.” over ruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct.

The state requested the addition of language similar to that found in State v. Gates, which states: “[A]ctive participation in the overt act that constitutes the substantive offense is not required, and a defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense is committed are relevant circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent.” (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct.

overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct.

Because the prosecutor argued an accomplice liability theory, it was necessary for the district court to inform the jury that the state was required to prove that appellant “played a knowing role in the commission of the crime.”

For purposes of imposing accomplice liability, “we distinguish between playing ‘a knowing role in the crime’ and having ‘[a] mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence.’ ” Palubicki, d at 487 (alteration in original) ().

(explaining that “[t]o impose liability for aiding and abetting, the state must show that the defendant played a knowing role in the commission of the crime” (emphasis added)).

When imposing liability for aiding and abetting, we distinguish between playing “a knowing role in the crime” and having “[a] mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence.”

(stating that evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would yield a different result).

To succeed on a claim of liability for aiding and abetting, the state must prove that appellant “played a knowing role in the commission of the crime.”

See, (holding that where defendant’s theory is contradicted by physical and testimonial evidence, circumstantial evidence that leads directly to guilt is sufficient to convict).

This court will uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence “if the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt.”