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And the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that this inquiry 6 should be “guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” (acknowledging that it is a “long established principle of American criminal jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level offenses mens rea is required”).

(requiring clear legislative intent for the court to determine an offense imposes strict criminal liability).

felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” C.R.M., d at 809 (); see, (reading knowledge requirement into possession of controlled-substance statute).

In doing so, we are “ guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or fe lony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.”

intent to do the act which results in the departure from custody.” see also State v. Knox, 311 Minn. 314, 322, 3 (stating that “[u]nder [section] 609.485, the acts must be intentional and voluntary in order for the departure to constitute an escape”); (stating that “legislature does not intend an unreasonable result” and “if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear”

6 In adopting this rule, we have been guided by the principle that “if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” d at 809 ().

Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent disfavoring offenses that do not require mens rea, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it is “guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.”

In C.R.M., the supreme court specifically stated that it was “ ‘guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.’ ” C.R.M., d at 809 (emphasis added) ().

1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), and legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear

Where we have found a statute ambiguous, we have said, “if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.”

To impose criminal liability for conduct unaccompanied by fault, however, “the legislative intent to do so should be clear.”

295 , 62 L.Ed.2d 307 (1979), ).

(declining' to find violation where vendor unintentionally served alcohol to minor, noting “if criminal liability * ⅜ * is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear”); Strand , 245 Minn, at 422-23, d at 616 (rejecting argument that a sale

(legislature has exclusive power to define what acts constitute a crime); (legislature has power to create strict liability offenses as long as this intent is clear in statute).

(statutes should not be construed to lead to absurd results).

Generally, civil penalties may not be imposed for unintentional conduct unless “the legislative intent to do so [is] clear.” (reading intent requirement into criminal statute); see also Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn. 225 , 236-37 n. 11, , 704-05 n. 11 (1967) (“[H]arm without intent is ordinarily justiciable only in civil litigation where all that is sought is injunctive relief.

the supreme court declined to eliminate the “carding defense” to the liquor sales statute.