Cited by

After briefing, the supreme court struck the case from its oral argument calendar and “remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Machholz,” superseded by statute, 1998 Minn. 12 Laws ch. 367, art. 2, § 23, at 696.

4 421 (Minn. 1998) (hol ding that Minnesota’s felony harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad)

In Dunham, we emphasized that, sub division 5(3) involves consideration of the objective reasonableness of both a respondent’s conduct and a petitioner’s belief.

8 protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.”

State v. Machholz , , 419 (Minn. 1998).

argues that the stalking and harassment statutes prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech, relying primarily on Hensel and State v. Machholz

When “evaluating challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, this court recognizes that the interpretation of statutes is a question of law.” (quotation and citation omitted).

But the notion of speech-delivery conduct with an “inextricable link” to a

(citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 (1987)).

See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987); see also State v. Washington-Davis, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2016 WL 3541745, at *4-7 (Minn. June 29, 2016).

(noting that a defendant can facially challenge a criminal statute even though the defendant’s speech is unprotected by the First Amendment).

11 “A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.”

I. “A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.”

An ordinance is overbroad on its face “if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.”

-21 (Minn.1998), the supreme court struck down the previous subdivision 2(7) of section 609.749, a catch-all provision which provided that it was unlawful to "engage[ ] in any other harassing conduct that interferes with another person or intrudes on the person's privacy or liberty."

his argument that harassment restraining orders may only limit unprotected speech, such as “fighting words” or “true threats.” And he argues that we should follow State v. Machholz where the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the criminal harassment statute then in effect was unconstitutionally' overbroad because the category of speech it proscribed could not be confined to “fighting words.” -21 (Minn.1998).

-18 (Minn.1998), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the criminal harassment statute, as applied to the defendant, was unconstitutional.

“Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, and [a court’s] power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.”

“A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.”

''[T]he overbreadth doctrine departs from traditional rules of standing to permit, in the First Amendment area, a challenge to a statute both on its face and as applied to the defendant.” (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 , 93 S.Ct.

Minnesota statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a court’s power to declare a statute unconstitutional “should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” ().

at 2916 ); (discussing how the potential “chilling, effect” of a facially overbroad statute on constitutionally protected speech justifies recognizing standing to make a facial constitutional challenge, even if the litigant’s own activities are not constitutionally protected).