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But we have also recognized that “[t]he felony murder rule encompasses a kil ling by one trying to escape or conceal a felony as long as there was no break in the chain of events between the felony and the killing.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See State v. Russell , (“In making its factual determination, the [fa ct-finder] was entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.”) (quotation omitted).

“In making its factual determination, the [fact-finder] [is] entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evid ence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.” (quotation omitted).

(“In making its factual determination, the [fact -finder] was entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.”).

(recognizing that “[m]ere presence at the scene of a crime does not, by itself, prove liability for the crime of another because ‘inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence do not rise to the level’ of criminal culpability” ()); see also Milton, d at 808 (requiring, for criminal liability as an accomplice, the state to prove the defendant intended her presence or actions to further the commission of the *664 crime).

(“The state meets its burden .

do not rise to the level of conduct” prohibited by law and that the state bears the burden of showing “some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its completion.” (quotation omitted).

“Even if the underlying felony is complete before the homicide occurs, felony murder may still be applicable.”

(“In making its factual determination, the [fact-finder] was entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.” (quotation omitted)).

(“Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense are circumstances from which a person’s criminal intent may be inferred.” ()).

(citations and quotations omitted); (“Even if the underlying felony is complete before the homicide occurs, felony murder may still be applicable.”).

“Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense are circumstances from which a person’s criminal intent may be inferred.”

(“In making its factual determination, the jury was entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.” (quotation omitted)); (stating that jurors “rely[] on their sensory pe

(stating that eliminating the possibility of retaliation may be a reason for killing a victim in furtherance of a robbery); (listing the identification of the assailants and facilitation of escape as two reasons why a killing might be in furtheran

(“The state meets its burden” to prove aiding and abetting “by showing ‘some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant ....’” ()).

“Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense are circumstances from which a person’s criminal intent may be inferred.”

ing while committing criminal sexual conduct, “the state must prove that ‘the “fatal wound” was inflicted during the same “chain of events” [in which the underlying felony took place] so that the requisite time, distance, and causal relationship between the felony and killing are established.’ ” (alterations in original) ().

ly recast the words of the statute, omitting the phrase “by the person.” See, (after quoting the accomplice liability statute, summarizing the elements of proof under the statute, including the requirement that the state must show that “the murder was reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of the intended crime”); (stating “[a]mple evidence also exists to demonstrate that [the victim’s] death was committed in furtherance of the aggravated robbery and that the murder was a reasonably fo

In order to prove that McBride inflicted the fatal blows on Dillon while committing criminal sexual conduct, the state must prove that “the ‘fatal wound’ was inflicted during the same ‘chain of events’ [in which the underlying felpny took place] so that the requisite time, distance, and causal relationship between the felony and killing are established.” (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.5(f) at 223 *366 n. 88 (1986)).

.1998); -16, 20 (Minn.1996) (affirming conviction when appellant shot and killed driver of car appellant was robbing); -45 (Minn.1995); (affirming conviction when appellant and others set out to rob gas station and shot and killed two people during the robbery); -14 (Minn.1993); -26 (Minn.1990) (affirming conviction when killing occurred after appellant committed a burglary).

Furthermore, none of the testimony placed Neal at the scene of the crime or in such a position that he could have played " 'some knowing role in the commission of the crime.’ " Flournoy, d at 359 ().

or attempting to commit * * * aggravated robbery.” To establish the necessary nexus between the killing and the underlying felony, the state must prove that “the ‘fatal wound’ was inflicted during the same ‘chain of events’ [in which the underlying felony took place] so that the requisite time, distance, and causal relation^ ship between the felony and killing are established.” (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.5(f) at 223 n. 88 (1986)).

“[T]he felony murder rule is [applicable] if the felony and the killing * * * are parts of one continuous transaction.” (citations and internal quotes omitted).