Cited by

The district court, “in 7 its discretion, determines whether the declarant was under the aura of excitement, and we review the determination for an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted); (deferring to the district court’s determination that the declarant was under a sufficient aura of excitement).

“It is for the [district] court, in the exercise of its discretion in making evidentiary rulings, to determine whether the declarant was sufficiently under the aura of excitement.” (quotation omitted); (deferring to the district court’s determination that the declarant was under a sufficient aura of excitement).

See Daniels, d at 783-84 (affirming the admission of statements made “within an hour” of a fire); d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985) (affirming the admission of a statement made “just 90 minutes after the murder”).

d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985) (deferring to the district court’s determination that the declarant was 9 under a sufficient aura of excitement); –84 (Minn. 1986) (same).

The evidence shows that J.R. told Officer Bannert about Rosas’s threat approximately five minutes after she called 911 and that her speech was “rapid.” (affirming admission of witness’s statement to witness 90 minutes after murder); (affirming admission of witness’s statements about conversation with defendant less than hour after incident); n.1 (Minn. 1

The “[l]apse of time between the startling event and the excited utterance is not always determinative.” Daniels, d at 783; see, (affirming that a statement made 90 minutes after a murder was admissible).

d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985) (holding that statements made 90 minutes after murder can still qualify as excited utterance).

(concluding that a witness statement made 90 minutes after a startling event was an excited utterance based on evidence that the declarant remained “unnerved”).

See State v. Berrisford , (affirming the admission of a statement made “just 90 minutes after the murder”); -84 (Minn. 1986) (affirming the admission of statements made “within an hour” of a fire).

See, e.g., Daniels, d at 782-84 (concluding that a statement made as long as an hour after the startling event may be considered an excited utterance); d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that a statement made 90 minutes after a murder may be considered an excited utterance).

(affirming the admission of a statement made “just 90 minutes after the murder”); Daniels, d at 783-4 (Minn. 1986) (affirming the admission of statements made “within an hour” of a fire).

(citation omitted); (admitting a statement as an excited utterance where there was testimony that the declarant was “very upset,” “extremely agitated,” and “very afraid”); (admitting statements as excited utterances where there was testimony that the declarant was “very upset,” “scared,” and “shaky”).

See State v. *277 Bauer, (victim’s statement to her brother was an excited utterance because she was “very upset,” “extremely agitated,” and “very afraid”); (declarant’s statement 90 minutes after a murder was an excited utterance because he was “scared,” “shaky,” and “very upset”).

Cf. Bauer, d at 367 (holding that statements about a startling event were admissible where there was testimony that the declarant was “very upset,” “extremely agitated,” and “very afraid”); (holding that statements made 90 minutes after startling event were excited utterances where there was testimony that de-clarant was “very upset,” “scared,” and “shaky”).

For example, has recently ruled a statement made 90 minutes after a murder was admissible under this hearsay rule exception.

we stated that when a conspiracy to conceal is at issue, statements creating the alibi are in furtherance of the conspiracy.

and, therefore except those facts relevant to the disposition of the issues here raised, will not be restated.