Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230.

154 citing documents.

Richard Joseph Terfehr v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed District, Wilkin ... Minn. Ct. App. 2026
Richard Joseph Terfehr v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed District, Wilkin ... Minn. Ct. App. 2026
Arianna Anderson, et al., Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
8 The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of official immunity is to ensure “that the threat of potential personal liability does not unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officials in the discharge of their duties.” n.1 (Minn. 1988).5 This statement is particularly apt because the Residents seek a court order compelling Minneapolis to allocate its inspection resources differently.
Minor Doe 601, a minor, by and through his mother and natural guardian, Mother Doe 601, Appellants, vs. … Minn. 2025
Minor Doe 601, a minor, by and through his mother and natural guardian, Mother Doe 601, Appellants, vs. … Minn. 2025
William Jepsen, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Eric Parker Dean, Minn. 2021
Discretionary function immunity is “designed to assure that the courts do not pass judgment on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government.”
Stacey Marable, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Dorene Larson, as Trustee for the heirs of Megan Marie Lehner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Wade Sotona and Kristine Sotona, as co-trustees for the next-of-kin of Brody Sotona, decedent, Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Operatio nal-level conduct “involve[s] decisions relating to the ordinary day-to-day operations of the government.”
Magnolia 8 Properties, LLC v. City of Maple Plain 893 N.W.2d 658 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Magnolia 8 Properties, LLC v. City of Maple Plain 893 N.W.2d 658 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Reg’l Rail Auth., -48 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that statutory immunity did not apply because the failure “to block off the loading dock or to warn, of its presence” involved “professional judgments regarding where and how to implement the policy of restricting access” to property, which were operational decisions); 234 (Minn. 1988) (distinguishing between an operational decision to post a traffic sign at a particular location, which involved professional judgment, from a policy decision directin
Go Green Energy, LLC, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
See, e.g., Holmquist v. State , (“The adoption of standards or regulations is considered a protected planning level activity because it almost inevitably requires the balancing of policy considerations.”) Rather, Go Green argues that (1) it is challenging not the adoption, but the operation of the ordinance; and (2) statutory
Barbara Kuntz v. Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Barbara Kuntz v. Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Wallace Armstrong v. Hasbargen Logging, Inc., State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Wallace Armstrong v. Hasbargen Logging, Inc., State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
involving questions of public policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy.” (“[The county’s] decision to place signs only along county roads and recognized right-of-ways involved more than merely a professional or scientific judgment; it involved the type of political, social and economic consideratio
JW Ex Rel. BRW v. 287 INTER. DIST. 761 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
J.W. ex rel. B.R.W. v. 287 Intermediate District 761 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
JW Ex Rel. BRW v. 287 INTER. DIST. 761 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
J.W. ex rel. B.R.W. v. 287 Intermediate District 761 N.W.2d 896 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Schroeder v. St. Louis County 708 N.W.2d 497 Minn. 2006
Schroeder v. St. Louis County 708 N.W.2d 497 Minn. 2006
Unzen v. City of Duluth 683 N.W.2d 875 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Unzen v. City of Duluth 683 N.W.2d 875 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 678 N.W.2d 651 Minn. 2004
Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Independent School District 11 678 N.W.2d 651 Minn. 2004
In dicta, however, this court has noted, “[N]ot infrequently a governmental entity is required to compensate for the harm done by a public official even though the official is not held personally liable.” , 233 n. 1 (Minn.1988) (citation omitted).
Minder v. Anoka County 677 N.W.2d 479 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church 679 N.W.2d 350 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church 679 N.W.2d 350 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
(addressing waiver of governmental immunity provided for in the State Tort Claims Act); Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Delta Dev., Inc., -84 (Minn.1979) (examining whether sovereign immunity was waived by the governing body of an Indian reservation by virtue of a “sue and be sue
Minder v. Anoka County 677 N.W.2d 479 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Podruch v. State, Department of Public Safety 674 N.W.2d 252 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Podruch v. State, Department of Public Safety 674 N.W.2d 252 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
Official immunity primarily is “intended to insure that the threat of potential personal liability does not unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officers in the discharge of their duties.” , 233 n. 1 (Minn.1988).
Zaske Ex Rel. Bratsch v. Lee 651 N.W.2d 527 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Zaske Ex Rel. Bratsch v. Lee 651 N.W.2d 527 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Fear v. Independent School District 911 634 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Fear v. Independent School District 911 634 N.W.2d 204 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea 623 N.W.2d 272 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea 623 N.W.2d 272 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
Conlin v. City of Saint Paul 605 N.W.2d 396 Minn. 2000
Conlin v. City of Saint Paul 605 N.W.2d 396 Minn. 2000
Operational level decisions, on the other hand, involve decisions relating to the ordinary day-to-day operations of the government.”
Fisher v. County of Rock 596 N.W.2d 646 Minn. 1999
Fisher v. County of Rock 596 N.W.2d 646 Minn. 1999
Planning level decisions involve questions of public policy — “the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy.”
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 592 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
S.W. v. Spring Lake Park School District No. 16 592 N.W.2d 870 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Kranz, d at 51 ( , 233 n. 1 (Minn.1988)).
Doe v. Park Center High School 592 N.W.2d 131 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Doe v. Park Center High School 592 N.W.2d 131 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Such a determination requires a narrow interpretation of the discretionary function exception, which focuses on the purpose for the exception.
Bloss v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents 590 N.W.2d 661 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
Bloss v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents 590 N.W.2d 661 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
The statutory immunity exception is narrowly construed and aimed at preventing courts from passing judgment on “policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government.”
Christensen v. Mower County 587 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Christensen v. Mower County 587 N.W.2d 305 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
(choosing whether to warn public of hazards is not inherently discretionary or operational); (placing signs may or may not be discretionary).